Original Articles

Faded networks: the overestimated Saudi Legacy of anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan

Author: Fuchs, Simon Wolfgang

Source: Global Discourse: An interdisciplinary journal of current affairs, Volume 9, Number 4, November 2019, pp. 703-715(13)

Publisher: Bristol University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1332/204378919X15718899714223

This article questions the often-assumed centrality of Saudi Arabia for the development of
anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan. I argue that those groups and individuals who have been
most vocal about the Shi‘i ‘threat’ since the 1980s lacked (and continue to lack) any strong
lineages with the Kingdom. Instead, their local polemics in Urdu foregrounded Pakistan as
a political idea and global promise for Islam. This status of Pakistan’s self-view was acutely
threatened by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent establishment of a religious
state under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Consequently, Pakistani sectarian scholars
transcended earlier Salafi-inspired arguments and tried to render Sunni Islam ‘fit’ to compete
with powerful Shi‘i symbols. In doing so, they displayed a remarkable willingness to appropriate
and rework Shi‘i concepts, something that is far from the mind of Saudi clerics.
key words Sectarianism • Saudi Arabia • Pakistan • Iran • Deobandis • Ahl-i Hadis
To cite this article: Fuchs, S.W. (2019) Faded networks: the overestimated Saudi Legacy of
anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan, Global Discourse, vol 9, no 4, 703–715,
DOI: 10.1332/204378919X15718899714223
If we want to believe the existing literature, it was in the 1960s that the Saudis
took charge of anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan. They did not create many of
the (longstanding) arguments from scratch but significantly turned up the heat
of what had been a rather slowly simmering affair with roots in colonial India
(Jones, 2011). The Partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 meant the emergence
of a two-winged Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims alongside the Indian Republic.
Shi‘is formed a significant minority of about 15 to 20 per cent of West Pakistan’s
population whereas their numbers in East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh) stood at
a comparatively insignificant 1 per cent. Aware of their community’s numerical
strength, Shi‘i organisations in West Pakistan in these early decades did not shy away
from openly voicing their demands, such as calling for separate religious education
or control over their endowments. They criticised various Pakistani governments,
several of which were military dictatorships, for failing to comply with these wishes.
Special Issue: Transnational Religious Networks and the
Geopolitics of the Muslim World
Simon Wolfgang Fuchs
While the language of discrimination was thus deployed, the time period until the
1980s witnessed few actual instances of either vicious anti-Shi‘i polemic or, worse,
sectarian violence (Rieck, 2015: 55–195).
Yet, the 1960s brought significant transnational and long-lasting change with them.
In 1968, the Salafi scholar Ihsan Ilahi Zahir (d. 1987) became the first Pakistani to
graduate from the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. The institution
had been opened in 1962 as a Saudi instrument to spread Salafism on a global scale
(Farquhar, 2016). Zahir established close and lasting links with the Saudi royal family,
scholars, and publishing houses in the Kingdom. He also faithfully maintained these
connections after returning home. In the ensuing decades, Zahir put into practice
what he had learned regarding the refutation of ‘false’ Islamic sects. He remained
highly prolific. The Pakistani scholar published 14 polemical books, all of which he
had originally written in Arabic. These were soon to be translated into Urdu with
his output from the 1970s onward predominantly attacking Shi‘i beliefs.
Given these clear entanglements, it is by no means surprising, then, to argue that
‘perhaps no single scholar has been more influential in aggravating Sunni-Shi‘a tensions
and violence in South Asia than Ihsan Ilahi Zahir’ (Haykel, 2011: 191). Studies on
the conflict between Sunnis and Shi‘is in Pakistan tend to single out intellectual input
from the Gulf as the main driver for how sectarian ideas have gained a foothold from
Karachi to Peshawar (Ahmed, 2011). Yet, this focus on Saudi Arabia and the power
of its networks, although popular, does not capture the important local and regional
dimensions of sectarianism in Pakistan. Instead, I would like to argue in this article
that the idea of Pakistan as a disputed political and religious category trumps those
clientelist relationships the Saudis managed to establish with local Salafi actors from the
Ahl-i Hadis tradition. The meaning of Pakistan was subject of an intense debate among
Sunnis and Shi‘is during the 1940s. After independence, the country found itself in
a suspended and striving relationship with Islam with modernists, traditionalists, and
secularists all trying to implement their specific but irreconcilable visions (Zaman,
2018: 54–94). Due to this primary importance of the political, the Iranian Revolution
of 1979 in particular unnerved Pakistan’s Deobandi scholars, who exert leadership
over the numerically largest Sunni denomination in Pakistan. Suddenly, they had to
face a fully formed – and precisely not still ill-defined and ‘suspended’ – rival Islamic
political project next door. In short, after 1979 there occurred a remarkable shift
from Saudi-aligned Salafis, who emphasised most of all the doctrinal incompatibility
between ‘proper’ and Shi‘i Islam, towards Deobandi protagonists, who regarded Shi‘is
as a predominantly political problem (Fuchs, 2019: 152–85).
In the following, I will concentrate on Pakistan’s most important anti-Shi‘i
organisation, the Sipah-i Sahabah-i Pakistan (Army of the Companions of the
Prophet). Originally founded in 1985 it is known since around 2009 as Ahl-i Sunnat
wa-l-Jama‘at (The People of the Prophetic Practice and the Community, ASWJ)
(Zaman, 1998; Abou Zahab, 2009). While probably not itself (or at least not any
longer) directly involved with violence against Shi‘i actors and groups, the SSP/
ASWJ has like no other organisation managed to lay the ground for an atmosphere
that is conducive to attacks on Shi‘is carried out by others. Moreover, there are
strong personal connections between its leading activists and those militants in the
ranks of the notorious Lashkar-i Jhangvi, demonstrated for instance by the fact that
in 2012 Lashkar-i Jhangvi‘s founder Malik Ishaq (d. 2015) was made vice president
of ASWJ (Mehmood, 2012). My main focus of analysis are three prominent and
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influential voices within the SSP/ASWJ, namely its former president ‘Ali Sher Haydari
(d. 2009) (‘Dastavezi film: ‘Allamah ‘Ali Sher Haydari’, 2011), the current chairman
Muhammad Ahmad Ludhiyanvi (Arshad, 2007), and the current central president
Aurangzeb Faruqi (Hanafi, 2014a). Each of these three men is an ‘alim (religious
scholar, pl. ‘ulama’) who was trained in Deobandi institutions and has received his
entire education in Pakistan.
In this article, building on Fuchs (2017b), I present two major arguments. First, I
make the case for the continuing divergence between sectarian arguments formulated
by religious scholars in Saudi Arabia and those advanced by ‘ulama’ in Pakistan.
For the latter, the question of politics is an essential part of their reasoning and not
an afterthought that sits awkwardly on more crucial and fundamental doctrinal
considerations. The ASWJ scholars – unlike their Saudi peers – do not merely react
to geopolitical events and adjust their teachings accordingly. Instead, the striving for
the soul of Pakistan as an ideological, Sunni state forms the heart of their enterprise.
This also explains their willingness to appropriate and rework Shi‘i symbols and ideas,
something that is far from the mind of Saudi clerics (Ismail, 2016: 12).
As far is my second argument is concerned, I claim that these immediate political
concerns made the ASWJ ‘ulama’ rethink the Sunni tradition in search for fresh
polemical arguments. One example is that Deobandi scholars elevate those early
Muslims who are designated as Companions (sahaba) of the Prophet Muhammad to
unprecedented levels unknown to the Sunni tradition (Khalek, 2014). As a result,
the Companions can serve as towering religious figures, able to compete with Shi‘i
conceptions of their divinely-appointed leaders, their Imams (Halm, 2004: 28–44). In
a further step, the well-structured defence of the sahaba as gatekeepers and guarantors
of both Islam and the caliphate as the ideal political system acquired overarching
In sum, then, the Pakistani case questions the supposed central role of Saudi Arabia
in fostering Sunni-Shi‘i sectarianism or leading to a ‘securitisation’ of the issue in South
Asia. Conventional wisdom sees this process as ‘ideologically and financially sustained
and supported by Saudi Arabia, the world epicenter of anti-Shia‘ism’ (Vatanka,
2015: 175). While I do not deny the possibility of continuing financial contributions
beyond the public eye, the primary religious networks created by the Saudis, namely
their intimate connections with leading Ahl-i Hadis ‘ulama’ in Pakistan, preceded
the Iranian Revolution and were not driven by geopolitical concerns. The message
pushed in these circles mostly reiterated longstanding polemical anti-Shi‘i tropes and
primarily theological controversies while staying clear of overtly political arguments.
Unlike the Salafis of the Ahl-i Hadis camp, the scholars of the SSP/ASWJ, who
have been dominating the sectarian scene since the early 1980s, do not require an
affiliation with Saudi institutions in order to claim religious authority in the context
of Pakistan’s Deobandi environment. Their local debates in Urdu do not seem to
filter back toward the wider Middle East and – as far as I am aware – have not been
translated into Arabic. Additionally, as I have also argued elsewhere, there is little
evidence to suggest that the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s had a decisive impact on
sectarianism in Pakistan. Despite all the Saudi funding for various Mujahidin groups,
their publications meant for external and internal consumption largely stay clear of
sectarian rhetoric (Fuchs, 2017a). The next paragraphs will spell out these tensions
between external influence and local concerns in some more detail.
Simon Wolfgang Fuchs
The ASWJ, sectarianism, and the dominance of politics
For Ihsan Ilahi Zahir, Shi‘is formed a predominantly doctrinal concern. None of
his works, irrespective of whether he released them before 1979 or after the Iranian
Revolution, features any explicitly political content. Instead, Zahir emphasised the
futility of working toward Sunni-Shi‘i taqrib (rapprochement). The Shi‘is, he held,
insulted the Companions of the Prophet as impious usurpers and charged them with
suppressing the original text of the Qur‘an because they intended to do away with
evidence for the supposedly divinely ordained leadership of the Shi‘i Imams (Brunner,
2019; Fuchs, 2019: 162–9). The arguments advanced by Saudi scholars in the four
decades since the Iranian Revolution have continued along these lines. Accusations of
polytheism (shirk) because of undue veneration for or even deification of the Prophet‘s
descendants and the supposed Jewish origins of Shi‘i Islam feature prominently
in these polemics (Ismail, 2016: 54–95). Saudi ‘ulama’ have so far refrained from
substantially debating the political implications of Iran‘s model of government, known
as vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent), but rather doubled down on their
longstanding polemics against Shi‘i Islam (Ismail, 2016: 144–52, 157–62, 166–89).
According to Ismail (2016: 202), there was only one noticeable, major change in
sectarian treatises in the wake of the Iranian Revolution: Saudi ‘ulama’ now began to
highlight the nefarious effects which Shi‘i dissimulation (taqiyya) had on their state.
Especially traditionalist-minded scholars, who dominatet the clerical establishment,
‘characterized the Shī‘a as treacherous and disloyal to the Saudi nation; such accusations
are absent from the rhetoric of the early ‘ulamā’’’(Ismail 2016: 203) It is important to
emphasise that these Saudi religious scholars did not develop an alternative political
vision to rival Iranian efforts of exporting its Revolution. Their abstention becomes
understandable in light of the tightly guarded political space in Saudi Arabia. The state
effectively prevents any criticism of the monarchy let alone reflections on possible
alternative political arrangements (Al-Rasheed, 2007: 59–101). The Pakistani ‘ulama’
of the ASWJ, by contrast, use their conflict with the Shi‘is as a launching pad for
pushing attacks on political grounds, labelling their religious opponents as bent on
undermining the original religious promise of Pakistan. The ultimate (and ulterior)
Shi‘i intention became manifest in how the country was transformed on a regular
basis on the ninth and tenth of Muharram each year, when Shi‘is commemorate
the martyrdom of their third Imam Husayn during the battle of Karbala in the year

  1. Sunni sectarian publications argue that the entire Pakistani public sphere then
    took on a Shi‘i appearance (Husayn, 2014; Ta‘aruf… Aghraz… nasb al-‘ayn, n.d: 15;
    Ahl-i Sunnat, 2014). Even more, the Sunni majority were victims of persecution,
    comparable in scope to that suffered by early Muslims at the hands of unbelievers
    (Ludhiyanvi, 2007c: 74). They were subjected to terrorism perpetrated by the state
    and supported by Iran, two actors allegedly working hand-in-glove (Siddiqi, 2014).
    Pakistan had clearly strayed from its divine mission to work toward the return of a
    rightly-guided caliphate (khilafat-i rashida) that would purify society and ensure Islam’s
    global dominance (Metro News, 2014: min. 01:15; Ta‘aruf… Aghraz… nasb al-‘ayn…,
    n.d.: 13–14). Instead, the authorities persecuted those who hailed the sahaba as the
    exemplary embodiment of a such a caliphal system and defended the Companions
    against insults that undermined its appeal (Haydari, 2010c: 53–4; Faruqi, 2014a: 24).
    The ASWJ portrayed itself as the biggest victim of sectarianism in Pakistan, positioned
    always at the receiving end (Faruqi, 2014b; 2018: min. 22:40; Ahl-i Sunnat, 2015;
    Fayyaz, 2015: min. 12:30). The only reason why they had so far been content with
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    merely organising yet another demonstration instead of taking more decisive action
    was that the ASWJ viewed Pakistan as its home which it would not like to set on
    fire, thus displaying a real sense of rightful ownership over the state (Ludhiyanvi,
    2007d: 224–5).
    Shedding light on Shi‘i strategies in Pakistan
    Like their Saudi peers, the Pakistani sectarian ‘ulama’ labelled the Shi‘is as being
    traitors at heart. This act of disavowal was not without pitfalls: Shi‘i religious scholars
    had been at the forefront of many causes very dear to their Sunni colleagues. All
    of these instances of erstwhile cooperation thus had to be labelled as outrageous
    deception and taqiyya, be it the Shi‘i participation in the Pakistan movement, the
    anti-Ahmadi struggle, or the opposition to the left-leaning president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
    (d. 1978). What redeemed ‘ulama’ from the broader Deobandi camp in general and
    those being attached with the ASWJ in particular from having initially fallen into
    this elaborate trap, however, was that they were also the first on a worldwide scale to
    now actively and effectively counter the implications of the Iranian Revolution. The
    entire Muslim world and even the Saudis had initially failed to appreciate the danger
    emanating from Khomeini. ASWJ publications detailed the initial excitement that
    had swept the entire Islamic world in the spring 1979. The catchy slogan ‘Neither
    East nor West but Islam, neither Shi‘is nor Sunnis but Islam’ had proven to be highly
    effective. Even senior literary and religious figures at the time were so overcome
    by Khomeini’s appeal that they completely forgot what Shi‘is actually believed in
    (Ta‘aruf… aghraz… nasb al-‘ayn, n.d.: 6). Fortunately for the Sunni cause, the ASWJ
    argued, Shi‘is had committed their own plunders. Out of missionary zeal, they had
    started to translate many of their essential works for the first time on a worldwide
    scale. Shi‘is thus threw off the ‘black cloak of dissimulation’ under which they had
    managed to disguise themselves as Muslims for the last 1,400 years (Ta‘aruf… aghraz…
    nasb al-‘ayn, n.d.: 7; Hassan, 2014: min. 02:50). Consequently, hundreds of volumes
    denigrating the sahaba in accessible Urdu turned up in Pakistan (Faruqi, 2014a: 25).
    Additionally, Iran made use of an effective agent in Pakistan, namely the main Shi‘i
    organisation of the early 1980s, the Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja’fariyya (Movement for
    the Implementation of Ja‘fari Law, TNFJ). The movement had been established to
    ‘spread Khomeini’s ideas’ and was thus opposed to the ‘ideology of Pakistan and the
    beliefs of the majority of this predominantly Sunni country’ (nazariyyah-i Pakistan aur
    aksariyyati sunni mulk ke ‘aqa’id) (Ta‘aruf… aghraz… nasb al-‘ayn, n.d.: 7–8).
    The first individual to counter these machinations on a global level was Haqq
    Navaz Jhangvi, the founder of the SSP, who clearly felt empowered by General Zia
    ul-Haq’s policy of Islamisation (Fuchs, 2019: 160–2). A brave young mujahid, Jhangvi
    took it on himself to rally the faithful all over Pakistan with the aim of resisting the
    Iranian ‘rebellion from Islam and its ideologies of unbelief’. Jhangvi faced an uphill
    battle with this self-assigned task. The outstanding anti-Shiʿi polemicists of the past
    had only exchanged blows with Shi‘i religious scholars. Jhangvi was the first to bear
    the propagandistic might of a Shi‘i state (Ta‘aruf… aghraz… nasb al-‘ayn, n.d.: 8–9).
    Instead of caving in, Jhangvi pursued a two-pronged strategy. First, he aimed at
    rapidly expanding the area of operation already in 1986, one year after the founding
    of the SSP. Second, he saw the pressing need for closing the Sunni ranks by rallying
    Pakistan’s various Sunni groups behind the mission of defending the sahaba and
    Simon Wolfgang Fuchs
    establishing the caliphate, an achievement that he hoped to replicated worldwide
    (Ta‘aruf… aghraz… nasb al-‘ayn, n.d.: 9–10, 28–9).
    The ASWJ saw the odds slowly shifting in its favour. It prided itself of having
    become the ‘biggest religious organisation’ in the country, bouncing back after each
    attempt to ban it (Hanafi, 2014b). Since the early 2000s, the organisation increasingly
    employed Sufi terminology to highlight that God had blessed the group: dream
    visions (which play a prominent role in modern Islam in general; Mittermaier,
    2011) bestowed on members allegedly revealed how martyred ASWJ leaders enjoyed
    privileged treatment in paradise (Ludhiyanvi, 2007a: 235; 2007c: 78–9). Referring to
    past successes, Muhammad Ahmad Ludhiyanvi recalled how the former leader and
    member of the national assembly (MNA) A‘zam Tariq (d. 2003) had in 1994 forced
    his way to occupy the speaker’s seat of Pakistan’s parliament. Tariq used this exalted
    position to declare a ‘Namus-i Sahaba Bill’ (Honour of the Prophet’s Companions
    Bill), which would have made any denigration of the sahaba a capital offence, as
    passed (Qasim, 1998: 121–3). According to Rieck (2015: 254), at this point most
    MNAs had already walked out ‘because of the unruly behaviour of the opposition’.
    Yet, at least in Ludhiyanvi’s narration, the subsequent applause by fellow deputies was
    significant. It underscored the existence of a silent but in reality dominating majority,
    both in parliament and also in the population at large, for the sectarian goals of the
    ASWJ (Ludhiyanvi, 2007a: 231–2).
    In the context of the predominance of the political in Pakistan’s sectarianism, it is
    also crucial to point out that the ASWJ continues to appropriate Shi‘i and Iranian
    revolutionary concepts and symbols for their own goals according to the pioneering
    observation by Zaman (1998: 702–3). Comparably to the Iranian case where fervent
    adherents of Khomeini’s revolutionary programme were designated as followers of
    ‘the Imam’s line’ (khatt-i imam) (Reda, 2014), ASWJ supporters were expected not
    to overstep Haqq Navaz Jhangvi’s ‘line’ (Ludhiyanvi, 2007c: 76; 2007b: 113). ASWJ
    activists who donated one third of their income were singled out. Their munificence
    outdid the mere 20 per cent (khums) (Kalyanavi, 2014) that Shi‘is are expected to
    pass on to their chosen Source of Emulation (marja‘ al-taqlid) (Sachedina, 1980). In
    an attempt at transcending Iranian symbolism, we also see a strong commitment by
    the ASWJ to celebrate the memory of its martyrs (Ahl-e-Sunnat Media Cell, 2019).
    A particular striking instance is the remembrance of the bloody stand-off that had
    happened in July 2007 between the Pakistani government and military, on the one
    hand, and those ‘ulama’, students, and militants who had entrenched themselves in
    Islamabad’s Red Mosque (Lal Masjid), on the other. The ASWJ did not hesitate to
    embrace the seminary, which had a longstanding history of agitating against Shi‘is
    (Blom, 2010). Reflecting on the violent confrontation that had to led substantial
    loss of life, ‘Ali Sher Haydari argued that even the battle of Karbala, essential as a
    founding event for Shi‘i group identity, paled in comparison. In Islamabad, more
    women and children had perished than when al-Husayn and his party came under
    attack. Moreover, the third Shi‘i Imam and his followers could rely on travelling
    provisions while those holed up in the Red Mosque faced a food crisis which meant
    that they had no other choice but to consume Guava leaves (Ludhiyanvi, 2007e: 282).
    At Karbala, al-Husayn and his small band had been deprived of drinking water. Yet,
    in Islamabad the access to water had already been cut off on the first day out of the
    full week which the siege lasted. Unlike al-Husayn, the encircled seminarians could
    not undergo ablution (ghusl) before their death (Haydari, 2010b: 264). In Iraq, the
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    attack had occurred on neutral, ‘secular’ ground but in Pakistan people were killed
    in a house of prayer. The siege of the Red Mosque, then, was unique in terms of
    cruelty, sacrifice, and oppression (Haydari, 2010b: 265). By arguing along these lines,
    ‘Ali Sher Haydari not only stressed the need for radical political change in Pakistan,
    he also effectively termed Sunnis as superior martyrs and took a powerful blow at
    the heart of Shi‘i Islam.
    Raising the position of the sahaba
    In order to further substantiate their calls for an exclusively Sunni state, ‘ulama’
    attached to the ASWJ show a remarkable fixation on the sahaba, whose importance
    at times even seems to overshadow the Prophet Muhammad himself. These sectarian
    religious scholars did not shy away from terming themselves ‘slaves of the sahaba’,
    a choice of terminology with which Wahhabi scholars would take serious issue
    (Haydari, 2010e: 177). In the view of ASWJ leaders, the Companions amplified and
    hence enhanced the brightness of the divine message (Haydari, 2010e: 158). The
    sahaba were the essential bridge to Muhammad because no human being could enjoy
    unmediated access to the Prophet (Ludhiyanvi, 2007c: 82). This also applied to the
    criteria for determining as to what should count as proper, authentic hadith. If the
    sahaba’s conduct differed from a known saying by Muhammad, then said report had
    to be classified as either unreliable or even abrogated (Haydari, 2010e: 168). One
    problem, though, was the Shi‘i emphasis on a Prophetic report, found also with
    variations in authoritative Sunni collections, that God had left the believers with ‘two
    weighty things’ (thaqalayn), namely the Qur‘an and the members of Muhammad’s
    household, the ahl al-bayt. According to the Shi‘i view, this report proved how essential
    their Imams were for understanding the true meaning of scripture. Both ‘weighty
    things’ were intertwined and eternal (Bar-Asher, 1999: 93–8). In order to diffuse
    this threat, ‘Ali Sher Haydari went as far as claiming that God had rather established
    two qiblas (direction of prayer). The first of these was – as is conventionally known
    – the Ka‘ba in Mecca, denoting the direction of worship. The second qibla, however,
    was no one else than the Companions. They form a direction of prayer for Muslims
    in professing their faithful submission to the guidance of the Prophet (Haydari,
    2010a: 108–9). Muhammad had deposited the ‘entire religion’ (sara din) with his
    Companions and had filled their breasts with the Qur‘an (Haydari, 2010e: 169). They
    thus acquired a status not unlike the Shi‘i Imams because ASWJ publications credit
    the sahaba with awesome powers. The latter’s words and statements would provide
    healing for every illness and the solution to every problem (Ta‘aruf… Aghraz… nasb
    al-‘ayn…, n.d.: 34). The sahaba should be seen as blessed with a superior form of
    comprehension which manifested itself in an exemplary conduct, even if it surpassed
    the understanding of ordinary believers. These dynamics could even be likened to the
    ambiguous and unclear (mutashabihat) verses in the Qur‘an, which Muslims also take
    as word of God even though they might be unable to grasp their precise meaning
    (Kinberg, 1988). In the same way as all the Qur‘anic verses were the ‘signs of God’
    (Allah ki ayat), the Companions were collectively His community (Allah ki jama‘at)
    (Haydari, 2010d: 66–7).
    Such a shift of the focus of gravity from the Prophet, venerated by both Sunnis
    and Shi‘is alike, toward the sahaba clearly reduced the already shrinking common
    ground between the two sects in Pakistan. Not helpful is the insistence by the ASWJ
    Simon Wolfgang Fuchs
    on its supposedly deep commitment to Muslim unity, underlined by the group’s
    unflinching veneration for the ahl al-bayt, a group so dear to the Shi‘is. In fact, the
    ASWJ adopted for its definition of membership among the ‘People of the House’ the
    most stringent Sunni interpretation possible. According to these sectarian ‘ulama’,
    the term exclusively referred to the Prophet’s wives. This position differed radically
    from the Shi‘i view, as well as from moderate Sunni conceptions, which applied the
    term to the Prophet’s daughter Fatima, his nephew and son-in-law ‘Ali, their sons
    al-Hasan and al-Husayn, as well as their descendants. While it is not uncommon
    for Sunni authors to include the Prophet’s wives in their definition, it is very rare
    to do so exclusively (Sharon, 1986). For ASWJ leaders, the Prophet’s wife ‘A’isha
    in particular has over the last years become a focal point. She is showered with the
    same epithets of purity that Shi‘is use to address their Imams and is lifted up into the
    rank of a fully qualified Muslim jurist who dispensed legal opinions even to male
    sahaba (Faruqi, 2014a: 25).
    In a second step after elevating their standing, the ASWJ turned the display of
    extreme partisanship toward the sahaba into the ultimate criterion for discriminating
    between ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ religious convictions. Those who kept watch to preserve the
    impeccable honour of the Companions guarded nothing less than Islam’s most precious
    manifestation and faith (iman) itself (Faruqi, 2014a: 18–19). These pro-sahaba activists
    should be considered as the gatekeepers of religion as a whole (Haydari, 2010e: 175).
    By implication, those Muslims who had historically fulfilled the role of sipah-i sahaba
    had always defended the essential aspects of Islam, such as prayer, the pilgrimage, or
    the profession of faith, too. Guarding the honour of the Companions was thus not
    a question of a particular organisation (tanzim) of rather recent vintage in Pakistan
    (Haydari, 2010e: 176–7). Rather, the ASWJ made the case that God Himself had
    condoned such an interpretation in the qur’anic verse 48:18, a part of which reads
    as ‘God was well pleased with the believers when they were swearing fealty to thee
    under the tree’. Muslim sources elucidate the reason for this revelation by connecting
    it with an event that took place in the year 628. The Prophet and a large group of
    his Companions had failed to enter Mecca for the lesser pilgrimage (‘umra). Fleeing
    from a sortie by Meccan troops, they had come to rest in the desert and opened
    negotiations with their enemies. During this time, rumours spread about the death
    of one of their envoys, the later third Caliph, ‘Uthman b. al-‘Affan (d. 656). In order
    to calm things and reassert his authority, Muhammad requested from his followers a
    pledge of allegiance and submission to his authority (Watt, 2012). Aurangzeb Faruqi,
    however, reinterpreted this episode in an unprecedented way (Görke, 1997). In his
    view, the primary reason of the pledge (bay‘a) was to avenge the blood of ‘Uthman.
    Because those present showed such a devotion to one of the sahaba and his honour,
    God did not hesitate to express his pleasure with them via aforementioned Qur‘anic
    revelation, effectively guaranteeing their admission to paradise. Today, the ASWJ
    would follow in the footsteps of this essential part of the Prophet’s mission and could
    thus be certain of God‘s special favour too (Faruqi, 2014a: 28–30).
    Lest anyone criticise the organisation‘s focus on historical figures that had no
    apparent connection to modern-day Pakistan, ASWJ leaders insisted that some of
    the Companions commanded a very real, even touchable presence on (or rather
    beneath) the country‘s soil. Muhammad Ahmad Ludhiyanvi recalled that he was
    once travelling with ‘Ali Sher Haydari near Khairpur in Sindh when they decided
    to stop at a small settlement next to the road. Their goal was to visit an ancient
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    cemetery which held the remnants of three sahaba who allegedly had come to the
    area before the Arab conquest in the year 711. Locals had recently dug a grave right
    next to their burial site and were eager to share with the two ASWJ leaders the
    strange events that had followed. First, a sweet fragrance had started to emerge from
    the Companions’ graves, gradually filling the entire locality. The bodies of the three
    sahaba had not decomposed, neither had their garments. One of the locals had even
    been able to touch the forehead of one of the corpses, feeling fresh sweat which
    made his hand smell pleasantly for an entire month (Ludhiyanvi, 2007b: 287–90).
    The ASWJ thus also displayed its own ‘cultural obsession with the wholeness of the
    body as the foundation for moral righteousness and political cohesiveness’, pertaining
    to the incorruptible earthly remains of the sahaba (Kugle, 2007: 60–8). Within such
    a culture of encompassing and exclusivist veneration for the close Companions of
    the Prophet, there could no longer be any room for Shi‘is in the country.
    Anti-Shi‘i discourses in Pakistan have come a long way since the 1970s when Ihsan
    Ilahi Zahir, the Pakistani graduate of the Islamic University of Medina who had
    returned home by then, launched his passionate effort to exclude Shi‘is from the
    fold of Islam. Far from simply continuing along his well-trodden path and merely
    recycling polemical tropes, the SSP/ASWJ pushed sectarianism into a novel direction
    that transcends related discourses emerging from the Gulf. Pakistani ‘ulama’ affiliated
    with the organisation painted Shi‘is as detrimental to the fulfilment of their country’s
    initial political promise, which was supposed to establish the dominance of Islam
    on a global level. In order to bolster their arguments, they followed a two-pronged
    strategy. First, these actors raised the importance of the sahaba as religious figures
    that could expect veneration not unlike the Shi‘i Imams. Second, they invested
    considerable efforts to place the defence of the Companions and their honour at the
    centre of all religious obligations. The combined public force of these doctrinal and
    political arguments, formulated in South Asia and the Middle East, have increasingly
    limited the space for any potential Shi‘i-Sunni rapprochement. Once such ideas have
    acquired the status of factual, self-evident knowledge, they are extremely difficult
    to dismantle and retract.
    What I have shown in this article is the importance of digging through layers of
    religious polemics that at first glance seem to be all cut from the same cloth. Instead,
    we have noticed important regional variations. While the final consequence of
    sectarian discourses, namely to render the Shi‘is as unbelievers or even apostates
    (murtadds) (Friedmann, 2003: 54–86, 121–59), may be the same, the road to this
    conclusion taken by Saudi and Pakistani ‘ulama’ is decidedly different. Therefore,
    I have argued, it is misleading to attribute too much leverage to the Saudi clerical
    establishment in kindling the flames of sectarianism in Pakistan. Deobandi networks
    that push for an exclusion of Shi‘is from the public deliberation of Pakistan’s (political)
    future do not rely on Saudi ideological input or funding. While they are happy to
    incorporate aspects of Saudi-sponsored Salafi arguments, they transcend the mere
    focus on theological point-scoring. Anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in Pakistan is thus a
    predominantly local affair instead of yet another manifestation of an Iranian-Saudi
    proxy war on South Asian soil.
    Simon Wolfgang Fuchs
    In addition to the discussed divergence pertaining to the predominance of doctrinal
    issues, on the one hand, vis-à-vis the embrace of the political, on the other, there are
    potential further research questions that would warrant our comparative attention
    when studying the Middle East and South Asia. ISIS, for example, adopted during the
    heyday of its caliphate a remarkable millenarian outlook, luring fighters to Syria with
    the promise that the final battles before the day of judgement were near (McCants,
    2015: 99–119). Attempting to accelerate the coming of the end of days and acting
    as a tool for the promised Islamic saviour (mahdi), however, is a notion that is usually
    far more pronounced in Shi‘i thought (Ourghi, 2009). The ASWJ, by contrast, stays
    entirely clear from such eschatological speculations. Their slain leaders even reportedly
    communicated to those left behind in dream visions how much they would prefer to
    fight the battle in Pakistan instead of being relegated to paradise (Ludhiyanvi, 2007c:
    79). The explicit this-worldly focus of the ASWJ could also be seen as an expression
    of how seriously they take the political and their mission that Pakistan may obtain its
    true purpose. This stands in contrast to ISIS, which displays a much more pronounced
    Salafi-fixation on doctrinal purity and hopes to transcend conventional political
    categories through violence. Additionally, a closer study of sectarian discourses in the
    Middle East and South Asia might also bring to the fore the extent to which these are
    bound up with perceptions of ethnic superiority. The argument of God singling out
    the Arabs is repeatedly made by Saudi scholars in their confrontation with Iran (Ismail,
    2016: 206). Such a reasoning, however, is – for obvious reasons – entirely missing
    from the Pakistani sectarian scene. These avenues for further research foreground the
    necessity to take the intellectual production of sectarian actors seriously, as I have
    attempted in this contribution. The way in which sectarian groups and thinkers frame
    their arguments, how they go about constructing the other and justify exclusionist
    rhetoric, deserves more attention than simply dismissing such pronouncements as a
    propagandistic smokescreen for more material motives such as influence and power.
    In the end, even geopolitical aspirations have to be grounded in local narrations that
    are meaningful to those audiences that are targeted with sectarian discourse.
    The author would like to thank Simon Mabon, Edward Wastnidge, and Saloni Kapur for
    their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
    Conflict of interest
    The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
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