Original Articles

Mansoor Ijaz saga: An example of media mismanagement by PPP

Related post: A critical analysis of Husain Haqqani vs Mansoor Ijaz saga

Mullen throws Husain Haqqani under the bus

The Mansoor Ijaz saga has been clearly mismanaged by certain leaders and office-bearers of the Pakistan People Party. Perhaps the whole affair in the aftermath of Ijaz’s Financial Times article could have been managed in a more sensible manner by refraining from those acrimonious articles which were written to attack and discredit Ijaz.

Needless to say, there is merit in Mansoor Ijaz’s opinion that it is Pakistan army, not civilian government, which has consistently supported and maintained contacts with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Therefore, military generals, not Pakistani civilians must be held responsible for supporting and spreading Jihadist terrorism. While we are not privy to why Mr. Ijaz felt the need to refer to the much contested memorandum in his Financial Times article, it was, however, ill-advised of those writers who deemed it fit to attack Mr. Ijaz in a series of articles and posts without considering adverse implications of such a strategy. We hope that such writers will reflect on their approach and , in future, carefully guard their integrity, reputation and independence. We are providing below a copy of Mansoor Ijaz’s original article and  conversations which do not shed great light on his critics both from right-wing and urban liberal class.

Time to take on Pakistan’s jihadist spies

By Mansoor Ijaz

Source: Financial Times

Early on May 9, a week after US Special Forces stormed the hideout of Osama bin Laden and killed him, a senior Pakistani diplomat telephoned me with an urgent request. Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s president, needed to communicate a message to White House national security officials that would bypass Pakistan’s military and intelligence channels. The embarrassment of bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil had humiliated Mr Zardari’s weak civilian government to such an extent that the president feared a military takeover was imminent. He needed an American fist on his army chief’s desk to end any misguided notions of a coup – and fast.

Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, and his troops were demoralised by the embarrassing ease with which US special forces had violated Pakistani sovereignty. Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s feared spy service, was charged by virtually the entire international community with complicity in hiding bin Laden for almost six years. Both camps were looking for a scapegoat; Mr Zardari was their most convenient target.

The diplomat made clear that the civilian government’s preferred channel to receive Mr Zardari’s message was Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. He was a time-tested friend of Pakistan and could convey the necessary message with force not only to President Barack Obama, but also to Gen Kayani.

In a flurry of phone calls and emails over two days a memorandum was crafted that included a critical offer from the Pakistani president to the Obama administration: “The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.”

The memo was delivered to Admiral Mullen at 14.00 hours on May 10. A meeting between him and Pakistani national security officials took place the next day at the White House. Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs, it seems, neither heeded the warning, nor acted on the admiral’s advice.

On September 22, in his farewell testimony to the Senate armed services committee, Admiral Mullen said he had “credible intelligence” that a bombing on September 11 that wounded 77 US and Nato troops and an attack on the US embassy in Kabul on September 13 were done “with ISI support.”Essentially he was indicting Pakistan’s intelligence services for carrying out a covert war against the US – perhaps in retaliation for the raid on bin Laden’s compound, perhaps out of strategic national interest to put Taliban forces back in power in Afghanistan so that Pakistan would once again have the “strategic depth” its paranoid security policies against India always envisioned.

Questions about the ISI’s role in Pakistan have intensified in recent months. The finger of responsibility in many otherwise inexplicable attacks has often pointed to a shadowy outfit of ISI dubbed “S-Wing”, which is said to be dedicated to promoting the dubious agenda of a narrow group of nationalists who believe only they can protect Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

The time has come for the state department to declare the S-Wing a sponsor of terrorism under the designation of “foreign governmental organisations”. Plans by the Obama administration to blacklist the Haqqani network are toothless and will have no material impact on the group’s military support and intelligence logistics; it is S-Wing that allegedly provides all of this in the first place. It no longer matters whether ISI is wilfully blind, complicit or incompetent in the attacks its S-Wing is carrying out. S-Wing must be stopped.

ISI embodies the scourge of radicalism that has become a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The time has come for America to take the lead in shutting down the political and financial support that sustains an organ of the Pakistani state that undermines global antiterrorism efforts at every turn. Measures such as stopping aid to Pakistan, as a bill now moving through Congress aims to do, are not the solution. More precise policies are needed to remove the cancer that ISI and its rogue wings have become on the Pakistani state.

Pakistanis are not America’s enemies. Neither is their incompetent and toothless civilian government – the one Admiral Mullen was asked to help that May morning. The enemy is a state organ that breeds hatred among Pakistan’s Islamist masses and then uses their thirst for jihad against Pakistan’s neighbours and allies to sate its hunger for power. Taking steps to reduce its influence over Pakistan’s state affairs is a critical measure of the world’s willingness to stop the terror masters at their very roots.

The writer is an American of Pakistani ancestry. In 1997 he negotiated Sudan’s offer of counter-terrorism assistance to the Clinton administration

A dangerous path for Pakistan, says Mansoor Ijaz

Source: The News, October 31, 2011

ZURICH: Mansoor Ijaz, the US business tycoon who has become the centre of a huge controversy over the reported memorandum sent through him by President Zardari to Admiral Mike Mullen, on Sunday night issued a rejoinder from Zurich, responding to the statements issued by presidential spokesman Farhatullah Babar, the Foreign Office and Ambassador Husain Haqqani on the issue.

His statement came hours after PTI leader Imran Khan told the huge Lahore rally that Ambassador Haqqani had sent the memo to Admiral Mike Mullen requesting the US army to help against Pakistan Army.

After Imran Khan’s allegations in his speech, Ambassador Haqqani had challenged the PTI leader on Sunday night to produce any evidence, if he had one, in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Mansoor Ijaz in his statement said: “On October 10, 2011, I published an opinion piece in London’s Financial Times in which I wrote that I had acted as a private channel to communicate sensitive information to Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The information, sent in the form of a Confidential Memorandum, was dictated to me and approved for transmission in its final form by a senior Pakistani government official with close ties to President Asif Ali Zardari. Since the publication of my opinion piece, much has been written about the Memorandum delivered to Admiral Mullen and much speculation has surrounded its content and the identity of the Pakistani official who asked me to intervene in getting it conveyed outside the knowledge of the Foreign Office and military/intelligence channels.

“Recent statements issued by the Foreign Office and the Presidency have attacked me personally for writing the FT opinion piece, have denied the existence of any such Memorandum as “fabrication” and have denied the president’s involvement in the development or approval of the contents of the Memorandum. This is a dangerous path for President Zardari and his staff to follow because the truth is incongruent with the statements his office is issuing to the Pakistani public. I have the facts — all the facts. Every word I say or write is backed with hard evidence and proof. Challenging me on that would be a grave mistake.

“To this date, I have refrained from publicly confirming, denying or engaging in any of the rife speculation surrounding who did what when in the issuance of the Memorandum or what it specifically contained as important offers to the United States government at a moment of great strain in the bilateral relationship after Osama bin Laden had been found and killed on Pakistani soil. I wish to continue to do so because I have no role in Pakistan’s political affairs.

“But I respectfully remind the Foreign Office, the president’s spokesperson Farhatullah Babar and the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, that the facts I have are irrefutable. The evidence is crystal clear. And while I do not wish to be dragged into the cesspool of Pakistan’s politics, the government should take great care in its public statements on the subject of the Memorandum or my role in bringing it to US government officials they themselves asked me to see it got to.

“As a 27-year veteran of Wall Street, I can do no better than to quote the big-screen character of Gordon Gekko. He said: “if you stop telling lies about me, I might just stop telling the truth about you”. It is time that Pakistan’s leaders stopped telling lies and got back to the business of governing for the betterment of their people rather than wasting time, energy and much-needed resources in the useless bickering and backbiting that defines today’s debate over the nation’s affairs.”

 

Text of Mansoor Ijaz rejoinder

FACTS ARE STUBBORN THINGS, says Mansoor IJAZ

NEW YORK – “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.” — John Adams, ‘Argument in Defense of the Soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials’, December 1770.

On November 10, 2011, Foreign Policy, a US news journal focused on foreign affairs reporting in Washington DC, published an article in which the author elicited certain statements from Admiral Mike Mullen’s spokesman, Captain John Kirby, denying that the Admiral had received a memorandum specifically from me containing certain information and making certain offers from the civilian government of Pakistan to the United States on May 10th, nine days after Osama bin Laden had been killed in a raid on the Abbottabad compound he was hiding in for nearly six years.

The background behind why this denial was solicited from Admiral Mullen, and issued, is important to understand. One month after I published an opinion piece in the Financial Times in which I wrote that I had been asked by a senior Pakistani diplomat to act as a private channel in getting the memorandum into the admiral’s hands — not that I delivered the memorandum myself, but that I made sure it got to him through the right channel in Washington — there is growing desperation within the government of President Asif Ali Zardari to cover its tracks in what a certain Pakistani official did, apparently with the president’s consent or perhaps just in his name, outside the knowledge of the country’s military leaders, intelligence department and even its Foreign Office. This cabal within Pakistan’s civilian government will stop at nothing to prevent me from telling the truth by attempting to discredit me — a miscalculation of epic proportions.

As I stated in my previous Press Release, I have the facts — ALL THE FACTS. And so today, without compromising names or the highly sensitive content of the memorandum, I am providing a sampling of the truth in my possession to set the record straight. My purpose is to give sufficient evidence to insure:
that there can be no doubt a request was made of me by a senior Pakistan government official, not that I asked to be involved in this matter. Neither did I offer to do anything until I asked senior current and former US officials whether there was receptivity to what the Pakistani official had authorized me to discuss with them.
that there can be no doubt a memorandum was drafted and transmitted to Admiral Mullen with the approval of the highest political level in Pakistan, and that the admiral received it with certainty from a source whom he trusted and who also trusted me. It was a source the admiral would not, and according to e-mail traffic in my possession, did not ignore.
that there can be no doubt proof exists of the admiral acknowledging receipt of the memorandum. Whether he chose to do anything with the memorandum or not, I cannot know and do not care — my responsibility was to see that the memo got into his hands safely. The visible actions of both governments in the aftermath of that memorandum being delivered demonstrate that if it was not a source of content for those actions, the actions taken by both the US and Pakistan even as recently as the past few weeks track closely with the offers made by Pakistan on May 10th.
that the public should know a persistent effort has been made by an array of Pakistanis, particularly by the diplomat who fears his name will be divulged, in the weeks following publication of my opinion piece to persuade, pressure, intimidate and even threaten me to not make further disclosures about the events of May 9th and 10th. The solicitation of a denial from Admiral Mullen was their last gasp hope in trying to shut me up. Obviously it did not work.
The data set forth below is divided into three categories. The first deals with dates on which the intervention was requested from me and some of the key communications at points during those three days to give an overview of how the intervention took shape. The second deals with communications I had with the Pakistani official in an effort to stop further disclosures that would compromise the Zardari government. And the third deals with Admiral Mullen’s press statement of November 10 disavowing any knowledge of the memorandum or the circumstances in which he got it.

I have withheld, pending an official investigation by certain organs of Pakistan’s government, names, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of those involved — this data will only be provided to the official bodies who request them from me and who demonstrate their independence and concern for learning the truth from these facts. The memorandum will remain out of public view unless the official bodies of Pakistan’s government deem it appropriate to release it.

THE MEMORANDUM

From about midday on May 9th until the afternoon of May 12th, I set forth below a sampling of BBM messages and times and dates as well as durations of calls with content to give an overview of the timeline in skeleton form. Much more data exists than has been shown here. The data set is complete. It can withstand any forensic examination required and can be verified if and when the need arises to give official bodies an accounting of what happened on those days. At the outset, the first BBM message sent as set forth below was unsolicited and sent by the Pakistani official to me on Monday, May 9, 2011 at 12:31pm. The timeline develops from this first instance of contact with the Pakistani official — prior to this unsolicited message, we had not had any material communications for several months. All times noted are Central European Time (with US time calculated to be six hours behind). BBM refers to BlackBerry messages. E-M refers to E-mails.
BBM 05/09/2011 12:31 [PAK OFFICIAL-NAME REDACTED]: Are you in London? I am here just for 36 hours. Can we meet for after dinner coffee or s’thing? BBM 05/09/2011 12:32 Mansoor IJAZ: I’m in Monaco but it’s no problem for me to fly up. Takes 90 minutes. What time did you have in mind? Where do you want to meet? BBM 05/09/2011 12:35 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Pls call me. I’m at [NAME OF HOTEL, TEL NO. AND ROOM NUMBER REDACTED] BBM 05/09/2011 12:35 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Waiting for ur call now TEL 05/09/2011 12:35:49 [TEL# REDACTED] call to Pakistan official at his request during which notes were taken to frame outline of memo. duration of call 16:03 TEL 05/09/2011 12:58:06 [TEL# REDACTED] call to US contact, duration of call 02:25 TEL 05/09/2011 13:54:31 [TEL# REDACTED] call to US contact, duration of call 19:26 Memorandum was formulated, edited and sent for Pakistani approval during the balance of the day of May 9th. E-M 05/09/2011 18:32 E-MAIL FROM IJAZ to PAK OFFICIAL: first draft of the Memorandum to review, edit and get approved BBM 05/09/2011 18:38 Mansoor IJAZ: The message I sent is what MM will see. It will be given directly to him and no one else BBM 05/09/2011 18:59 Mansoor IJAZ: My friend in DC simply said too many people have been burned in the past two years on the US side and he wanted to insure that on such a sensitive subject, the data and proposal are clear. This is you to me, me to him. He trusts me enough to know I won’t bring it forward unless it has top level approval. [SENTENCE RELATING TO NAMES REDACTED]. So get whatever message you want delivered back to me and I’ll insure it gets in MM’s hands. Best. M BBM 05/10/2011 00:29 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Msg recvd. Tweaking. Middile of road option sounds good. Will call morning. E-M 05/10/2011 02:04 E-MAIL FROM IJAZ TO US CONTACT with final agreed draft of Memorandum, pending one final approval from Pakistani official to confirm agreement on content and agreement to go ahead with delivery to Admiral Mullen BBM 05/10/2011 08:47 Mansoor IJAZ: You have mail from two of my mailboxes. Please read, respond and then we have one last short discussion before I put everything in motion. Thanks. M TEL 05/10/2011 09:06:16 [TEL# REDACTED] call to Pakistan official, duration of call 11:16 — during this call, the official gave me his consent and told me he had “approval from the boss” to proceed E-M 05/10/2011 14:04 RETURN RECEIPT of E-mail from US contact sent at 02:04am (at his local time 08:04am) which contained the Memorandum TEL 05/10/2011 14:51:33 [TEL# REDACTED] call to US contact (at his local time 08:51), duration of call 02:55 — informed the contact that we had a GO from Zardari and that the memo I had sent him at 02:04am was final and could be delivered to Admiral Mullen BBM 05/10/2011 14:57 Mansoor IJAZ: Message delivered with caveat that he has to decide how hard to push — we only set the table. He must decide if he wants one course meal or seven course meal. Ball is in play now — make sure you have protected your flanks E-M 05/11/2011 20:06 E-MAIL FROM US CONTACT TO IJAZ stating “Mansoor, message delivered, Best [NAME REDACTED]” A meeting took place during the afternoon of May 11 in which senior Pakistani officials and senior US officials were present. The purpose of the back-channel memorandum as conceived by the Pakistani official was to give the US side sufficient incentive in the form of the memo’s high-quality deliverables that it wouldappear innocuous to Pakistani intelligence and military officials accompanying certain political officers of the government to the meeting if and when AdmiralMullen delivered a strong rebuke against any military intervention that might displace the civilian government in the days following the raid. The Pakistani official called me after the meeting had taken place and was almost gleeful that Admiral Mullen had agreed to take certain actions in line withwhat was asked of him and that it would all remain within the normal course of inter-agency dealings in his role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We can no longer exclude the possibility that the civilian apparatus needed to create the specter of a coup — when none actually existed — to divert attentionaway from….. well, let’s leave that for another day. We continue with the data and stick to the facts. BBM 05/12/2011 00:36 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Call me on my cell BBM 05/12/2011 00:37 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Also, M in ur msgs above referred to the Admiral, right? BBM 05/12/2011 00:37 Mansoor IJAZ: Yes BBM 05/12/2011 00:54 Mansoor IJAZ: Clarification. M at the end of a message is Mansoor. M or MM in the text of a message is the admiral. Apologies for any confusion. E-M 05/12/2011 01:44 E-MAIL FROM US CONTACT TO IJAZ confirming time of delivery when Admiral Mullen received the Memorandum and that Admiral Mullen had called the US contact (the remaining content of this e-mail is not for public disclosure) BBM 05/12/2011 02:47 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Thanx. On way to [LOCATION REDACTED]. Will touch base on return BBM 05/12/2011 02:54 Mansoor IJAZ: Good luck. Let me know at any time if you need any help
ORCHESTRATING THE ADMIRAL’S DENIAL

I wrote the FT opinion piece, ultimately published on October 10th, back in September, a few days after Admiral Mullen testified in Congress at his final hearing about the complicity of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services in certain attacks on United States and NATO interests. I wrote the piece because I felt Admiral Mullen, whom I do not know personally but have admired greatly for his steady hand in dealing with a tough bunch, had been harshly mistreated by Pakistan’s press corps for stating an essential and existential truth.

I felt it was important for the public at large to understand that he had genuinely tried to do something about the problem as he navigated the complex relationship between Washington and Islamabad, and that the failures cropping up in the bilateral relationship were not for a lack of trying to fix things. I opened the piece with the brief anecdote of what had been done in May to highlight the tangible actions that had been taken to deal with the growing interference and threat posed by extremist segments of the military and intelligence communities in Pakistan.

I did not imagine at the time I wrote the piece that Pakistan’s press corps would only latch on to the issue of a secret memorandum being issued without public (or at least wider government agency) knowledge or that the Pakistani official who asked me to make sure it got into Admiral Mullen’s hands could view anything we had done as wrong for the survival of the civilian government. Unfortunately, as I have learned over and over in dealing with Pakistan’s leaders through four government changes since 1994, they just cannot avoid dissimulation — being something other than what they pretend to be.

On October 28th, after a week of press releases, op-ed pieces and editorials in the Pakistani press regarding the Memorandum, my role in delivering it, the expected denials of the Foreign Office and the tongue-lashing of my good name, I and the Pakistani official who started this all shared an interesting exchange of messages via BlackBerry — perhaps the last communications we will ever have. The full details of that exchange will remain private, except for a few interesting remarks that foretold what was being planned in eliciting the Mullen denial — which I’ll deal with in the next segment.

These exchanges demonstrated the increasing tension, hostility, anxiety and frustration of the Pakistani official in not being able to control a monster of his own making. It also showed the desperation of himself and his bosses to head off a coming storm in accounting for their actions. A review of the partial BBM messenger transcript between myself and the Pakistani official which began on the day after Pakistan’s Foreign Office issued its version of the Mullen denial sets the record straight with crystal clarity:

10/28/2011 21:37 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Basically you don’t get it

10/28/2011 21:37 [PAK OFFICIAL]: You have given hardliners in Pak Mil reason to argue there was an effort to get US to conspire against Pak Mil

10/28/2011 21:38 [PAK OFFICIAL]: I will make sure FO shuts up

10/28/2011 21:38 Mansoor IJAZ: Okay, well I know my IQ is pretty low so you are probably correct in saying I just don’t get it.

10/28/2011 21:39 [PAK OFFICIAL]: The Pak press be damned

10/28/2011 21:39 [PAK OFFICIAL]: I stand by you as a man of integrity werving his country

10/28/2011 21:40 Mansoor IJAZ: But from my point of view, if there was a real threat, as you stated at the time, it is clear you were trying to save a democratic structure from those hawks

10/28/2011 21:41 [PAK OFFICIAL]: You get to write the book on how you changed US-Pak dynamic and won the war in A’tan (w/ some help from a Paki nerd) 😀

10/28/2011 21:42 Mansoor IJAZ: I was happy to get the message in the back door because it served American interests to preserve the democratic civilian setup and the offers made, if achieved, were very much congruent with American objectives in the region

10/28/2011 21:42 [PAK OFFICIAL]: True that, friend. But you know premature revelation ain’t good

10/28/2011 21:43 Mansoor IJAZ: As far as I can see, we did right. Unless there is something I don’t see here. But then I’m sorta dumb from down on the farm where them hillbillies live

10/28/2011 21:43 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Hey! Don’t run down hillbillies

10/28/2011 21:44 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Even the smartest can miss a piece of the puzzle

10/28/2011 21:46 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Let this one go. There is much to do. MUCH. [REDACTED]

10/28/2011 21:47 [PAK OFFICIAL]: We’ll make things happen and if we can’t, we’ll write a book about it

10/28/2011 21:48 [PAK OFFICIAL]: The debate abt your oped has caused my detractors to put pressure on my boss

********************************

10/28/2011 21:54 [PAK OFFICIAL]: It is folks at State who got pissed off by your mission

10/28/2011 21:54 Mansoor IJAZ: Which mission? Sudan, Kashmir, there were so many they got pissed off about. [REDACTED]

10/28/2011 21:54 [PAK OFFICIAL]: The latest one

10/28/2011 21:55 Mansoor IJAZ: Yeah, I got it. You’re right!

10/28/2011 21:58 Mansoor IJAZ: Anyway, State will always hate me because I don’t accept their muddling way of doing things

10/28/2011 22:03 [PAK OFFICIAL]: I don’t know for a fact but I won’t be surprised if the FO statement was prompted by someone here

10/28/2011 22:11 [PAK OFFICIAL]: And now they hate me more when folks [REDACTED] who hate me tell them you and I might have been together on s’thing (whether we were or not is irrelevant to them)

10/28/2011 22:12 [PAK OFFICIAL]: That’s why I have been requesting you to let this one go

10/28/2011 22:12 [PAK OFFICIAL]: That takes attention off me

10/28/2011 22:13 Mansoor IJAZ: Hmmmmmmmmm……. Not sure anything could take attention off you

10/28/2011 22:16 Mansoor IJAZ: Did we really solve a true problem or was this all smoke and mirrors?

10/28/2011 22:16 Mansoor IJAZ: I mean on those days of stress…

10/28/2011 22:23 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Too early to say re solution

10/28/2011 22:28 [PAK OFFICIAL]: I think we save the situation from an extremely violent outcome

*******************************

11/01/2011 22:06 Mansoor IJAZ: Hi buddy, I understand you/ your foreign office hacks are commissioning hatchet pieces against me. Unfortunate…. very unfortunate

11/01/2011 22:31 [PAK OFFICIAL]: I will enquire and stop them. There’s no need for any of this.

11/01/2011 22:31 [PAK OFFICIAL]: You haven’t helped by engaging so much w/ Pak media.

11/01/2011 22:32 [PAK OFFICIAL]: What happened to the ‘silent soldier’?

11/01/2011 22:34 Mansoor IJAZ: Roger that

11/01/2011 22:38 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Are you sure your side won’t deny?

11/01/2011 22:38 Mansoor IJAZ: No, maybe they will. But that would also be a mistake. Too much proof on that side as well.

11/01/2011 22:39 [PAK OFFICIAL]: But does “proving” help anything?

11/01/2011 22:39 [PAK OFFICIAL]: Is it not the nature of a private mission that officials deny it?

11/01/2011 22:41 Mansoor IJAZ: Don’t know. Don’t care. My point is simple — I’ve said what I was going to. Attacks on my person will not be tolerated. And my statement stands. Stop telling lies about me and I might just stip telling the truth about you

11/01/2011 22:42 [PAK OFFICIAL]: If you were to listen to my advice, you would let this blow over and prove yourself afterwards. You are the one who will outlast the flying s***

11/01/2011 22:43 [PAK OFFICIAL]: That is usually my strategy: be there when the others have self-destructed or blown over

The most alarming exchange was on November 1st when the diplomat asked me, presciently as it turned out when Foreign Policy published its article 9 days later, whether my side (meaning the US officials with whom we had communicated) would not deny the existence of the memorandum, etc. It was a threat in plain sight — a polite reminder that this Pakistani expert in media management would insure a denial by Pakistan would be matched by a denial in the US with the messenger damned in between. Meanwhile, his name would remain hidden. And his role in all this would be left for further expounding on in his new book.

One final note on this entire episode. Once the Pakistani official figured out I was not one he could cow down, intimidate, persuade or threaten, he deleted me from his BlackBerry contact list in the hopes that any conversation between us would automatically get deleted as well. He did this on or about November 6, three days before the Foreign Policy piece was published. An interesting coincidence…. trying to erase history as if it never happened….

I leave it to the readers to decide who did what to whom, when and for what purpose — the facts are now sufficiently enunciated to give anyone who views this story with an unjaundiced eye a clear view of the events that took place in May, and the Herculean effort to cover it all up during the past one month since I wrote my views in the FT.

ADMIRAL MULLEN’S STATEMENT & FOREIGN POLICY’S ARTICLE

Josh Rogin wrote: “Ijaz also alleged in his op-ed in the Financial Times that Zardari communicated this offer by sending a top secret memo on May 10 through Ijaz himself, to be hand-delivered to Adm. Michael Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a key official managing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.” — I never said I delivered anything to Adm Mullen. What I wrote was — the memo was delivered to Adm Mullen at 1400 hrs on May 10.

Captain John Kirby told FP, “Adm. Mullen does not know Mr. Ijaz and has no recollection of receiving any correspondence from him,” — it is true that I do not know Admiral Mullen and have never met him. But the person I asked to take the memorandum to him — that person knew him about as well as anyone can. And that person knows me pretty well too.

Captain Kirby: “I cannot say definitively that correspondence did not come from him — the admiral received many missives as chairman from many people every day, some official, some not. But he does not recall one from this individual…” It surely did not come directly from me, and we have proof that Admiral Mullen received the memorandum and acknowledged it to the person who delivered it to him.

The entire Rogin article was written with a slant to discredit me personally because whoever put him up to writing the article could not avoid the facts — facts that the hidden hand behind Rogin’s article knew full well because he, along with myself, are the only two people who know precisely what we did.

Rogue operations in governments have no place in our world today. The people of Pakistan deserve better. They deserve to know the truth. And it is alone for the Pakistani people to decide whether their political leaders deserve their faith and trust after learning the truth of what has been done in their names. Equally, the American people deserve to know the truth. Our patience for the misdeeds and machinations of Pakistan’s political leaders is now all but lost, and we do not need the aggravation of further manipulation at the hands of Islamabad’s disingenuous rulers, or disingenuous US bureaucrats who hide the sins of foreign diplomats so they can get any sliver of America’s agenda executed. Bad policy is bad policy. It cannot be sugar-coated with diplomatic niceties.

I end where I started. Facts are stubborn things. If the Pakistani government’s vicious cabal stops telling lies about me, I might just stop telling the truth — the whole truth — about it. The whole truth, once it comes out, will not be easy for anyone to swallow. I remain as adamant as ever that the truth be told fairly, justly and without revisionists and hypocrites doing all they can to avoid the judgment of history.

ENDS–

http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=26358&title=Text-of-Mansoor-Ijaz-rejoinder

About the author

Jehangir Hafsi

33 Comments

Click here to post a comment
  • ‘Memo Mansoor’ strikes back, with live ammo

    News Desk
    Saturday, November 12, 2011

    4

    NEW YORK: The US businessman at the centre of the Mike Mullen Memo controversy, Mansoor Ijaz, on Friday released sensational messages and correspondence exchanged with a Pakistani diplomat, saying that these are only “some of the facts” about the memo.

    The transcripts he released after the confused denial of the memo by Admiral Mullen’s former spokesman include SMS messages, dates and time of telephone calls and emails exchanged with a senior Pakistani diplomat before and after the memo was delivered to Admiral Mike Mullen.

    In an exhaustive 3,300-word rejoinder, issued after the former spokesman of Adm Mike Mullen tried to deny the existence of the memo in the Foreign Policy blog, Mansoor Ijaz said: “Without compromising names or the highly sensitive content of the memorandum, I am providing a sampling of the truth in my possession to set the record straight. I am prepared to present this evidence for forensic investigation.”

    Ijaz in his statement said his purpose was “to give sufficient evidence to insure that there can be no doubt a request was made to me by a senior Pakistan government diplomat, not that I asked to be involved in this matter. Neither did I offer to do anything until I asked senior current and former US officials whether there was receptivity to what the Pakistani official had authorized me to discuss with them.”

    Mansoor said there can be no doubt a memorandum was drafted and transmitted to Admiral Mullen with the approval of the highest political level in Pakistan. “That the admiral received it with certainty from a source whom he trusted and who also trusted me. It was a source the admiral would not, and according to e-mail traffic in my possession, did not ignore.”

    He also stated there can be no doubt proof exists of the admiral acknowledging receipt of the memorandum. “Whether he chose to do anything with the memorandum or not, I cannot know and do not care — my responsibility was to see that the memo got into his hands safely.” The visible actions of both governments in the aftermath of that memorandum being delivered demonstrate that if it was not a source of content for those actions, the actions taken by both the US and Pakistan even as recently as the past few weeks track closely with the offers made by Pakistan on May 10.

    The US businessman also revealed that “a persistent effort had been made by an array of Pakistanis, particularly by the diplomat who fears his name will be divulged to persuade, pressure, intimidate and even threaten me to not make further disclosures about the events of May 9th and 10th. The solicitation of a denial from Admiral Mullen was their last gasp hope in trying to shut me up. Obviously it did not work.”

    Releasing the electronic data (full text available on The News website), Mansoor Ijaz said he had withheld, pending an official investigation by certain organs of Pakistan’s government, names, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of those involved. “This data will only be provided to the official bodies who request them from me and who demonstrate their independence and concern for learning the truth from these facts. The memorandum will remain out of public view unless the official bodies of Pakistan’s government deem it appropriate to release it.”

    (Mansoor’s rejoinder carries a large number of BBms’ emails etc which cannot be reproduced here due to space constraints but can be read on The News website)

    Mansoor revealed that afterwards a meeting took place during the afternoon of May 11 in which senior Pakistani officials and senior US officials were present. The purpose of the back-channel memorandum as conceived by the Pakistani official was to give the US side sufficient incentive in the form of the memo’s high-quality deliverables that it would appear innocuous to Pakistani intelligence and military officials accompanying certain political officers of the government to the meeting if and when Admiral Mullen delivered a strong rebuke against any military intervention that might displace the civilian government in the days following the raid.

    “The Pakistani official called me after the meeting had taken place and was almost gleeful that Admiral Mullen had agreed to take certain actions in line with what was asked of him and that it would all remain within the normal course of inter-agency dealings in his role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We can no longer exclude the possibility that the civilian apparatus needed to create the specter of a coup — when none actually existed — to divert attention away from… well, let’s leave that for another day. We continue with the data and stick to the facts.”

    Mansoor also released a set of messages after the Memo story was published in the Financial Times. These exchanges demonstrated the increasing tension, hostility, anxiety and frustration of the Pakistani official in not being able to control a monster of his own making, he stated.

    “It also showed the desperation of himself and his bosses to head off a coming storm in accounting for their actions. A review of the partial BBM messenger transcript between myself and the Pakistani official which began on the day after Pakistan’s Foreign Office issued its version of the Mullen denial sets the record straight with crystal clarity”.

    Referring to the so-called denial by Admiral Mullen’s former spokesman, Mansoor Ijaz said he had never claimed that he himself delivered anything to Adm Mullen. “What I wrote was — the memo was delivered to Adm Mullen at 1400 hrs on May 10.

    “Captain John Kirby told FP, ‘Adm. Mullen does not know Mr. Ijaz and has no recollection of receiving any correspondence from him.’ It is true that I do not know Admiral Mullen and have never met him. But the person I asked to take the memorandum to him — that person knew him about as well as anyone can. And that person knows me pretty well too.”

    Captain Kirby told FP: “I cannot say definitively that correspondence did not come from him — the admiral received many missives [messages] as chairman from many people every day, some official, some not. But he does not recall one from this individual…”

    Mansoor Ijaz says: “It surely did not come directly from me, and we have proof that Admiral Mullen received the memorandum and acknowledged it to the person who delivered it to him.

    “The entire Rogin article was written with a slant to discredit me personally because whoever put him up to writing the article could not avoid the facts — facts that the hidden hand behind Rogin’s article knew full well because he, along with myself, are the only two people who know precisely what we did.

    “I end where I started. Facts are stubborn things. If the Pakistani government’s vicious cabal stops telling lies about me, I might just stop telling the truth — the whole truth — about it. The whole truth, once it comes out, will not be easy for anyone to swallow. I remain as adamant as ever that the truth be told fairly, justly and without revisionists and hypocrites doing all they can to avoid the judgment of history,” Mansoor Ijaz says.

    When contacted for official reaction to this latest development, Foreign Office spokesperson Tehmina Janjua told The News that she was unaware of any development regarding issuance of any evidence or e-mail correspondence by Mansoor Ijaz regarding transmission of memorandum and thus said she will not comment on it. She added however that the Foreign Office has the same stance on this issue that it had taken initially.

    Presidential aide Senator Faisal Raza Abidi also did not take any call initially but later his PS said that Mr. Abidi will return the call after one and an half hour around 10:30 PM PST. That call never came. Spokesman of the Presidency Farahatullah Babar too did not attend the phone.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=10234&Cat=13

  • Dissecting a ‘leak’: On Ijaz Mansoor saga – by Shaukat Qadir
    On October 10, Mansoor Ijaz, an American business tycoon of Pakistani origin, made a startling disclosure in an op-ed article that he had written for The Financial Times (FT) regarding the contents of a memo which were revealed to him by a “senior Pakistani diplomat… close to President Zardari”. The memo was finalised on May 11 and intended for Admiral Mike Mullen to pass it on to US President Barack Obama. Apparently, Zardari apprehended a military coup in the blowback from Osama bin Laden’s unilateral execution by the US and, in attempting to preempt it, went so far as to promise an entire ‘new security team’, which, by implication, would be more prone to accept US demands. Zardari, apparently, promised to defang the ISI and also offered more, which the author implies, but did not disclose.

    Quite obviously, this ‘leak’ resulted in considerable speculation, as it was surely intended to. There was the expected anti-Zardari hype but there was also a strong feeling that Ijaz’s disclosure was a pack of lies. Pakistani government spokesmen obviously denied the existence of such a memo and cast aspersions on the author; as did Mike Mullen and the US government.

    I must admit that I too was skeptical to begin with, but I was also conscious that the FT is not an irresponsible rag and was unlikely to carry such an accusation without insuring itself against legal proceedings by ensuring its veracity.

    What finally convinced me of the truth of Ijaz’s assertion was his statement in response to the Haqqani challenge to produce his evidence before the Supreme Court. He concluded his response with, “As a 27-year veteran of Wall Street, I can do no better than to quote the big-screen character of Gordon Gekko. He said: “if you stop telling lies about me, I might just stop telling the truth about you”. It is time that Pakistan’s leaders stopped telling lies and got back to the business of governing for the betterment of their people rather than wasting time, energy and much-needed resources in the useless bickering and backbiting that defines today’s debate over the nation’s affairs.”

    The question that arose was: if Ijaz was not seeking cheap publicity, nor does he need to make a name for himself as an investigative journalist, why should this leak occur in October, more than five months after the event? It also became obvious that his role as the preferred intermediary was critical; it offered Zardari that priceless luxury: deniability!

    The first thing that came to mind after this realisation dawned was that if this memo had been entrusted to Ijaz’s care on behalf of Zardari, it was more than likely that its disclosure was also on Zardari’s request. The question then was, what did Zardari hope to gain?

    So, I went back and reread Ijaz’s original article. Ijaz, very cleverly, had picked up on Mullen’s accusations made days before his retirement, to let loose another tirade on the ‘rogue ISI’ and, by implication, the already embarrassed Pakistan army chief.

    And who could gain more from this than Zardari? What wouldn’t he give to further embarrass the army and the ISI and perhaps put into place a more pliable ‘new security team’?

    The denial by Pakistan’s Foreign Office, our man in DC and the spokesperson for the president, followed by Ijaz’s strongly worded statement, merely played out the conclusion of a well-orchestrated farce; which actually ended in convincing most analysts in Pakistan of the veracity of Ijaz’s assertion.

    It also succeeded in further demonising the ISI and embarrassing the GHQ.

    Unfortunately for Zardari, it still did not weaken the GHQ so much that he could find himself in a position strong enough to put in place a ‘new security team’! The one thing Zardari and Ijaz failed to vector into their equation is the fact that when there is such an obvious attempt to undermine the army chief, it is the entire army that is affected and the consequence is greater unity within the ranks.

    If Zardari were to try to install a new security team, he would face considerable opposition and, what is far more important, he is unlikely to find a ‘pliable’ team which would succumb to domestic political pressure or to US demands that clash with our national interests. Perhaps it is time for Zardari to follow the sterling advice in Ijaz’s response, even if it was made sarcastically.

    Published in The Express Tribune, November 13th, 2011. 

    ————-

    FO once again trashes Mansoor Ijaz on memo issue

    Usman Manzoor
    Wednesday, November 02, 2011

    ISLAMABAD: Even after the strong and assertive rejoinder by Mansoor Ijaz, the US business tycoon who has become the centre of a huge controversy over the reported memorandum sent through him by President Zardari to Admiral Mike Mullen, the Foreign Office of Pakistan is still sticking to its stand that there was no truth in what Mansoor was saying.

    Mansoor Ijaz, however, told the popular Geo TV programme “Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Saath” on Monday that if the Pakistan government did not stop telling lies about him, “I would start telling the truth about them.”

    The FO spokesperson, when contacted by The News to take the view of the FO over Mansoor Ijaz’s strong and irrefutable rejoinder, said that the position of the Foreign Office is the same as issued to the media and has also been placed on the website of the FO.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=10028&Cat=13

  • Why FO denial of memo, and why now

    Mohammad Malick
    Sunday, October 30, 2011

    ISLAMABAD: The October 10th issue of the respected publication, Financial Times, carried an article by Pakistan origin US millionaire, Mansoor Ijaz, claiming that he had conveyed an unbelievably sensitive message of President Zardari to Admiral Mike Mullen, meant for President Obama. He claimed that on May 9th, he had been approached for this errand by a top Pakistani diplomat.

    He even gave specific details of who the message was delivered to and when. To Admiral Mullen at 1400 hrs on May 10th, to be precise. This alone should have indicated that specific records were being maintained for future usage. The FT leak was more hazardous than a nuclear spill (literally speaking it also spoke of retooling the nuclear equation amongst other things) but for almost three weeks, Islamabad maintained a stony silence. In fact, nobody said a word even after US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton tacitly confirmed it all when she refused to categorically shoot down Mansoor’s version of facts.

    On Oct 28th however, a full 18 days after the publication of the FT article, the foreign office woke up with some sudden sense of urgency to issue a rather funny sounding denial in a matter, which is hardly a laughing affair. If it were a lie by a controversial personality then the Pakistan government should have immediately challenged it. Mansoor along with FT should have been sued for defamation and both should have been taken to the cleaners for slander. But barring the issuance of a belated and vaguely worded denial, neither the FO nor any other organ of the government has dared to sue either. One wonder’s why? Maybe Mansoor Ijaz is telling half lies if not the whole truth, but it is the unfathomable behaviour of Islamabad that ironically is lending greatest of credence to his claims.

    It is a unique denial indeed, which does not ever refer to a specific article either by its title or the identity of its author. It’s a paradox indeed because on one hand the FO obviously deemed the article so important that it assumed that everybody would instantly know the subject matter of its disdainful denial even though it does not identify it specifically and yet it did not consider it worth responding to for almost three weeks. Then, the FO also does not make any specific reference to any of subsequent newspapers write-ups while only referring them to as “subsequent write-ups” while trashing them as “unwarranted, speculative and unnecessary”.

    And of course there was this other little niggle in the diplomatic shoe as well: nobody ever directly accused the foreign office of using any third person to convey a toxic message to President Obama, so why this belated FO bristling? In his article, Mansoor had never claimed that he had conveyed the message at the behest of the foreign office but had been categorical in pointing out that he had been dealing with a particular individual who simply happened to be a top diplomat. Without naming anyone in his article, Mansoor has pointed his finger at the top Pakistani diplomat who took ‘independent politically motivated initiative’, to the absolute ignorance of the ministry of foreign affairs.

    Why the earlier inexplicable silence, and why this sudden need to deny? Why is the institution now being forced to do a last minute desperate cleanup (cover up?) job of clearing the debris left behind by the ill fated initiative of the one-man diplomatic corps? Is panic starting to take over Islamabad, which now knows that the people-who-matter know the precise details of this misadventure. Greatest of consternation is also being caused by the absolute silence of Rawalpindi, which was expected by Islamabad to pose certain queries in the wake of the investigations carried out by its super heavyweight. Such a move would have at least afforded Islamabad the opportunity to deny the ill advised move altogether, offer some remedial palliatives and also offer the prized head of the top diplomat if that would have satisfied the garrison. But greatest anxiety is being caused because of the continued silence as it is increasingly convincing the top decision makers in Islamabad that final conclusions may have already been drawn elsewhere, and that could be the only reason why no questions are flowing in its directions.

    The breaking of the official code of silence is understandable. A lot has happened during the last three weeks. The super benefactors of our ruling dispensation have apparently decided that the immensely corrupt incumbent ruling regime does not qualify for long term political investment and hence will not be coming to its rescue come crunch time. Damaging investigations have taken place during the past 18 days. Evidences have been combed through. Decisions have been taken. Only modalities and the finer nuances of the final moves need to be fine-tuned. With PML-N retching up the political pressure and Imran Khan stoking the political fires, things may be picking up way faster than the arrogant ruling dispensation had anticipated barely three weeks ago. It is said that one week is a long time in Pakistan’s politics. By that calculation, three weeks could prove a future-changing

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=75136&Cat=2

  • Memo from USA

    Anjum Niaz
    Saturday, November 12, 2011

    We are watching a stripper dance on the stage to a sexy number. We are titillated. We want to see the stripper reveal more. Mansoor Ijaz is the dancer. On October 10, he revealed a self-important story about a memo that contained something as lethal as a dirty bomb. The London-based newspaper ‘Financial Times’ printed it under the headline “Time to take on Pakistan’s jihadist spies.” Ijaz, a smarmy Pakistani-American businessman, based his FT article on the memo, supposedly written by a not-named Pakistani diplomat, allegedly dictated by Zardari, with instructions to pass it on to Admiral Mullen.

    Mansoor Ijaz now threatens to explode the dirty bomb. Were a blast to occur, like the dirty bomb which contains radioactive material killing those who come in contact with it, the memo’s radiation could contaminate its inventors, instantly wiping them off. But the tease that Ijaz is, he will not bare it all, preferring instead, to dance around it like strippers do.

    To give you another analogy, we have team A and team B playing a football match. America is Team A and Pakistan is Team B. Admiral Mike Mullen and President Zardari captain their respective teams. Mansoor Ijaz (who has graduated from being a stripper) is the goal keeper in Mullen’s team, while the ‘nameless’ diplomat is Zardari’s goal keeper. The football is the Pakistan army. Remember a ball never speaks. It only moves. So far it has not moved for reasons only known to the ball! There are cheerleaders from both the teams.

    The Zardari camp has a handful of TV and print mouthpieces rooting for him; the American camp is quiet but for its dodgy goalkeeper Mansoor Ijaz, who puts out press releases threatening to expose foul play. So far his threats are just that. The only person to openly accuse Team B of foul play is Imran Khan. At his rally of millions recently, he exposes fully the game Zardari has played including the identity of his goalkeeper, the Washington-based diplomat.

    Did Imran Khan rush to judgement without proof? The great Khan is a cricketing legend. He may lack the Machiavellian chalaki of the Zardari team, but he knows about ball-tampering. So he must be pretty confident when he openly and publically named the culprit caught in the process. As for the football…didn’t I just say, it will not speak but home in when the time comes? Let me add here that the football, according to sources in the know, has collected enough moss (read proof) to move against Team B.

    The plot thickens. A retired spokesman of the retired Mullen told a blog that the latter does not know Mansoor Ijaz nor did he get a missive from him. Fair enough! But Mullen’s spokesman leaves the door wide open for conjecture when he says: “I cannot say definitively that correspondence did not come from him – the admiral received many missives as chairman from many people every day, some official, some not.” Stop! This statement merely denies Mullen’s acquaintance with Mansoor Ijaz, but not the memo.

    Go back to Mullen’s September 22 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee highlighting the ISI’s role in sponsoring the Haqqani Network – including attacks on American forces in Afghanistan. Then read Ijaz’s FT story in which he quotes Zardari saying “The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.”

    Did Mullen base his testimony on the allegedly sensitive contents of the memo? The highest ranking US military officer would be a fool to stake his whole reputation if he was not sure. For him to now obfuscate the memo matter must get the Pakistan Army’s antennas up.

    Enough confusion and conjecture has swirled the media waves. Only a full disclosure will do. Ijaz, no more teasers please.

    The writer is a freelance journalist. Email: anjumniaz@rocketmail.com

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=76984&Cat=9

  • Latest from Dawn:

    Mansoor Ijaz stands by his claim

    In an email message to Dawn, Mr Ijaz pointed out that the denial confirmed his claim.

    “I never said I delivered anything to Admiral Mullen. What I wrote was — the memo was delivered to Adm Mullen at 1400 hrs on May 10,” Mr Ijaz wrote. “We have proof that Admiral Mullen received the memorandum and acknowledged it to the person who delivered it to him.”

    Mr Ijaz confirmed Capt Kirby’s claim that Admiral Mullen did not know the Pakistani-American businessman.

    “It is true that I do not know Admiral Mullen and have never met him. But the person I asked to take the memorandum to him — that person knew him about as well as anyone can. And that person knows me pretty well too,” Mr Ijaz wrote.

    He claimed that the article which included Capt Kirby’s denial was written “with a slant to discredit me personally because whoever put him up to writing the article could not avoid the facts — facts that the hidden hand behind (this) article knew full well because he, along with myself, are the only two people who know precisely what we did”.

    However, in his clarification Mr Ijaz does not say that he was directly contacted by President Zardari or that he was acting on his instructions.

    Meanwhile, diplomatic sources in Washington raised new objections to Mr Ijaz’s statement, noting that the Pakistanis were saying they never sent the message while the Americans were saying that they did not receive it.

    “Even if Mr Ijaz’s argument that he did indeed communicate with third parties about serving as a secret intermediary is accepted, he cannot prove that his role affected decisions either in Pakistan or the US,” said one such source.

    “If Mansoor Ijaz delivered a secret message, why did he publicise it unless he is part of some trap for the democratic Pakistani government?” the source asked.The source also disputed Mr Ijaz’s claim that the Pakistani official who gave him President Zardari’s message used a Blue Berry to exchange message. “Are private BB messages or calls sufficient to form basis of international diplomacy?” he asked.

    “Even if he proves he exchanged messages with someone he considers a senior diplomat, is there any proof with Mansoor Ijaz that he was acting under authority of President Zardari or that the memo Ijaz delivered was actually read by Admiral Mullen?”The source pointed out that after each time Mr Ijaz claimed he played a secret channel role, there had been a controversy. “Is it possible that he exaggerates his role for self-publicity and promotion? Why should he be deemed credible?” the source asked.

    http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/12/mansoor-ijaz-stands-by-his-claim.html

  • Source: http://www.insaf.pk/Forum/tabid/53/forumid/1/tpage/3/view/topic/postid/113184/Default.aspx#125266

    http://pakistanblogzine.wordpress.com/2011/11/03/namoos-e-haqqani-network-nhn-by-ghulam-ahmad-toori/

    A critical analysis of Husain Haqqani vs Mansoor Ijaz saga

    I have no major issues with personal clouts and tribal loyalties as long as such clouts and loyalties are used for collective, not personal, benefit. However, questions arise when individuals with shady past and dubious present misappropriate intellectual and political capital of a political party to create and activate a media tribe to promote their personal interests while ignoring or even suppressing issues of more urgent and collective importance.

    Take, for example, the case of Pakistan’s ambassador to the USA, Mr. Husain Haqqani (the person who manufactured and distributed offending pictures and documents about Shaheed Benazir Bhutto and Begum Nusrat Bhutto), who has a dedicated lobby of paid propagandists, urban-centric “liberal” opportunists (some of whom are clearly pro-military establishment) and ambitious flatterers who hang around him on Twitter and also in Islamabad or Washington D.C., not missing out a single opportunity to praise him, eulogizing his imaginary services to Pakistan or Pakistan Peoples Pary. President Zardari is abused by some of their friends (e.g., Ejaz Haider and Tammy Haq), Benazir Bhutto is cursed (e.g., Murtaza Razvi’s article on Nusrat Bhutto’s death), PPP is blamed (e.g., the blaming the victim brigade’s columns on Taseer’s murder), who cares? as long as the Namoos (honour) of Haqqani is carefully guarded. Clearly Mr. Haqqani has misappropriated the PPP’s intellectual capital and naive followers to develop and promote his personal career and guard his personal honour. Sadly, some sincere progressive writers and columnists too have allowed themselves to be used for personal promotion and defence of Mr. Husain Haqqani.

    While Ambassador Hussain Haqqani has played an important role in serving Pakistan’s and PPP’s interests in Washington, D.C., the due credit for his performance goes to President Asif Zardari who is the main mind behind political manoeuvring and policy making in the last four years.  While Mr. Haqqani is an able executioner, as he was in his capacity as an assistant to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Nawaz Sharif  and previous masters, the key role of President Zaradri is being diluted and completely put aside by the Namoos-e-Haqqani Network (NHN) on Twitter and also in mainstream media. For them, and also for our esteemed Ambassador, it is sufficient if his own Namoos (honour) is carefully guarded by the likes of Ejaz Haider, Ayesha Tammy Haq and others, some of whom are known for their deep hatred of the very leader (President Zardari) and the party (PPP) he is duty-bond to serve. For Haqqani, his own Namoos is the first and last priority, the rest is simply disposable!

    Such network has been able to thrive because of a naive decision by the PPP leadership to accommodate the Ambassador’s wife in the President’s media team. It is, therefore, no wonder that most (if not all) of the Namoos-e-Haqqani Network loyalists, columnists, bloggers and Tweeps show little to no interest in highlighting the  military state’s role in murder of PPP leaders (Benazir Bhutto, Salmaan Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti) and atrocities against the Baloch, Pashtuns, Shia Muslims, Ahmadiyya Muslims and others, which have gained further momentum since the PPP came to power in early 2008.

    The NHN has taken little to no interest in highlighting the plight of thousands of the Balochs, Pashtuns and Shia Muslims who have been mercilessly butchered by Pakistan army and its proxy jihadi organizations (TTP-SSP-LeJ etc).

    Barring a token statement or two, the Namoos-e-Haqqani Network has done nothing to highlight the ongoing persecution and murder of Toori Pashtuns (Shia Muslims) of Parachinar who remain besieged by the ISI-Haqqani Taliban for the last four years. In fact one of their paid operatives (ironically a  Toori Shia) is seen actively promoting and defending the honour of ISI. Similarly, the NHN has kept tight-lipped on the ongoing massacres of thousands of Baloch nationalists who are fighting for their basic human rights.

    As a recent example of how the NHN operates in Pakistan’s mainstream media and also on Twitter, consider the case of how NHN members have been activated to defend the honour of Husain Haqqani in response to the Mansoor Ijaz saga and Imran Khan’s speech. Read again, the emphasis is not on defending the honour of Pakistan, or that of President Zardari, the emphasis is clearly on defending the honour (Namoos) of Husain Haqqani.

    While there are many examples on Twitter, let me cite only a few tweets. Note how one flatterer bestows Hussain Haqqani and his wife with the title of Mr. Pakistan and Mrs. Pakistan, a proposal which is hurriedly endorsed by the ‘Mrs. Pakistan’.

    mSaleemJaved Saleem Javed
    Out of despair? RT @mazdaki: Imran Khan targeting @husainhaqqani is slanderous , pathetic & desperate #fail #ptijalsa

    akchishti akchishti
    So when are we giving this couple @husainhaqqani @fispahani Mr & Mrs. Pakistan award? seriously!

    fispahani farahnaz ispahani
    sweet thought! RT @akchishti: So when R we gving ths couple @husainhaqqani @fispahani Mr & Mrs. Pakistan award? srsly!

    dasghar Dilawar Asghar
    @husainhaqqani I wud ditto what @adnanrasool sd and wht @akchishti just sd that both u and @fispahani R Mr and Mrs Pakistan in their own way

    fispahani farahnaz ispahani
    Bless u.! ! MT @dasghar: @husainhaqqani I wud ditto wht @adnanrasool & @akchishti just sd that both u & @fispahani R Mr & Mrs Pakistan

    With reference to the NHN activities in response to Mansoor Ijaz saga, it will be useful to reproduce the entire article because of which Husain Haqqani and his defendants deemed it appropriate to criticize Mr. Ijaz:

    Time to take on Pakistan’s jihadist spies

    By Mansoor Ijaz

    Source: Financial Times

    Early on May 9, a week after US Special Forces stormed the hideout of Osama bin Laden and killed him, a senior Pakistani diplomat telephoned me with an urgent request. Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s president, needed to communicate a message to White House national security officials that would bypass Pakistan’s military and intelligence channels. The embarrassment of bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil had humiliated Mr Zardari’s weak civilian government to such an extent that the president feared a military takeover was imminent. He needed an American fist on his army chief’s desk to end any misguided notions of a coup – and fast.

    Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, and his troops were demoralised by the embarrassing ease with which US special forces had violated Pakistani sovereignty. Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s feared spy service, was charged by virtually the entire international community with complicity in hiding bin Laden for almost six years. Both camps were looking for a scapegoat; Mr Zardari was their most convenient target.

    The diplomat made clear that the civilian government’s preferred channel to receive Mr Zardari’s message was Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. He was a time-tested friend of Pakistan and could convey the necessary message with force not only to President Barack Obama, but also to Gen Kayani.

    In a flurry of phone calls and emails over two days a memorandum was crafted that included a critical offer from the Pakistani president to the Obama administration: “The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.”

    The memo was delivered to Admiral Mullen at 14.00 hours on May 10. A meeting between him and Pakistani national security officials took place the next day at the White House. Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs, it seems, neither heeded the warning, nor acted on the admiral’s advice.

    On September 22, in his farewell testimony to the Senate armed services committee, Admiral Mullen said he had “credible intelligence” that a bombing on September 11 that wounded 77 US and Nato troops and an attack on the US embassy in Kabul on September 13 were done “with ISI support.”Essentially he was indicting Pakistan’s intelligence services for carrying out a covert war against the US – perhaps in retaliation for the raid on bin Laden’s compound, perhaps out of strategic national interest to put Taliban forces back in power in Afghanistan so that Pakistan would once again have the “strategic depth” its paranoid security policies against India always envisioned.

    Questions about the ISI’s role in Pakistan have intensified in recent months. The finger of responsibility in many otherwise inexplicable attacks has often pointed to a shadowy outfit of ISI dubbed “S-Wing”, which is said to be dedicated to promoting the dubious agenda of a narrow group of nationalists who believe only they can protect Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

    The time has come for the state department to declare the S-Wing a sponsor of terrorism under the designation of “foreign governmental organisations”. Plans by the Obama administration to blacklist the Haqqani network are toothless and will have no material impact on the group’s military support and intelligence logistics; it is S-Wing that allegedly provides all of this in the first place. It no longer matters whether ISI is wilfully blind, complicit or incompetent in the attacks its S-Wing is carrying out. S-Wing must be stopped.

    ISI embodies the scourge of radicalism that has become a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The time has come for America to take the lead in shutting down the political and financial support that sustains an organ of the Pakistani state that undermines global antiterrorism efforts at every turn. Measures such as stopping aid to Pakistan, as a bill now moving through Congress aims to do, are not the solution. More precise policies are needed to remove the cancer that ISI and its rogue wings have become on the Pakistani state.

    Pakistanis are not America’s enemies. Neither is their incompetent and toothless civilian government – the one Admiral Mullen was asked to help that May morning. The enemy is a state organ that breeds hatred among Pakistan’s Islamist masses and then uses their thirst for jihad against Pakistan’s neighbours and allies to sate its hunger for power. Taking steps to reduce its influence over Pakistan’s state affairs is a critical measure of the world’s willingness to stop the terror masters at their very roots.

    Clearly, Mr. Mansoor Ijaz’s article is an expression of the fact that it is not Pakistan’s civilian government but its army, ISI in particular, which is responsible for an on-going support to Al Qaeda and Taliban. What’s wrong in such position? Yet, for the defendants of Mr. Haqqani, it is more important to defend his personal interests even if that has to be at the cost of truth and principles. Here are five snapshots, three are newspaper items and two are blog posts:

    Mehmal Sarfraz writes in Daily Times (Editorial, 1 Nov 2011):

    Mr Khan’s speech started with attacks against President Zardari and the Sharif brothers. His repetition of the false story pertaining to Ambassador Husain Haqqani about a nonexistent letter was uncalled for. Mr Khan should not bend facts to suit his case.

    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\111\story_1-11-2011_pg3_1

    Dr Mohammad Taqi writes in Daily Times (No he Khan’t, 3 Nov 2011):

    The PTI leader has been hanging out with Sheikh Rashid of Rawalpindi and early in his speech hit a low that even the foul-mouthed Rashid might envy. Imran Khan’s accusation against Ambassador Husain Haqqani, making wild allegations and that too based on a story by Mansoor Ijaz — a discredited ‘mediator’, neo-con sympathiser and proponent of Bush’s Iraq war — was simply pathetic. One wonders about his motive to quote a person who boasts of ties to both India and global jihadists. While a separate column is needed to address this issue, it just goes to show the shallowness of the PTI leader and that in his desperation for power he can stoop to any level.

    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\113\story_3-11-2011_pg3_2

    Kamran Shafi writes in Express Tribune (3 November 2011):

    Then he goes and badmouths our ambassador to the United States, let us not be afraid to name him, Husain Haqqani, by calling him the US ambassador to the US, i.e. a US stooge. As if this was not enough, he quotes from a controversial article by someone who has been much talked about in the press and in other public forums in the United States, let us not be afraid to name him either: Mansur Ijaz, saying that Haqqani asked Ijaz to deliver a letter to the Americans from Asif Zardari begging them to save him from Pakistan’s army generals.

    Now then, let alone doing a 10-minute internet search and finding out exactly who Mansur Ijaz is, if Imran or his advisers had thought about this matter for 10 seconds before putting it in his speech, it would have become clear even to them that there was something very, very wrong with this storyline. If Haqqani is a US stooge, why would he need someone like Ijaz to deliver Zardari’s letter to the Americans? Elementary what, Imran?

    As for Ijaz, I will only quote from the Roanoke Times, a newspaper out of Virginia. On December 26, 2001, President Clinton’s former national security adviser, Samuel ‘Sandy’ Berger, called Ijaz’s allegations “ludicrous and irresponsible”, when Ijaz said that the Clinton administration had ignored several offers from the Sudanese government to share intelligence on Osama bin Laden.

    According to the same paper, Susan Rice, who served as assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1997 to 2000, and is now the US ambassador to the UN, said about Ijaz’s claims that the “White House was not looking for foreign policy assistance from Ijaz”, “We did not need, nor would it have been appropriate for us to use a private citizen… ”.

    http://tribune.com.pk/story/287082/welcome-imran/

    Sabahat Zakariya writes in Express Tribune – Blog (1 Nov 2011):

    The speech was full of feel-good optimism as was expected and required. Talk of corruption, delivering rights to the poorest in the society and anti-Zardari sentiment elicited the most visible roars of approval. Personally speaking, I was disappointed at his resorting to lies about Hussain Haqqani’s nationality but heartened by his passing mention of minority and women’s rights. http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/8695/how-imran-khan-won-me-over/

    Pakistan Media Watch – Blog writes in “Media Conspiracies and Imran Khan” (31 October 2011)

    In an otherwise straightforward speech in Lahore on Sunday, Imran Khan alluded to a conspiracy theory of Mansoor Ijaz that this blog has discredited not only once, but twice already. One can give Imran Khan the benefit of doubt, though, as there is a history of examples of journalists feeding Imran conspiracies, possibly as an attempt to curry favour with the PTI chief. As we stated before, “Whether or not you support Imran Khan, all political leaders need to be given the facts, not led by their noses on a wild goose chase”. As Imran’s political influence grows, it is important that he – and all political leaders – be able to make decisions from factual information, not conspiracies. Otherwise, the consequences can be disastrous.

    http://pakistanmediawatch.com/2011/10/31/media-conspiracies-and-imran-khan/

    I repeat: I have no major issues with personal clouts and tribal loyalties except when such clouts and loyalties are based on misappropriation of a political party’s intellectual and political capital for personal benefit while discarding the collective benefit.

    Now let me ask: why is no such tribal support activated to mourn Ajmeer Shah? Why is such tribal loyalty absent when human rights activists and media persons misrepresent Shia genocide by the ISI backed TTP-SSP-LeJ as routine sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias? Why is the NHN nowhere to be seen when dumped, deshaped dead bodies of the Baloch youths are found? Politically speaking, why does such NHN go into hiding when Mosharraf Zaidi, Ejaz Haider, Najam Sethi etc manufacture most poisonous and slanderous attacks on President Zardari? Where do they vanish when Murtaza Razvi writes a poisonous post against Benazir Bhutto on the death of her own mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto? Is the honour of Husain Haqqani more important than the honour of Shaheed Rani?

    I hope someone may help me in findings answers to the above questions.

    Note to NHN propagandists: I believe in political, non-violent struggle against the oppressors and the opportunists. In this respect my ideal is not Al Zulfiqar but Benazir Bhutto who waged a peaceful struggle against military dictators (General Zia, General Musharraf) as well as against opportunists (Jatoi, Khar, Ramay, Aitzaz Ahsan) within her own party. I hope Pakistan Blogzine will be kind enough to publish this post discarding all pressures and blackmailing by the NHN.

  • MANSOOR IJAZ, counter-terrorism analyst, tells the Morning Majority on 630 WMAL that it seems implausible that Inter-Services Intelligence, the premier Pakistani spy agency, knew nothing about where bin Laden was.

    Indeed, it seems much more likely that elements within the agency knew exactly where he was, and kept bin Laden within that compound on just the terms it wanted. In all of this, Pakistan has almost certainly acted as a knowing babysitter, watching over the terror master so he would do no further harm — as long as the babysitting fees were sufficient and recurring. Washington, in its infinite naiveties, simply did not know who exactly was being babysat. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil; it was the perfect arrangement between a Pollyannish parent and its seditious babysitter.

  • Back in August 2011, Najam Sethi wrote:

    Pakistan proposes, US disposes?

    Rather cunningly, too, via Hussain Haqqani, his sharp Ambassador in Washington, Mr Zardari is leveraging with the US by letting it negotiate with GHQ over the net worth of the strategic or transactional dimensions of the US-Pak relationship whereby each actor is venting its anger, alienation and frustration directly and bluntly with the other.

    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20110819&page=1

  • Such Gup (Najam Sethi):

    Riot act in reverse

    Now that Admiral Mullen has denied that he ever sent the notorious “Memo” from Hubby to the White House (pledging that the government would replace the current military leadership following the OBL raid on May 2), Hubby’s loyal trooper in DC is off the hook. Our man in DC has stuck by Hubby through many a crisis while being attacked by the khakis for doing precisely that. Of late, we hear, Our man in DC has read out the riot act in reverse and has told the khakis that he is ready to give up his crown of thorns and go back to teaching and writing. Hubby doesn’t want that, given Our Man’s Washington rolodex and ability to win friends and influence people in the US. Ironically, while the khakis loathe seeing him as our rep in DC, they’re more worried about what he might do once he is free from the obligations of office. For the moment, the khakis seem to have decided that it’s better to have him on side than against.

    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111111&page=32

  • Spouse Support
    Hussain Haqqani, his wife attack Imran Khan for his comment

    KAVEREE BAMZAI NOVEMBER 5, 2011 | UPDATED 13:59 IST

    When Imran Khan accused Pakistan Ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, of working against his country’s interests, he found himself under a two-pronged attack.

    Not only from Haqqani who gave an interview to a TV channel daring Khan to prove his charges but also his articulate wife, Asif Ali Zardari’s spokeswoman, Farahnaz Ispahani, who tweeted: “Attacking my husband by name! How powerful is my husband. And how small is Imran Khan.” Really? We would like to know how powerful Haqqani is, and why.

    Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/imran-khan-accuse-pakistan-ambassador-to-the-us-hussain-haqqani/1/158800.html

  • Imran should bring the letter to SC: Haqqani
    By Katrina Jones
    – Oct 31st, 2011 (No Comment)

    Islamabad: Pakistani ambassador of the United States Hussain Haqqani has said if Imran Khan has the letter of President Asif Ali Zardari, he should present it in the Supreme Court.
    According to a private TV channel, the ambassador said that leveling charges could not change the facts.
    Earlier on Sunday, Imran Khan alleged that Haqqani was working for US interest and he has no concern with Pakistan.

    http://www.thenewstribe.com/2011/10/31/imran-should-bring-the-letter-to-sc-haqqani/#.Tr-cCEPib8A

  • Fahim Siddiqui
    November 3, 2011 at 10:55 am
    It’s interesting to see an honourable doctor all humility and praise for Pakistan’s ambassador to US:
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    Imran Khan targeting @husainhaqqani is slanderous , pathetic & desperate #fail #ptijalsa
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    I concur MT“@husainhaqqani: @frooq @mazdaki I block all users of abusive language, irrespective of party affiliation ” #yougotblocked
    beenasarwar beena sarwar
    Good policy. RT @husainhaqqani: @frooq @mazdaki I block all users of abusive language, irrespective of party affiliation
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    MT “Reuters on @husainhaqqani speech about #US – #Pakistan relations at @ChicagoCouncil bit.ly/tNUIuJ”
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    Must watch MT“@husainhaqqani invites young #Pakistanis 2 be a nation of achievers, not complainers t.co/qcqzwYIb” Be the change u wanna see
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    MT “@husainhaqqani: Tribute by @fispahani :’ #NusratBhutto -We Salute You’ bit.ly/vfatQQ” Iron Lady – for resolve against tyrant
    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    by mazdaki
    Reuters– ‘Pakistan military denies BBC report on Taliban links’ reut.rs/ss7aLH
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    Must watch MT“@husainhaqqani invites young #Pakistanis 2 be a nation of achievers, not complainers t.co/qcqzwYIb” Be the change u wanna see
    mazdaki Mohammad Taqi
    wohi maikhana-o-sahbaa,wohi saghar,wohi shisha/magar awaze nosha nosh madham hoti jati he goo.gl/WWicr @beenasarwar @husainhaqqani
    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    by mazdaki
    On way to Portland, OR. Look forward 2 town hall meeting w/ Pakistani community in Oregon tonight
    beenasarwar beena sarwar
    by mazdaki
    ‘Crush India’ 1971 mood is like’Crush America’ mood now: Cowasjee; we need realism of @husainhaqqani (YES) bit.ly/oYo8As #Pakistan
    Reply

    Tahir Jadoon
    November 3, 2011 at 10:55 am
    aliarqam aliarqam
    #ImranKhan speaks against @husainhaqqani saying he wrote letter to the Americans to rescue him from Pakistan Army’s wrath
    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    by aliarqam
    RT @newpakistan: “If U have nevr bn called a kafir or a traitor being an activist in Pakistan, U dont matter” aje.me/uHw9oY
    SundayDT SundayMagDailyTimes
    by aliarqam
    Ambassador @husainhaqqani speech2 youth-MUST WATCH.R we going 2be a nation of complainers or a nation of… fb.me/1iqnJiBik
    aliarqam aliarqam
    MT @husainhaqqani ‘Of Change & Altrnatives’ DT editorial describes attack on me based on “false story” & “uncalled for” bit.ly/sKWhkl
    Reply

    Mussalman
    November 3, 2011 at 10:56 am
    غالباً یہ 1991ء کا موسم گرما تھا، جب لاہور کے گورنر ہاؤس میں وزیراعظم نواز شریف نے ایک ہنگامی اجلاس طلب کیا۔ لاہور کے نواحی ضلع شیخوپورہ کے بعد کہ ہمیشہ جرائم کی پرورش گاہ رہا، لاہور شہر میں ڈکیتیوں کی لہر تھی اور بے پناہ تھی۔ درویش وزیر اعلیٰ غلام حیدر وائیں کے علاوہ جو تعلیم و تدریس اور وعظ و نصیحت کے آدمی تھے، پنجاب کے انسپکٹر جنرل پولیس چوہدری سردار محمد بھی شریک تھے۔ قلم و قرطاس کا آدمی، جسے پولیس گردی سے زیادہ مطالعے اور سیاست سے شغف تھا۔ پنجاب پولیس برباد تھی اور ہر گزرتے دن کے ساتھ برباد تر ۔ 1988ء سے 1990ء تک میاں محمد نواز شریف کی وزارت اعلیٰ کے دوسرے دور میں پنجاب پولیس میں 25 ہزار سے زیادہ بھرتیاں ہوئیں تقریباً سب کی سب سفارش پر۔ نون لیگ سے تعلق رکھنے والے ایم پی اے اور ایم این اے فیصلہ کن تھے۔ ہر ایک کا کوٹہ ۔حصہ بقدر جثہ۔ ایسے ایسے لوگوں کو وردی پہننے کا شرف حاصل ہوا ، جیلوں میں جنہیں جانا چاہئے تھا۔ اس کے بعد شہباز شریف کی بہترین کوششوں کے باوجود پنجاب پولیس کبھی سنبھل نہ سکی کبھی سدھر نہ سکی۔ تلاطم خیز دور میں اصل مسئلہ امن نہیں سیاسی استحکام تھا۔ یہ کہ چند ووٹوں کی اکثریت سے قائم مسلم لیگی حکومت کو کیونکر اور کس طرح بچا لیا جائے۔ مرکز میں محترمہ بے نظیر بھٹو کی حکومت تھی۔ سب سے بڑا دردِ سر جس کا یہ تھا کہ ”رجعت پسندوں“ کے رہنما نواز شریف سے کیونکر نجات حاصل کی جائے۔ جس طرح نواز شریف کے علاوہ فوج اور خفیہ ایجنسیوں کا یہ کہ جلد از جلد کس طرح محترمہ سے چھٹکارا پایا جائے۔ امریکہ میں صدر زرداری کے ذاتی نمائندے حسین حقانی تب میاں صاحب کے بازوئے شمشیر زن تھے اور اخبارات میں اس طرح کے اشتہار چھپا کرتے”تم نے ڈھاکہ دیا، ہم نے کابل لیا“۔ حسین حقانی کے پاس کچھ تصاویر تھیں، جو وہ ہر ایک کو دکھایا کرتے اور مطلع کرتے کہ معاملات کو اگر ان پر چھوڑ دیا جائے تو چشم زدن میں وہ غنیم کے لشکر کو بحیرہ عرب میں غرق کر سکتے ہیں۔ اقتدار کا توازن ارکانِ پنجاب اسمبلی کے ہاتھ میں تھا۔ ایک آدھ بھی بگڑ تا تو شریف حکومت لرزنے لگتی۔
    کل رات مے کشوں نے توازن جو کھو دیا
    خط سبو پہ کون و مکاں ڈولتے رہے
    انہی دنوں میاں محمد نواز شریف نے لیاقت بلوچ سے یہ کہا تھا : شب تمام بندوبست کر کے سوتا ہوں، لیکن سویر سو کر اٹھتا ہوں تو لگتا ہے، بچوں گا نہیں؛ چنانچہ ارکان اسمبلی کو آسودہ رکھنابہرحال لازم تھا۔ ظاہر ہے کہ ارکان کی ترجیح پٹوار تھی یا پولیس۔ اپنی پسند کا تحصیل دار ،اپنی پسند کا تھانیدار۔ عنایت مقصود ہوتی، تو ایک عدد یا ایک سے زیادہ نائب تحصیل داروں کی تقرری کے پروانے عطا ہوتے۔ عتاب جس پر نازل ہوتا، اس کے حلقے میں مخالف تھانیدار لگا دیا جاتا ۔
    وزارت اعلیٰ کے دو مشکل برس بتانے کے بعد میاں محمد نواز شریف فوج، خفیہ ایجنسیوں، ایم کیو ایم ، پولیس اور پٹوار کی مدد سے بڑی اکثریت والے وزیر اعظم بنے تو پنجاب کے گورنر میاں محمد اظہر ان کے لئے دردِ سر ہو گئے۔ آئے دن وہ انہیں یاد دلاتے کہ مہنگائی بڑھ رہی ہے اور برباد کر دی گئی پولیس مجرموں کی بجائے معصوم شہریوں کا تعاقب کرتی ہے۔ میاں صاحب مگر کچھ اور مشاغل میں مگن تھے۔ وقتی مصلحت میں اقتدار اور سیاست کی حرکیات کو نظر انداز کر دینے والے ان کے سرپرست جنرل اسلم بیگ، جنرل حمید گل اور غلام اسحاق خان ٹک ٹک دیدم، دم نہ کشیدم کی تصویر۔ تصویر نے مصور سے بغاوت کر دی تھی۔ تخلیق اب خالق کا منہ چڑاتی تھی۔ تقدیر کند خندہ
    تو آں قاتل کہ از بہر تماشا خونِ من ریزی… ناتمام…ہارون الرشید
    http://search.jang.com.pk/details.asp?nid=505600
    Reply

    Yasin
    November 3, 2011 at 11:02 am
    It is a known fact that Mr Haqqani worked as a paid advisor for IJI, the same IJI which was provided millions of rupees by the ISI to defame and defeat Benazir Bhutto and PPP. Much of that illegal money was provided in order to manage the media campaign (read smear campaign) against BB. Link it with Sheikh Rashid Ahmed’s recent revelation about Mr Haqqani’s role in the BB’s letter forgery, and that will give us the whole picture.
    Will the blind disciples of Mr Haqqani care to read, and reflect?
    http://criticalppp.com/archives/1356
    Reply

    Yasin
    November 3, 2011 at 11:02 am
    BB was a very generous and kind hearted lady. There is no argument about that. Her comments about Mr Haqqani represent the same kindness which was a part and parcel of BB’s character.
    Do you suggest that Mr Haqqani did not have any role in BB’s defamation, or that he never approached Musharraf to become a minister in his cabinet, or that he was never paid money from the ISI’s illegal payments to IJI, or that he was a naive young student during all those years?
    Mr Haqqani is a man of dubious credentials; commitment and loyalty seem to be lacking in his character. In the words of Ardershir Cowasjee, Mr Haqqani is a ‘weaver of lies, the most prominent weaver and damage-doer in Pakistan’s history‘.
    http://www.dawn.com/weekly/cowas/990629.htm
    Reply

    Rahat Ali Changezi
    November 3, 2011 at 11:04 am
    Comments on Husain Haqqani and Balochistan From an LUBP article:
    Hoss says:
    July 23, 2011 at 12:43 pm
    First I don’t think there are liberals in Pakistan. The name mentioned Raza Rumi, Marvi sarmad and few others are not liberal by any means. Marvi is a PPP supporter, Raza Rumi has no clue about any thing. He is primarily a meaty mouthy writer with half baked ideas and probably does not even understand what liberalism is all about. Most of these guys just follow Hussain Haqqani who is nothing more than a rank opportunist. A recent article in a US paper, a baloch writer, exposed Hussain Haqqani, and I agree with what he wrote about him. Will try to post the link too. I read somewhere that most of the Pakistani liberals are primarily left of the center in good times and right of the center in bad times. There is no chance of true liberal emerging from a predominantly feudal society where most of the middle class so called liberals, profess liberalism to become acceptable to the elite. Even the secularists from the smaller provinces are secular in reaction to state’s commitment to religion and the use of religion to suppress political rights of the people of the smaller provinces. They hardly believe in human rights and are as against the women rights as an fundamentalist rightwing can be.
    We have a thoroughly confused society and there is no magic wand to fix that. This confusion helps the establishment to manipulate different groups for maintaining its control over the state.
    With apologies to the writer, I don’t think there is even a single soul in the Ppp that can be called liberal in any sense. Liberals stand for change, and none in the ppp likes the change.
    Ali Arqam says:
    July 23, 2011 at 1:36 pm
    Kudos, Hoss Sain!
    You nailed it, The article you are mentioning was by Masti Khan, I think, who exposes HH for writing a letter to Carnegie Endowment to stop a gathering of Baloch secularists.
    Though HH has denied writing such letter but Masti Khan sticks to what he has written.
    Ayesha S wrote an obituary when democrat HH turned to a diplomat HH, and criticised him for using his intellect and skills advocating the military in United States.
    But everything is right under the tag of “Pragmatism” and “Practicality”.
    Hoss says:
    July 23, 2011 at 1:59 pm
    Actually Ali I had discussion with Ayesha when she was in DC on HH and his continuously changing loyalties. I think at heart he is still a gun touting jamaatia that he was in Karachi.
    Ali Arqam says:
    July 23, 2011 at 2:30 pm
    Though a columnist friend commented that Ayesha S is harsh on HH, but when I watched his recent session at Carnegie Endowment, I was shocked after listening him repeating the same arguments in defense of military on post Bin Laden developments, as spinned by the pro military writer Ejaz Haider and others like him.
    http://criticalppp.com/archives/53901
    Reply

    Waris Jatoi
    November 3, 2011 at 11:08 am
    Is it a coincidence that the 50 rupee note with Hussain Haqqani’s picture is signed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan.
    Does anyone remember Hussain Haqqani’s famous interview in which he candidly admitted: “I was always with the President”????
    Reply

    Samad
    November 3, 2011 at 11:14 am
    Slanderous post.
    Reply

    Pari Agha
    November 7, 2011 at 9:23 am
    I can identify the following names as key affiliates of NHN on Twitter:
    Raza Rumi, Marvi Sirmed, Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Ejaz Haider, Beena Sarwar etc, and some mini-affiliates: Riaz Toori, Shahid Saeed, Malik Siraj Akbar etc.
    While I personally respect the writings of Raza, Marvi and Taqi, I think they are sacrificing their own Namoos for the sake of Haqqani’s Namoos which is not a great bargain
    Reply

    Urooj Sarwar
    November 7, 2011 at 9:25 am
    If you are writing against Hussain Haqqani and General Kayani, you must be a member of Al Zulfikar.
    Reply

    Jhanrnay Ka Dharna
    November 7, 2011 at 9:31 am
    The 50 Rupee note with Ambassador Haqqani’s picture is an apt expression of the benefits (money, accommodation, lunch, appreciation, benefits) he provides to various members of his Namoos Network. He was trained in this art by none else than the ISI chief Hamid Gul, the founder of IJI.
    How can NHN flatterers refuse such generosity?
    menu note wakha, mera mood banay
    http://youtu.be/u3pu9AsiAxE

    http://pakistanblogzine.wordpress.com

  • I really enjoyed Najam Sethi’s comment about Hussain Haqqani. It is interesting that Mr. Haqqani is equally trusted and mistrusted by PPP and GHQ.

    Of late, we hear, Our man in DC has read out the riot act in reverse and has told the khakis that he is ready to give up his crown of thorns and go back to teaching and writing. Hubby doesn’t want that, given Our Man’s Washington rolodex and ability to win friends and influence people in the US. Ironically, while the khakis loathe seeing him as our rep in DC, they’re more worried about what he might do once he is free from the obligations of office. For the moment, the khakis seem to have decided that it’s better to have him on side than against.

    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111111&page=32

  • Sethi sahab writes “For the moment, the khakis seem to have decided that it’s better to have him on side than against.”

    Does this mean HH is on khakis side? Then why did Dr. Taqi, Mehmal etc choose to attack Mansur Ijaz who is clearly anti-ISI.

    Mansur Ijaz = anti-ISI
    Hussain Haqqani = on Khakis side

    Some writers attacked Ijaz, defended Haqqani.

    Decide yourself!!!!

  • You are ignoring the fact that by implicating Pakistani diplomat, Mr. Ijaz did not help the PPP or President Zardari.

  • @Khaled

    You are ignoring the fact that Mr. Haqqani used some reputed columnists to protect his own career.

    Mr. Haqqani is very career-oriented. He will happily serve Imran Khan or General Kayani if they were to form future government of Pakistan.

  • Wednesday, May 12, 2010

    Obituary of a Democrat
    by Ayesha Siddiqa

    Husain Haqqani (HH) will be remembered for his services to Pakistan’s democracy. His voice is missed in today’s Washington, DC and its academic circles. Indeed, HH was in American capital speaking for democratic forces at a time when no one would commit themselves to speaking out for what Pakistan and its people deserve. I still cannot forget the evenings in 2004-05 when HH had still not managed to elevate himself to the position of an ambassador and was engaged in writing his seminal work on Pakistan’s military and its links with the militants. Artfully, he would utter poetic verses of famous Urdu poets punctuated by theoretical jargon to explain how he arrived at his important conclusion that the army was in bed with the Taliban and jihadis. Of course, HH is a man of monologues, but in the company of veteran journalist Khalid Hassan, he would often give others the chance to speak. Probably, the art of creating a dialogue belonged to KH rather than HH. At that time in history, HH seemed like a person close to unearthing a treasure which, indeed, his book turned out to be. “Pakistan – Mosque to Military” is a seminal work which may not be produced again, especially not by him. The smooth prose, the readability of the narrative and the facts provided in those pages make the book more than just and account of what Pakistan’s military had done to the country. The organization, as HH pointed out, had since long been engaged with religious zealots and used them to fight its battles.

    Hussain Haqqani (HH) believed that his work would contribute to the struggle by democractic forces to push back the dictatorial dispensation of General Pervez Musharraf. HH had happily embraced the Pakistan People’s Party’s victory in the 2008 elections as the great success of democracy. For him, Benazir Bhutto’s death in December 2007 did not matter since the ultimate joy was that she had managed to make her party transit to democracy. This is what HH and many of his friends in Pakistan and in the US called transition to democracy. I remember meeting him on February 19th 2008 for the recording of Shehryar Azhar’s program for ARY on the post-election scenario in Pakistan (if Husein was the prophet of transitional politics Azhar was his Khalifa. Between the two it was claimed that elections represented the change Pakjistan was waiting for). During that meeting Husein thumped his own back and chest claiming that his predictions had indeed come true – Benazir Bhutto managed to force Musharraf to shed his uniform and win the elections. It didn’t matter for the ambassador that she had paid with her own life for this transition to happen.

    Later, HH became the great ambassador of this transitional democracy. It didn’t matter that the structural problems in Pakistan’s politics continued such as the excessive power of the military, the comparative weakness of political institutions and myopia of the combined civil-military ruling elite of the country. The plan was to use American pressure to push back the military in Pakistan. One worried for the life and security of this diplomatic cow-boy especially after the GHQ in Rawalpindi managed to get rid of its own child General Mehmoud Ali Durrani as National Security Advisor. The Kerry-Lugar bill was the high point of HH – the democrat. This was the best he could achive. But it also invoked the wrath of the top brass. The GHQ was extremely upset and made sure it overturned the famous ‘transition to democracy’. Besides other measures, HH’s franchise for marketing Pakistan’s democratic forces in the US was seriously threatened by GHQ’s shadow ambassadors in Washington. One is a professional turncoat female diplomat and the other is a relative of an army chief-turned-author. Both are assisted in the US capital, albeit indirectly, by several menial researchers of Pakistani and American descent. The entire team of head honchos and menials combined tries to change American minds and convince them that military is the best thing which has happened to Pakistan. Given that most want to be ambassador in Washington, DC their loyalty to the GHQ and efficiency in marketing the khakis cannot be underestimated. While the lady continues to be busy cultivating relations in Washington so that she could take the most coveted position at some future date, the gent has also emerged as a wannabe. He even got a defense-analyst-for-hire reputed as one of many military’s trumpets to write op-eds suggesting that the wannabe should be made the ambassador instead. The military trumpet, who is reputed to pimp for the GHQ, US government and many others depending on who can pay a good price was even invited to an American think tank by the gent as a reward for writing a favorable article. Surely, the lady was not happy with such a move. The said gent spends all his time pontificating about the influence and stability of the military in Pakistan. At the US think-tank the trumpet spoke about turning Islamabad into Dhaka.

    Suddenly, the skies of American capital city seemed full of vultures hovering around to search the dead body of a diplomat they could chew on. Things became extremely dramatic as it was a matter of survival. For our friend HH, the choice was between killing the democrat to save the diplomat or vise versa. Obviously, the choice was to save the diplomat which was the logical thing to do in a Washington DC where policymakers and the human-terrain type academics stick to a set recipe for democracy out of the political cookbook. HH the diplomat could hear the sound of the boots marching to Washington and it was best to put the democrat to sleep. And so one evening those present at the occasion of the reception hosted at the Pakistan embassy, Washington, DC in honor of the foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani also witnessed the funeral of Husein the democrat.

    Those of us, who care about democracy and politics in Pakistan, will remember the man for his services. He was a charming salesman whose presence will be missed in Washington where there is now hardly anyone to sing a song of and for the democratic forces in Pakistan. The vultures are still hovering above searching for bits and pieces of flesh and bones of the democrat. The spirit will probably be in some pain at the moment but will soon vanish from where it may not be recalled. The services of HH the democrat will always be remembered.

    May his soul rest in peace.

    Posted by Ayesha Siddiqa

    http://ayeshasiddiqa.blogspot.com/2010/05/obituary-of-democrat.html

    comments:
    Hossp said…
    A good one.

    But HH has a history of opportunism…
    May 12, 2010 5:59 PM

    Ayesha Siddiqa said…
    It is still sad that he is unable to defend democracy and is now with the khakis
    May 12, 2010 8:38 PM

  • In the meanwhile, ISI’s best friend from India, is dutifully doing his job:

    Rezhasan Rezaul Hasan Laskar
    Mansoor Ijaz on Geo News now on the infamous memorandum.
    18 hours ago Favorite Retweet Reply

    Rezaul Hasan Laskar: An Indian journalist embedded in Deep State’s narratives
    http://criticalppp.com/archives/58465

    ………

    SamadK Samad Khurram
    Does any body have Mansoor Ejaz’s email? I want some of my fiction to make headlines.

    shahidsaeed Shahid Saeed
    I like the Chocolate dipped Strawberries more RT @HumaImtiaz Apparently Mansoor Ijaz received a message on a Blue Berry bit.ly/utQCnj
    12 Nov Favorite Retweet Reply

    HumaImtiaz Huma Imtiaz
    Apparently Mansoor Ijaz received a message on a Blue Berry. bit.ly/utQCnj

  • Chiltan salma jafar
    Some PPP officials call their critics barking dogs…:-)) Hilarious!!!

    Chiltan salma jafar
    Few hav the palate fr such a pinching piece RT: @farhadjarral A critical analysis of HusainHaqqani vs MansoorIjaz saga: bit.ly/vBwD8F

    Chiltan salma jafar
    @Laibaah1 an amazing piece…keep it up!

  • Its stupid to attack him. Every one knows whats the Truth. Zardari regime should show some courage or it will be a diaster

  • Sherry,

    I agree.

    The News (editorial written by Sehbai / Mir Shakil Rahman) is right here:

    “Yet, after two weeks of stern government denials, TV talk shows and op-ed columns lambasting Ijaz, the confused denial by Admiral Mullen’s spokesman and Ijaz’s BBM records, important questions remain unanswered and the content of the infamous memo remains sealed. ”

    However, in the same editorial, Sehbai/Mir Shakil/establishment show their true colours when they write:

    “Is there a cover-up going on. The memorandum holds the key to unfurling what the Zardari government is so keen to hide. It is time to end the Kabuki dance between the Zardari government and Mansoor Ijaz. Official bodies of Pakistan charged with our national security, justice and legislation need to do everything in their power to see that the memo’s content gets known. Whether that is through an invitation extended to Ijaz to testify in a parliamentary setting, or an in-camera sitting with our army and intelligence officials, or as evidence provided in Supreme Court hearings, the Ijaz dossier must be made public and verified. The facts are now sufficiently in view. What Pakistanis must do is insist that the cover-up stops immediately. The president himself should call on the evidence to be presented in full — if he really has nothing to hide.”

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=77383&Cat=8

    Mansoor Ijaz affair has been foolishly mismanaged by PPP’s media advisers, and who else but Zardari is being forced to pay the price.

    huay tum dost jiss ke dushman uss ka aasman kyun ho

  • BREAKING

    Spokesperson said that the meeting decided to call Ambassador Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Ambassador in Washington, to Islamabad to brief the country’s leadership on a host of issues impacting on Pak-US relations and the recent developments.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=26553&title=President-chairs-meeting-of-PPP-senior-leaders

    PPP wants briefing by Haqqani on issues impacting Pak-US ties

    Asim Yasin
    Tuesday, November 15, 2011

    2

    ISLAMABAD: President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani Monday decided to call Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington, to Islamabad to brief the country’s leadership on a host of issues impacting on Pak-US relations and recent developments.

    The decision was taken during a core committee meeting, held at a time when Shah Mehmood Qureshi said goodbye to the PPP and resigned from National Assembly membership. The meeting was called to discuss the political impact on the party of Qureshi’s decision.

    According to sources, the decision to call Haqqani was taken to defuse the situation arising from the memo allegedly written by President Asif Ali Zardari to Admiral Mike Mullen, and recently denied by the government as well as Mike Mullen.

    According to sources, it was viewed that individuals come and go but this will have no impact on the party as Qureshi had written his political obituary and political wilderness is his destiny. Sources said one of the participants of the meeting said since the formation of the PPP, many individuals had used the party platform for their political ambition but ‘turned into zero’ after leaving it.

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=10298&Cat=13

  • sharmilafaruqi SHARMILAFARUQUI
    Ambassador haqqani called to Pakistan to xplain mansur ejaz’s allegations

    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    @Sam_pk FYI–President & PM always have right 2 summon any of their appointees 4 meetings. Ambs being called 4 briefing is normal

    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    @DrAwab Lagay raho Munna Bhai, BDS, MS 🙂 Baat karnay kay liey bulaya hai, daant nikaalnay kay lie nahin 🙂

    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    @DrAwab Nothing immediate. PPP wants briefing by Amb on issues impacting US-Pakistan ties bit.ly/u5magR”

    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    @PakistanRT @Zawaf84 Nothing immediate. PPP wants briefing by Amb on issues impacting US-Pakistan ties bit.ly/u5magR

    husainhaqqani Husain Haqqani
    @NewmarkBobby Nothing immediate. PPP wants briefing by Amb on issues impacting US-Pakistan ties bit.ly/u5magR

  • There shouldn’t by any doubt in anyone’s mind that Mansoor Ejaz hates Pakistan. He would do anything to malign Pakistan and quite frankly even if that letter was written, I don’t disagree with what Zardari allegedly said in it. General are a cancer to pakistan, they have to go at any cost.

    Zardari too is cancer but he can be removed but Generals are not!

  • Its stupid to attack him. Every one knows whats the Truth. Zardari regime should show some courage or it will be a diaster

    I agree.

  • Typical Pakistani mentality. Even Ejaz Mansoor hates Pakistan, we should see the facts, no matter who discloses. Same like Salman Butt and Asif. Yet thier family and friends are crying that they were innocent. Columnists started with same attitude that Indian media is behind this and it is conspiracy against Pakistan. We should come out of self made portray of being innocent in all cases. At the end, Mansoor Ejaz will be proven true. This is nothing, they can go to any extent to remain in power.

  • Musawer Mansoor Ijaz – America’s Secret Emissary

    JAIDEEP E. MENON

    With the path breaking ceasefire offer by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the political environment surrounding the Kashmir issue has changed. The American angle in this development is often mentioned, without much clarification as to what exactly that entailed. It appears that Washington has acted, at the least, as a source of ideas, as a facilitator and perhaps even as an applier of pressure on the parties involved. One of the people apparently batting for the American side is Musawer Mansoor Ijaz, an American-born businessman and policy advisor of Pakistani origin. He visited Kashmir discreetly in recent months and is one of the people whose ideas on the Kashmir issue seems to filter through to President Bill Clinton. Ijaz can be expected to continue to play an intriguing, if somewhat mysterious, role within the US-India-Pakistan triangle. One can also expect that he may move on to greater prominence through this issue. So who is Mansoor Ijaz?

    In attempts to understand a person, it is a good idea – as Socrates once said – to begin at the beginning. In the case of Mansoor Ijaz, that would have to be with his parents Mujaddid and Lubna. Both were highly intelligent and, apparently, intense individuals with an inclination towards the sciences, in particular physics. Mujaddid was regarded a very demanding personality, while his wife Lubna – who it is said had a Mughal heritage – was a driven personality who did not flinch from breaching societal and traditional barriers. Their story, and more importantly that of their son, for all intents and purposes begins in 1960 when Mujaddid and Lubna emigrated to the USA.

    It is said that Mujaddid played a role in Pakistan’s early nuclear programme. What role he could have played is unclear, because at the time of his emigration to the US, there was no indication that Pakistan had a nuclear programme of any sophistication. More likely, however, is that Mujaddid may have been involved at a conceptual/advisory level and in preliminary developments in Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear programme initially. In view of his expertise, he probably also kept close links from the US with his old schoolmates and teachers who subsequently went on to occupy very high positions in the Pakistani nuclear establishment. As such, he may have been an important source of offshore nuclear technical expertise for Pakistan. Ironically, Mansoor, may be playing a similar role of information and expertise provider (on Pakistan’s nuclear programme) for the country of his birth, the USA. But we get ahead of ourselves.

    After Mujaddid arrived in the US, he settled initially in Florida. Mansoor was born in Tallahassee (FL) in August 1961. But in the following years the family soon moved on to the Blue Ridge Mountains area of Virginia, where Mujaddid was to teach nuclear physics at Virginia Tech, a position he held for 26 years. Meanwhile, Lubna started a doctorate at Virginia Tech and became the first woman PhD in solar physics at the institution. Simultaneously, the pater familias branched into another line of work: farming & real estate. Mujaddid accumulated a small fortune by buying, developing and selling land. As he grew wealthier, he sponsored more than 100 Muslim students to study in the US and helped 50 relatives relocate to America.

    The Ijaz family lived on their farm, and in some ways Mansoor and his brother Farouk had what might be considered an idyllic childhood – going to school, playing ball, learning the things American children learn, and then returning to the farm where he is said to have “milked Holsteins and pitched hay”. Mujaddid and Lubna, however, were not “social rebels”. He was a reserved, stoic and reverent man with a deep love for the land he left behind. He and Lubna ensured that their children were brought up with a good understanding of Pakistani and Islamic traditions. Mansoor and Farouk started at childhood to offer daily prayers facing Mecca. Mansoor still does his daily religious duties.

    This picture would not be wholly American without at least one example of the racism Mansoor and his brother experienced as children. At their elementary school in Blacksburg (VA), they were the only dark-skinned children and were the subject of taunts because of their colour. In high school in nearby Christiansburg, Mansoor who was small in stature (a “deficiency” compounding the colour problem) was beaten by bullies. This may partly explain why Mansoor took to sports. He had a particular interest in tennis and weightlifting. But his parents, typically sub-continental, were not amused. They saw it as a distraction from academic activities. Mansoor has been quoted as saying: “I would beg to play tennis. My father would ask about my grades”. Nevertheless, Mansoor had by then begun to demonstrate his personal smarts as well as qualities of character. He enrolled in the University of Virginia, tutoring the basketball team to help pay his tuition, and while at the university he also earned All-American weightlifting status. At the university he preferred to study law, but was nudged in the direction of architecture by an adviser. In his junior year, his father suggested that he shift to physics. Thus he graduated with a bachelor’s degree in nuclear physics from the University of Virginia in 1983.

    Once again, the sub-continental cultural heritage kicked in and the time for an arranged marriage was nigh. So, in 1983, his family fixed a spouse for him in the Islamic tradition and Mansoor wed Yasmine (who duly proceeded to issue two offspring). In the meantime, Mansoor pursued further studies at the Massachussets Institute of Technology, where he received a degree in mechanical engineering in 1985. He had trained as a neuro-mechanical engineer under a fellowship granted by the joint MIT-Harvard Medical School Medical Engineering Program. Now the following segment of Mansoor’s life is quite vague. It appears he continued postgraduate work at MIT, because according to one of the sources “three and one half years into his graduate studies” at MIT, Mansoor was called home to Virginia for family reasons. His parents, who had lived in the early 1980s in Saudi Arabia (for reasons unknown), had returned to Virginia. But family finances were squeezed, apparently because Mujaddid did not have a clue about basic economics (i.e. interest rates & inflation), which seems rather odd for someone who can understand nuclear physics. In any event, the situation was a turning point for Mansoor, for Mujaddid ordered him to New York to learn the ropes on Wall Street.

    A new phase of Mansoor’s life commenced. His took a job at Van Eck Associates, a mutual fund company. His first project with them was to analyse nuclear fallout from the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union. His models of how world geo-political events affected market conditions proved profitable for Van Eck, and he was soon entrusted to run a large mutual fund that anticipated changes in foreign policy. To build his models, Mansoor drew extensively on his experience at MIT. Having learned the ropes, Mansoor wasted no time in starting his own company: Crescent Investment Management, located on Lexington Avenue, in 1991. The company’s logo, designed by his father Mujaddid, is the Islamic crescent moon recognised worldwide. (It is also the dominant motif on the flag of Pakistan). Mansoor began traveling extensively, visiting Pakistan and several Middle East countries seeking business deals. He built up an impressive network of contacts. At Crescent, he once again put his MIT analytical modelling experience to good use and developed the company’s proprietary currency and interest rate risk management systems known as CARAT, TRACK, RMU and CALOP. Crescent rapidly became a successful company, with a $2.7 billion investment portfolio by the mid-1990s, according to Mansoor.

    For Mansoor, 1992 was a watershed year. It was marked by personal tragedy and change, when his father died of brain and lung cancer. In a gesture mixed with symbolism and drama, Mujaddid had left a lasting message for his son – giving his dying instructions on videotape. In the tape, Mujaddid indicated that – since Mansoor had shown his capability to adapt to changes – he should dedicate himself to helping the Islamic world. Mansoor subsequently said that his father had passed the baton (given Mujaddid’s expertise, outsiders may wonder what exactly the baton was), noting: “There was always a cultural gap between us…His death gave me a conscience”. Although the father-son relationship had not been one of overtly displayed affection, not unlike most sub-continental father-son relationships, Ijaz had been a dutiful son and had always wished to please his father. It is no leap of faith therefore, to assume that his father’s final dramatic gesture had a lasting impact on Mansoor. It is equally safe to assume that Mansoor was already on the radar of the American intelligence agencies because of his obvious brilliance, his parentage, his business skills and his connections. No doubt, they also noticed his growing contributions to the Democratic Party. Indeed, he was singled out in 1994 by the Democratic National Committee which had by then recognised that he was more than just a source of funds.

    In May 1994, one Ari Swiller (one strand in Mansoor’s Jewish links), who has been described as being “in charge of $100,000 donations” for the Democrats, sent a one-page memo fax to Maria Haley, a director of the US Eximbank who has found jobs for many Asian-Americans in the Clinton Administration. According to the Arkansas Democrat Gazette (ADG) of 28 April 1997, the memo claims that Mansoor is “very interested in using his background in nuclear physics”, and accompanies a biographical sketch listing his background and contacts. Subsequently, Haley and Swiller have clammed up. Mansoor has been quoted as saying he does not know anything about the fax, adding (with good reason): “Why would I want a job with the government? I make a hell of lot more money where I am”.

    The biographical sketch, nonetheless, emphasises Mansoor’s knowledge about the nuclear establishment in Pakistan. According to ADG, the memo says that Mujaddid’s “closest classmates and teachers in Pakistan are now in charge” of Pakistani nuclear facilities, including the directors of the Centre for Nuclear Studies and of PINSTECH, Pakistan’s leading nuclear-research facility. Further, ADG claimed that a note at the bottom of the sketch says this, “These names have been provided at the request of the DNC in order to more fully evaluate the potential of a mutual relationship.” The note asked for strict confidentiality. Whatever the case may be, by 1995, Mansoor was hobnobbing with the Washington elite, including Clinton and his wife. By then he was also in a position to directly send letters to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto through a high-ranking intermediary. In other words, he was in the thick of intrigues in 1995 involving the US (at re-election fund-raising time) and an “attempted coup” in Pakistan.

    Imagine the scene, a glamorous fund-raising dinner ($1000/plate) for the Democrats on 11 July 1995, at the home (haveli) of Pakistani cosmetics millionaire Rashid Chaudhary. Guests of honour were Vice President Albert Gore and his wife Tipper. In a gesture to symbolise long-term friendship, Gore planted a tree in his host’s back yard that evening. Chaudary’s wife gave Tipper a shalwar kameez, which she changed into before dinner in order to please the hosts; the objective was to raise $150,000 that night from the 150 guests.

    Yet the event was not about food (which was plain, catered chicken and vegetables) but about politics – both the American and sub-continental versions. And this is where Mansoor comes into the picture. He was seated at the head table, along with Chaudhary and Gore as well as Izzat Majeed, a former Saudi oil adviser and chief Executive of Alyph Ltd., a London financial consulting firm; Nancy Soderberg, then Deputy Assistant to the President for national security affairs; Alexis Herman, a former Democratic National Committee chief of staff who moved on to become head of the White House Office of Public Liaison and Clinton’s nominee for secretary of labor; naturalized American Yusuf Haroon, a former Pakistani politician whose family owns the Pakistani newspaper group Dawn; and two unidentified businessmen. Just as important as who was present at the dinner was who was not: namely, Maleela Lodhi, Pakistan’s then Ambassador to the United States. She had not been invited. Instead, the Bhutto government was represented by Wajid Shamzil Hassan, Pakistan’s Ambassador to London.

    Why so? Well, intrigue was in the air. Plans of a “coup” in the making against the Bhutto government were already afloat and the White House was already aware of it. US media reports have it that Yusuf Haroon was the point man on this on the American side. His goal was to get maximum publicity coverage with the high and mighty in the US so that the credibility of the coup would be enhanced. A speech by Gore at a dinner hosted by Chaudhary at which Haroon was at the head table was just such an opportunity. (Photos were taken by Larry Glenn, a pro hired by the Democratic National Committee). But this plan collapsed, in manner similar to how the coup fizzled out some months later. Pivotal in the derailment of the plan was Mansoor, the American-born Pakistani with the “cultural gap” with his late father. He had to choose between divergent interests and outcomes, and he did. Here’s how.

    Mansoor, through his sources in Pakistan, had learned that a coup was being prepared against Bhutto. He then injected himself into the situation by doing two things: (1) informing the US government which had a pro-Bhutto stance at the time; and (2) informing Bhutto herself in a four-page letter dated June 29 and delivered to Zafar Hilaly, her National Security Adviser. The thrust of the information provided by Mansoor was as follows: Yusuf Haroon and Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan, then Pakistan’s Chief of Military Intelligence, were plotting to oust Bhutto. According to the ADG, Mansoor said that he learned of the plot from sources inside Pakistan who were aware of his political connections in the US.

    In the letter to Bhutto, Mansoor recommended that she send a trusted friend to represent her at Chaudhary’s dinner, namely Shamzil Hassan, the ambassador to London. Oddly enough, it appears that she may not have trusted Maleeha Lodhi, ambassador in Washington; perhaps Bhutto, a fairly shrewd judge of character, recognised that Maleeha – like her brother Amir Lodhi – would sell herself to the highest bidder (and she has done so since). One would have thought that Mansoor’s interjection to save Bhutto would have earned him her eternal appreciation, but this was not to be. She dealt with the ‘coup attempt’ in her own way, apparently compromising Lt. Gen. Quli Khan and getting him to nail his own underlings, but that’s another story.

    Gore’s office and the National Security Council had been forewarned by Mansoor about the coup and were in no mood to be used. Indeed, it has been reported that on the day of the dinner, Mansoor called the Vice President’s office to warn his staff. At the same time, foregoing $150,000 was not an option. So, Mansoor provided an escape route by suggesting a way to subvert the plotters’ plan: Gore should somehow address the coup issue when he spoke. Thus Gore gave a long speech and at the end said a coup in Pakistan against Bhutto would not be tolerated by Washington. As numerous journalists were present, the Haroon-Quli Khan plan was quashed in public – at least from the US perspective.

    The question here is, what made Mansoor decide that the best course of action was to inform the US Government. He obviously knew that, having family members still in Pakistan, they would be vulnerable. He also knew that, if it came out (as it did) that he was the leaker of information, powerful people in Pakistan would gun for him (perhaps literally). On the other hand, he knew that if he did not inform the US (and if the US found out that he had known), Pak-Americans in general would be cast in a negative light. He could not be sure, in another uncertainty, that the US would believe him.

    Yet he took the course of informing the US, and it seems he was right; in subsequent years he has been noted wearing US presidential cufflinks and the White House has said it welcomes his views. In April 1997, the White House press spokesman (also the National Security Council press officer) David Johnson has been quoted as saying: “We found him (Mansoor) to have an interesting cultural perspective, particularly with respect to Pakistan… We’ve had no discussion with him about nuclear capabilities, nor negotiations, nor about code names”. The issue of “code names” came up because it was reported that Mansoor was known among circles interested in his activities as “Leo” (the star sign of his birth month August), a bit obvious perhaps but reality does not always conform either to Fleming’s fantasy or to notions of bureaucratic alphanumeric efficiency. In any case, it seems Mansoor did not decide to inform the US about the coup purely on grounds of personal benefit – although that too may have been involved (as will be shown later).

    The year 1995 was eventful for Mansoor in other ways. He was honored as the Endowment for Democracy’s 1995 “Humanitarian of the Year” in recognition of his efforts to aid poor and disaffected people in Bosnia, South Africa, Hungary and Pakistan. The Endowment for Democracy is seen as a Jewish-controlled organisation. From late 1995, however, Mansoor became a severe critic of the Bhutto government, attacking it for corruption, etc. He said subsequently to ADG that, “We were saving democracy from the hands of military dictators, not Mrs. Bhutto as a person…When I wrote the anti-corruption pieces, I was speaking out on behalf of the poor and disaffected people of Pakistan who had no other voice to protect them from the ravages of the Bhutto regime’s unforgivable conduct. There is no contradiction”. This earned him her lasting enmity.

    Was there something more than plain old altruism to Mansoor’s criticism of Bhutto? We’ll never know for certain, but consider this: for what other reason was the year 1995 eventful for Pakistan? The Brown Amendment was passed that year. Indeed, from the beginning of the year the Clinton administration was lobbying for the bill with help from Chaudhary. In June 1995, as Mansoor became aware of the coup plans, the bill was a hot topic, and at the time of the Chaudhary haveli dinner in July it was being debated in the Senate. The Brown Amendment was included in a foreign appropriations bill passed by the Senate in September 1995. In the same month, Mansoor hosted a low-profile fund-raiser for Gore at his Manhattan penthouse. Twenty contributors with “blue-chip credentials” contributed $150,000 to the Clinton-Gore Re-Election Committee, according to a Pakistani journalist present. (White Houe records show 25 guests present contributed $5,000 each). Gore promised during the dinner that the Clinton administration would devote more energy to the “South Asian situation” in its second term. By November 1995, the Brown Amendment was passed.

    After the Brown Amendment was passed, however, Mansoor’s ties with Bhutto began to deteriorate fast. He began writing high profile critiques of her government for corruption. This continued through the following year. That there may be reasons beyond altruism for his views was suggested in October 1996 when Pakistani Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Shaikh said a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Mansoor arguing against foreign investment in Pakistan was “infantile, vindictive and without any credibility” as well as being the result of “pique”. Shaikh said Mansoor was attacking Bhutto because he could not “derive sufficient benefit” from the government.

    Separately ‘Dawn’ quoted a Pakistan Embassy spokesman in Washington as saying that Mansoor was blasting Islamabad because the embassy denied him $15 million he had demanded to secure votes in the US House of Representatives for the passage of the Brown Amendment. The spokesman said that in 1995, after the Brown Amendment had made it through the US senate and then had to be voted on by the House, Mansoor went to the embassy along with his lawyers with a proposal that smacked of a ‘sting operation’. He added, “Mr. Ijaz wanted us to release $15 million for a satellite communications company R.D.D.A. which had done some work for Pakistan in 1979 for which they were not paid and they would sue the government to recover the monies. Ijaz told us that in this way you will kill two birds with one stone, one we will ensure votes in the US House for the Brown Amendment and the other the company R.D.D.A. will not sue you”.

    The spokesman also said that when Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi was given this proposal she saw it as a trap wherein the Pakistani government could land in bigger trouble; so she turned down Mansoor’s proposal saying that “it was illegal”. In the Wall Street Journal article, Mansoor implied that Lodhi used “aggressive tactics” in pushing to recoup the payments for the stalled F-16s (the focus of the Brown Amendment) after the passage of the Amendment because her brother, Amir Lodhi, was interested in the Mirage deal with France as he was the middleman.

    According to the ‘Dawn Wire Service’ of 04 October 1996, the Pakistan Embassy in Washington struck back with a press release in which it refuted Mansoor’s allegations regarding the reasons for Maleeha Lodhi’s eagerness to recoup the F-16 payments. Interestingly, the press release added that Mansoor had been urging Islamabad to recognize Israel. It said he had visited Israel on several occasions, once on the invitation of the mayor of Jerusalem.

    The press release pointed out that in 1995 Mansoor had been given the “Humanitarian of the Year” award by a “major Jewish organization” (Endowment for Democracy – as mentioned earlier). It added further that the reasons for this award was his efforts in establishing clinics and schools in Belgium and parts of Eastern Europe for the Jewish communities there. The press release said Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, who attended the award ceremony, praised Mansoor and his “philanthropist activities”. Then in his speech Mansoor thanked Ambassador Kamal’s wife saying “Thank you Mrs. Kamal for Dal, Roti and Kabab”. Also in October 1996, Mansoor served as a Plenary Session speaker on nuclear proliferation at the State of the World Forum in San Francisco, along with General Lee Butler, Senator Alan Cranston, Nobel laureate Joseph Rotblat and others. Not surprisingly, Mansoor was not too unhappy with the departure of the Bhutto government after President Farooq Khan Leghari sacked it on charges of corruption. It must be noted, in the meantime, that allegations of financial blackmail by Mansoor had surfaced in ‘Dawn’ and ‘Dawn Wire Service’ – both owned by Yusuf Haroon, the man who paid the price for Mansoor’s decision to inform the US government about the coup plot against Bhutto.

    Mansoor continued to maintain a high profile in the US on matters related to Pakistan and, increasingly, Sudan. He is said to have had good links with the Nawaz Sharif administration. It has been reported (Washington Post, 29/4/97) that by the summer of 1996, Mansoor was lobbying strongly for improved US-Sudan ties; Sudan has been on the US list of terrorism-supporting states since 1993. He reportedly made In a half-dozen trips to Khartoum between July 1996 and April 1997, and met several times with Sudan’s president, Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan Bashir, and the country’s real power – the militant Islamic leader, Speaker Hassan Al Turabi, advising them on how to soften the Clinton administration’s position.

    According to the Post, in that time frame, Mansoor also met with senior White House and State Department officials – including Sandy Berger – to urge “constructive engagement” which would include enlisting Turabi’s help in curbing international terrorists. A White House spokesman subsequently said the Mansoor had provided helpful “insight”, although other officials have said they did not find his analysis “compelling”. Other officials he met included Susan E. Rice, special assistant to the president for African affairs; senior officials in the State Department’s African affairs office; and several senior members of Congress, including Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), ranking minority member on the House International Relations Committee, according to government sources. Mansoor also had meetings with FBI and U.S. intelligence officials. At the time, Mansoor had not registered with the Justice Department as a lobbyist for Sudan and said he had received no known compensation from the Khartoum regime.

    The Post said that in April 1997, Mansoor “returned from another trip to Khartoum with a letter from Bashir to Hamilton. Bashir offered in the letter to allow FBI agents unrestricted access in Sudan to determine whether the government supports international terrorists, according to a Sudanese official”. Hamilton passed the letter on to the State Department and told the Post that he had met Mansoor three or four times and found him “a very bright, energetic guy” with “a lot of contacts in the Sudan”. The Post also quoted Mansoor as saying: “I am of the view that Doctor Turabi (then speaker of Sudan, an Islamic radical now marginalized somewhat in Sudanese politics) has access to every single major fringe radical group on the face of the planet,” Ijaz said. “Let’s use him to be our bridge to all of these fringe radical groups”.

    (This writer finds the statement by Mansoor to be debatable. Turabi, who fancies himself something of an intellectual with global pretensions (Sorbonne-educated PhD), does indeed have vast links across the spectrum of Islamist militant activity. But he is only a “moderate” within a militant spectrum. His antecedents are with the Muslim Brotherhood, and he will not hesitate to turn extremely radical if he judges the time to be right. In other words, his moderation is reserved for the right audience).

    On 10 June 1997, Mansoor, provided a testimony to the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime on “Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act”. According to a profile appended as Exhibit B to the testimony he had also become involved in “designing, funding and implementing projects for the people of third-world countries under the direction of his private foundation, The Ijaz Group. His current projects include structuring the asset management systems for the governments of the CIS and designing models for low-income housing in poor African countries”. He was also becoming highly visible in the media, with op-ed pieces in the Wall Street Journal, LA Times, BARRON’s Roundtable Currency discussions, ‘CNN’, etc.

    Mansoor by 1996/97 had begun displaying photographs in his New York office of him and Clinton, Gore, etc. Wearing his Crescent Investment hat, according to the Exhibit B profile, he had also “advised the Unity Government of President Nelson Mandela on low-income housing programs, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia on global investment programs for domestic pension plans, and President Haidar Aliev of Azerbaijan on investment of the revenues from Caspian oil reserves. He also meets regularly with the economic and political leaders of Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan, the Sudan and Persian Gulf states on economic and political issues related to his investment management business”.

    Yet his efforts with Sudan were to take a sudden turn for the worse, (at least temporarily). In summer 1997, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were hit by bombs. The culprits were judged to have received help from Sudan and Afghanistan. In August 1997, both countries were hit by the US with cruise missiles, although later it was acknowledged that the Sudanese target was perhaps wrongly identified. What was Mansoor’s Sudan angle? Well, Sudan was preparing to export oil around 1997 and Mansoor wanted to place himself in a position so that Crescent would be chosen to manage some of Sudan’s export income.

    After the Sudan developments, it did not take very long for Mansoor to raise his profile once again. In May 1998, India set off nuclear bombs, and this was followed by Pakistan within the month. Mansoor’s analytical skills were much in demand by the broadcast and print media and he obliged. After the October 1999 coup in Pakistan, he was once again in high demand and his views (strongly anti-military) were well appreciated.

    In the meantime, Mansoor had managed to get on the prestigious Council for Foreign Relations in the US where he got involved in policy recommendations for South Asia. His background in Washington and his current position no doubt helped Mansoor in arranging a discreet visit to Jammu & Kashmir in May 2000. The fact that he did not have to go through the usual check-up formalities at Srinagar airport in Kashmir may be explained by the fact that he was accompanied and guided throughout his visit in Kashmir by officials of the Indian intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and military officials, who no doubt have assessed his present and future value as an opinion maker and policy driver.

    Notes:

    Dawn Wire Service (October 4, 1996); Dawn Newspaper (date unavailable); Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (April 25th & 28th, 1997); Washington Post (April 29, 1997); The News online; and Exhibit B from Mansoor Ijaz’s Testimony to the House of Representatives (June 10, 1997, 10:00 am, at the Rayburn House Office Building). All the information contained in this article is in the public domain.

    BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR – Volume 3(2) September – October 2000

    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/menon.html

  • Yorkdale’s new food court Dine On 3 opened in the summer of 2012 to replace a previous food court that was adjacent to Holt Renfew. The food collection was a part of a major $35 million expansion to the mall. Dine On 3 is located on the third level of the former Eaton’s department store and features a wide variety of food options including; Famoso Neapolitan Pizzeria, Amaya Express, SU SHI by Spring Rolls, and the world’s largest Illy Espressamente Caf. Dine On 3 also includes some regular food chains such as A KFC, and Subway. The food court covers 45,000 square feet (4,200 and features 18 different eateries.