Original Articles

Wikileaks on General Kayani and his ‘democratic’ puppets

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WikiLeaks unmasks who are our real puppet-masters?

Wikileaks reconfirm the Taliban ISI Alliance (LUBP update 29 Nov 2010)

General Kayani allowed US special forces to secretly operate in Pakistan

‘President’ Kayani is the most powerful man of Pakistan

US embassy cables: Pakistani army chief hints at unseating Zardari

Who is Gilani trying to please? by Omar Khattab

We already knew that our elected puppets are just here for temporary entertainment, while the strings are being pulled by the Don behind the curtain, the king-maker.

Today we have an elected government which has no control on foreign policy (on Afghanistan, India, USA, etc) nor on issues of ‘national security’ (including nuclear programme and the war on terror, while the terror of ‘good Taliban’s continues to be manufactured and propagated by the ISI), and is unable to prosecute the killers (some of them in khaki uniform) of their own chairperson Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

It is, therefore, no wonder that General Kayani was termed as the most powerful man in Pakistan, listed in the Forbes ‘World’s Most Powerful People’ at number 29.

Latest in this series is the following candid assessment by a US intelligence official (thanks to Wikileaks) about who is the ‘real man’ in Pakistan, in other words who must the US engage with in negotiating ‘real business’.

Viewing cable 10PARIS71

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10PARIS71 2010-01-22 17:05 2010-11-29 12:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0071/01 0221744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY AD133C36 MSI9843-695)
R 221744Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8101
S E C R E T PARIS 000071

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
H PASS TO HOUSE STAFFER KESSLER’S OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR AF PK FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,
SANCTIONS AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: 09 PARIS 1671

Classified By: Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.

PAKISTAN: REINFORCING POLITICAL RELATIONS
—————————————–

¶12. (C) Zerinini said France is working to reinforce its political relations with Pakistan, and was expecting President Sarkozy to visit Pakistan “early in the second quarter” of 2010. The GOF does not want to return to a relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the
1980s, and is instead focusing on counter terrorism in addition to economic and trade links. France is also trying to support an EU-Pakistan dialogue, but she said Pakistan makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting to focus exclusively on economic issues. Zerinini said the Pakistani government is eager for trade concessions, but does not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on
Kashmir.

¶13. (C) On the role of the Pakistani military, Zerinini said: General Kayani has “learned the lesson of Musharraf” and was staying behind the scenes. However, he is manipulating the government and parliament, including to prevent change on Pakistan’s policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties
continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the military. Zerinini also argued that the west had missed its opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan. Citing Jalaladin Haqqani as an example, Zerinini said in 2004 he had standing as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the
organization to represent a significant military threat. However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat, even if it had the will to do so.

¶14. (C) Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective, and that more coordination was needed among donors, especially the United States. She said the Group of Friends of Democratic Pakistan, while imperfect, was designed to transform Pakistan’s political elite and give them more leverage over the military. However, Zerinini said it is not being utilized. She said the U.S. was making significant efforts to help develop Pakistan’s energy sector, but she added “I have not seen any of this in the energy working group of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan.”

Source: Cable Gate


’جنرل کیانی نےحکومت کو فوجی مفاد میں استعمال کیا‘

وکی لیکس پر شائع شدہ پیغام کے مطابق پاکستانی فوج کے سربراہ جنرل اشفاق کیانی نے پس پردہ رہ کر سویلین حکومت کو فوجی مقاصد کے لیے استعمال کیا ہے۔

یہ بات بائیس جنوری سنہ 2010 کو پیرس میں امریکی سفارتخانے کی جانب سے امریکی محکمۂ خارجہ کو بھیجے گئے ایک مراسلے میں کہی گئی ہے۔

س مراسلے میں فرانسیسی حکومت کے پاکستان اور افغانستان پر انٹر ایجنسی سیل کی سربراہ جیسمین زرینینی کے حوالے سے بتایا گیا ہے کہ ان کے خیال میں جنرل کیانی نے’مشرف سے سبق سیکھا ہے‘ اور وہ کھل کر سامنے نہیں آ رہے ہیں۔

تاہم جسیمین زرینینی کا یہ بھی کہنا تھا کہ وہ (جنرل کیانی) پسِ پردہ رہ کر حکومت اور پارلیمان کو اپنے مقاصد کے لیے استعمال کر رہے ہیں جن میں افغان سرحد کے ساتھ واقع قبائلی علاقوں کے لیے پاکستان کی پالیسی کو تبدیل نہ ہونے دینا بھی شامل ہے۔

دستاویز کے مطابق انٹر ایجنسی سیل کی سربراہ کا یہ بھی کہنا تھا کہ جنرل کیانی کیری لوگر بل کے حوالے سے تنازعہ کھڑا کرنا چاہتے ہیں کیونکہ یہ بل امریکی امداد کو فوج پر بڑھتے ہوئے سویلین کنٹرول سے مشروط کرتا ہے۔

اسی گفتگو میں جسیمین زرینینی نے یہ بھی کہا کہ مغرب نے پاکستان میں پناہ لینے والے افغان طالبان کا صفایا کرنے کے لیے پاکستانی فوج پر دباؤ ڈالنے کا موقع گنوا دیا ہے۔

ان کے مطابق اس کی ایک مثال جلال الدین حقانی ہیں جو کہ بقول ان کے سنہ 2004 میں بطور ایک رہنما سامنے آئے تاہم اس وقت نہ ہی وہ کسی تنظیم کے نمائندہ اور نہ ہی کوئی بڑا خطرہ تھے۔ تاہم جب خلیج سے ملنے والی بڑی رقوم کی بدولت وہ ایک نیٹ ورک قائم کرنے میں کامیاب ہو گئے ہیں تو اب پاکستانی فوج کے لیے انہیں شکست دینا مشکل ہے چاہے وہ اس کے خواہشمند بھی ہوں۔

مراسلے میں بتایا گیا ہے کہ جیسمین زرینینی کے مطابق حکومتِ فرانس پاکستان سے اسّی کی دہائی میں صرف فوجی سازوسامان کی فروخت پر منحصر تعلقات جیسے تعلقات کی خواہاں نہیں اور وہ چاہتی ہے کہ پاکستان کے ساتھ مضبوط سیاسی تعلقات ہوں اور معاشی اور تجارتی روابط کے علاوہ دونوں ممالک انسدادِ دہشتگردی کے شعبے میں بھی تعاون کریں۔

Source: BBC Urdu

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  • General Kayani has ‘learned the lesson of Musharraf’ and was staying behind the scenes, Head of France’s Afghanistan-Pakistan cell Jasmine Zerinini is believed to have said. The French official also acknowledged that the Pak Government does not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on Kashmir, according to the documents released by Wikileaks.

    Pakistan Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has “learned the lesson” of his predecessor Gen Pervez Musharraf and prefers staying behind the scenes while affecting the government’s decision-making on key issues, according to secret American documents released by WikiLeaks.

    Jasmine Zerinini, head of the French government’s interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, told Richard Kessler, staff director of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in January that Gen. Kayani was playing a behind the scenes role in issues like the war against terrorism and stirring up a controversy over linking civilian control of the military to increased American aid.

    “On the role of the Pakistani military, Ms. Zerinini said General Kayani has ‘learned the lesson of Musharraf’ and was staying behind the scenes. However, he is manipulating the government and parliament, including to prevent change on Pakistan’s policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the military,” said one of the thousands of secret cables released by WikiLeaks.

    General Kayani was appointed army chief by Musharraf, who was forced to resign in August 2008 to avoid being impeached by the civilian government led by the Pakistan People’s Party.

    Reports have suggested that Kayani plays a key role in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially relations with the U.S. and India.

    Ms. Zerinini argued that the West had “missed its opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan”.

    Citing Afghan warlord Jalaladin Haqqani as an example, Ms. Zerinini said that ‘in 2004 he had standing as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the organisation to represent a significant military threat.”

    “However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat, even if it had the will to do so,” the cable quoted Ms. Zernini as saying.

    Ms. Zerinini said France was working to “reinforce its political relations with Pakistan” as it did not “want to return to a relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the 1980s, and is instead focusing on counter-terrorism in addition to economic and trade links.”

    However, the French official acknowledged that the Pakistan government “does not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on Kashmir.”

    While France was trying to support an E.U.-Pakistan dialogue, “Pakistan makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting to focus exclusively on economic issues,” she said.

    Ms. Zerinini was further quoted in the cable as saying that “bilateral measures alone to strengthen (Pakistan’s) civilian government were unlikely to be effective, and that more coordination was needed among donors, especially the U.S.”

    She said the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, “while imperfect, was designed to transform Pakistan’s political elite and give them more leverage over the military” but the forum was not being utilized.

    http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article924197.ece

  • I can not agree more to your assessment.
    Kayani & his fellow rascals have learned no lesson from history & continue to produce jihadi monsters which will ultimately destroy their masters also.God bless them!

  • WikiLeaks Document Dump Exposes Muslim Governments’ Hypocrisy
    By Muqtedar Khan

    WikiLeaks is in the process of dramatically transforming foreign affairs and international relations. It is revealing over 250,000 cables from US embassies worldwide to the State department and other classified documents. The consequences of this ‘mega-scoop’ will be very far reaching indeed.

    For the United States the issues are both strategic as well as ethical. On a strategic level the leaks — which expose frank assessment of foreign leaders by senior American officials and American thinking on many critical issues — will complicate Obama administration’s ability to deal with its allies and may increase global cynicism about US intentions.

    Many of the allies will be angry and distrustful. They will also be afraid of being candid in the future. All players in the future will be trying to second-guess each other, unwilling to articulate what their real intentions and goals are. After all, nobody wishes to read a summary of their confidential dialogue with Americans in the New York Times. The revelations may also reverse many of the hard earned diplomatic gains made by the State department over the years in acquiring support for US policies from many nations.

    On the ethical level, the key question is: What will the American public do with the knowledge that the US government has allies who are known criminals; that it says one thing in public and pursues another policy in reality; that bullying seems to be a standard operating procedure and intervening in every affair seems to be a natural instinct of US foreign policy. Will the Senate, or the House, call for hearings to hold the administration accountable? Will there be a public outcry?

    The revelations so far about the Muslim world are eye opening. Muslims, even some American Muslims have raised criticism of American foreign policy to the level of religious ritual. Often Muslim radicalism and alienation is explained as a direct consequence of US foreign policy alone (the point being that US foreign policy is anti-Islam and subversive to Muslim nations). Therefore Muslim anger and radicalism against the U.S. while often expressed in unjustifiable ways is still understandable.

    But now that the shenanigans of Muslim nations, most importantly their collusion with America’s so called anti-Islam foreign policy, is exposed, what will Muslims do? Will they also hate Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar and other nations just as much as they hate America? Or will they recognize that nation states have interests and they pursue them in whatever ways they can; and understand that US foreign policy neither advances nor targets any religion?

    The preliminary review of the cables by New York Times and the Guardian reveals the duplicity of many Arab nations on foreign policy — especially in the case of Iran. For example, in the past few years, Arab nations have publicly countered Israeli propaganda that Iran is a bigger threat to the world, than the resolution of the Palestinian issue, with claims that the failure to bring a just solution to the Palestinians was the number one issue for Arabs and Muslims. But apparently, privately these same nations have been parroting Bibi Netanyahu’s mantra to the U.S., repeatedly asking the US to bomb Iran and even invade it with ground troops.

    The Saudis refer to Iran — a fellow “Islamic nation” — as “evil”, and have asked the U.S. to “cut off the head of the snake”. The same cables also reveal that even now the main financiers of al Qaeda are Saudi donors. American presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama have identified al Qaeda as the biggest threat to the U.S., and yet they collude with the nation whose citizens are its biggest financiers. Why don’t the Saudis cut off the head of the real snake by arresting and imprisoning al Qaeda’s financiers? Most Americans know that fifteen of the nineteen terrorists that attacked the US on September 11, 2001, were Saudis. None were Iranians. A significant number of foreign fighters who joined al Qaeda in Iraq were Saudis. This is a classic case of the pot calling the kettle black.

    (Do not interpret my criticism of Saudi Arabia as support for Iran. Its current leaders are a bunch of thugs who stole governance from their own people by force and made a mockery out of the idea of an Islamic democracy.)

    It seems that on key issues Arab foreign policy is the same as Israel. Except Israel is open, and Arab states are not. In the future, if we wish to understand Arab foreign policy, all we have to do is take Israeli foreign policy and add hypocrisy (nifaaq) to it; voila.

    Another level of hypocrisy that Muslim nations seem to be practicing is in their dealings with their own populations. While the US is worried that WikiLeaks latest revelations will undermine its relations with its allies, Muslim governments are worried that these same leaks will expose the extent to which they routinely lie to their own people.

    Nation after Muslim nation has been supporting and collaborating with the U.S. and lying to its public about the extent of its support for US foreign policy. For example, the Yemeni president acknowledged that he would continue to lie to his people and claim that American military operations in Yemen are Yemeni operations; the Pakistani government does not want its people to know the extent to which it cooperates with the U.S. on nuclear issues.

    It is amazing how Muslim governments engage in policies of which they know their citizens will not approve.

    Now, thanks to WikiLeaks, at least Muslims who hate America for its foreign policy must realize that their own countries are collaborators. Perhaps their hatred will now be more evenly spread rather than just focusing on the U.S. If not, then they are hypocrites, too.
    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/muqtedar-khan/wikileaks-exposes-muslim-governments-hypocrisy_b_788963.html

  • playing politics by bargaining with the killer of BB

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/167125

    1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and Chief of Army Staff Kayani, Ambassador pressed for quick action on immunity for former President Musharraf. Zardari and Gilani said flatly that they were committed to providing immunity, but not until after the presidential election (now scheduled for September 6). Pushing immunity now, they believed, could jeopardize Zardari’s candidacy. Kayani expressed concern that if immunity becomes tied up with the ongoing debate over the judges’ future, it may never happen.

    3. (C) Zardari told Ambassador August 23 that he was committed to indemnity for Musharraf. Ambassador stressed that only the promise of indemnity had persuaded Musharraf to step down as President. We believed, as we had often said, that Musharraf should have a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the country. Zardari cited a British anecdote about the Spanish empire and said “tell the most powerful man in the world that there is no way that I would go back on what I have said.” Zardari noted that he already had firmly committed to the U.S., the UK, and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani that indemnity for Musharraf would be forthcoming. Ambassador urged him to do it quickly. Zardari said flatly that to do it before he was elected President would lose him votes, but he would do both the legislation and a presidential pardon as soon as he was elected. Zardari revealed that former President Musharraf had approached Chief Justice Dogar about issuing a restraining order against the impeachment motion, but Dogar had refused. Zardari also alleged that Musharraf had planned to replace COAS Kayani if Dogar had blocked the impeachment.

  • Zardari feared coup, named sister as successor if killed

    LONDON: Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari had informed the US ambassador to Pakistan that “he had instructed his son Bilawal to name his sister, Faryal Talpur, as president” in the eventuality of his assassination, the Guardian reported today.

    According to the latest cache of WikiLeaks published by the British daily, Zardari has made extensive preparations in case of his own assassination.

    Last year Zardari told US ambassador Anne Patterson, that if he was assassinated, “he had instructed his son Bilawal to name his sister, Faryal Talpur, as president”.

    Zardari is frank about the strength of the Taliban – “I’m sorry to say this but we are not winning” the war against extremists he told US Vice-President Joe Biden in 2009, one of the leaked US cables state.

    “I am not Benazir, and I know it,” he told US ambassador Anne Patterson after his wife’s death.

    The Pakistan President reportedly feared a fresh army coup.

    Zardari said he was concerned that Kayani might “take me out”, Biden reported to former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown during a meeting in Chile in 2009. Brown said he thought it was unlikely.

    According to The Guardian report based on US cables, Pakistan opposition leader Nawaz Sharif had a “notoriously difficult personality” while his family is noted to have “relied primarily on the army and intelligence agencies for political elevation”.

    In a May 2008 meeting with a visiting American Congressional delegation, Zardari reportedly said: “We won’t act without consulting with you.”

    Sharif repeatedly told the US ambassador that he was “pro-American”, despite his often critical public stance. He thanked the US for “arranging” to have Kayani appointed as army chief.

    “The best thing America has done recently,” he said. “The fact that a former prime minister believes the US could control the appointment of Pakistan’s chief of army staff speaks volumes about the myth of American influence here,” the Ambassador noted afterwards.

    After General Pervez Musharraf resigned as president in 2008, ambassador Patterson pressed Zardari to grant him immunity from prosecution.

    “We believed, as we had often said, that Musharraf should have a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the country,” she said.

    The US and Kayani worried that Zardari would renege on his word.

    “Zardari is walking tall these days, hopefully not too tall to forget his promise to Kayani and to us on an immunity deal,” wrote Patterson. If Zardari didn’t protect Musharraf then it would make him look bad.

    “I have to bring the army along with me,” he said, also noting that the delay “does nothing for Zardari’s reputation for trustworthiness”.

    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Zardari-feared-coup-named-sister-as-successor-if-killed/articleshow/7019793.cms

  • Kayani blackmails Afghanistan against pursuing a ‘pro-india’ policy threatening to use his favourite “assets” against them if they don’t follow his dictate:

    http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article924251.ece

    The army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, had been “utterly frank” about the consequences of a pro-India government coming to power in Kabul, noted a 2009 briefing before his visit to Washington. “The Pakistani establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see as… an important counterweight.”

  • State Department cables: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
    Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 13:31
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002427
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
    TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
    KERRY-LUGAR
    Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6. These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani. DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill’s long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and “assessments;” and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine political support for the Army’s anti-terrorist effort.

    2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much publicized “clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.

    3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this time.

    4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either reintegration or reconciliation without it.

    5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at any time. End Summary.

    6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting. General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no intention of taking over the government. “If I had wanted to do this, I would have done it during the long march.8

    7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers. Pasha said they could not figure out why these “conditions” on assistance had been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so

    ISLAMABAD 00002427 002 OF 003

    much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation, despite the different situation on the ground.

    8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan’s development. The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but President Bush had refused to sign it.

    9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund.

    10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the government to say it had been “informed” by the debate.

    11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

    12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it “left off:” he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan’s integrity and intelligence.

    13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz

    ISLAMABAD 00002427 003 OF 003

    stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward immediately. End Note.)

    14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in Afghanistan was the “perception that the US was winning.” There was no chance for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/pakistan-usforeignpolicy3

  • Nice collection of write ups on past and present events behind the curtain. An eye opener for those that have localized vision of Zardari-Nawaz Sharif struggle for power. Zardari is the beneficiery of hard work of Benazir’s deliberations and pursuations during her self-exiled period to convince USA that she was the obvious choice, if ever powers that be in USA had to bow down to Congress’s collective verdict that US interests can better be served in the region by a democratic set up in Pakistan, rather than vouching on a single military man. The present set up of democracy with a complete control of Army behind the curtain is an attempt to satisfy “both the parties”.

    About Nawaz Sharif, he would remain in bad book of America in spite of his clandestinely unqualified support offer, as long as his rendezvous with Osama Bin Laden in the past is not forgotten by Congress members. If he can not make visits to USA and pursuade his case convincingly to Congress members he must formulate a strong team of lobby for the same.

  • لندن … وکی لیکس نے نئے راز فاش کرتے ہوئے دعویٰ کیا ہے کہ چیف آف آرمی اسٹاف جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی صدر زرداری کو اقتدار سے علیحدہ کرنے کا سوچ رہے تھے۔

    ۔وکی لیکس کے نئے انکشافات کے مطابق مارچ 2009 میں جنرل کیانی نے پاکستان میں تعینات امریکی سفیر این ڈبلیو پیٹرسن سے ملاقات کی تھی۔ انھوں نے امریکی سفیر سے کہا تھا کہ وہ صدر زرداری پر استعفے کے لیے دباؤ ڈالیں گے۔

    وکی لیکس کا دعویٰ ہے کہ جنرل کیانی عوامی نیشنل پارٹی کے سربراہ اسفندیار ولی کو صدر بنانے کے حق میں تھے۔ وکی لیکس کے مطابق نائب امریکی صدر جو بائیڈن نے بھی کہا تھا کہ صدر زرداری نے برطانیہ کے سابق وزیر اعظم گورڈن براؤن سے ملاقات میں خدشہ ظاہر کیا تھا کہ فوج انھیں اقتدار سے الگ کردے گی۔ صدر زرداری نے ان معاملات سے نمٹنے کی حکمت عملی تیار کرلی تھی۔

    http://www.jang.com.pk/jang/dec2010-daily/01-12-2010/u54426.htm

    US embassy cables: Pakistani army chief hints at unseating Zardari

    http://criticalppp.com/archives/31250

    ’زرداری کو صدارت سے ہٹانے کا خیال آیا تھا‘

    برطانوی اخبار گارڈین میں بدھ کو شائع ہونے والے وکی لیکس کے خفیہ سفارتی پیغامات کے مطابق 2009 کے اوائل میں جنرل کیانی نے صدر زرداری کو عہدۂ صدارت سے الگ کرنے کا خیال ظاہر کیا تھا۔

    زرداری کی جگہ اسفندیار
    جماعت الدعوۃ کی مدد
    پاکستان کے جوہری ہتھیار
    ڈرون حملوں کی حمایت
    براہمداغ افغان پناہ میں

    یہ بات بارہ مارچ سنہ 2009 کو اس وقت پاکستان میں امریکی سفیر این ڈبلیو پیٹرسن کی جانب سے بھیجے گئے ایک مراسلے میں کہی گئی ہے۔

    پیغام کے مطابق دس مارچ کو جنرل کیانی سے امریکی سفیر کی ایک ہفتے میں ہونے والی چوتھی ملاقات میں انہوں نے دوبارہ اشارہ دیا کہ ا گر حالات تیزی سے بگڑے تو انہیں نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی صدر زرداری کو استعفٰی دینے کے لیے کہنا پڑے گا۔

    کلِک ججوں کی بحالی میں جنرل کیانی کا کردار

    کلِک جنرل کیانی نے حکومت کو فوج کے مفاد میں استعمال کیا

    خیال رہے کہ مارچ سنہ 2009 میں سابق آمر جنرل مشرف کی جانب سے غیر فعال بنائے گئے ججوں کی بحالی کے حوالے سے سیاسی بحران عروج پر تھا۔

    مراسلے میں یہ بھی کہا گیا ہے کہ جنرل کیانی نے صدر زرداری کے متبادل کے طور پر اسفند یار ولی کا نام لیا۔ سفیر نے مزید لکھا تھا کہ ’ قطع نظر اس کے کہ وہ( جنرل کیانی) صدر زرداری کو کتنا ناپسند کرتے ہیں نواز شریف ان کے لیے اس سے بھی زیادہ نا قابل بھروسہ شخص ہیں‘۔

    پیغام کے مطابق یہ ایک باقاعدہ فوجی بغاوت نہ ہوتی اور وزیراعظم گیلانی کی حکومت اپنی جگہ قائم رہتی اور یوں انتخابات کی نوبت نہ آتی جس کے نتیجے میں نواز شریف برسرِاقتدار آ سکتے تھے۔

    امریکی حکام کا اس مراسلے میں یہ بھی کہنا ہے کہ انہیں پاکستان میں فوری فوجی بغاوت کا کوئی امکان دکھائی نہیں دیتا تاہم جنرل کیانی امریکہ کو قبل از وقت خبردار کر رہے ہیں تاکہ اگر ایسا ہو تو وہ یہ کہہ سکیں کہ انہوں نے امریکہ کو پہلے ہیں بتا دیا تھا۔

    امریکی اخبار نیویارک ٹائمز کے مطابق ایک اور مراسلے میں پاکستانی صدر نے امریکہ کے نائب صدر جو بائڈن کو بتایا تھا کہ آئی ایس آئی کے ڈائریکٹر اور جنرل کیانی انھیں اقتدار سے الگ کر دیں گے۔

    سفارت خانے کے پیغام کے مطابق مارچ دو ہزار نو میں امریکہ کے نائب صدر جو بائڈن نے برطانیہ میں وزیراعظم گورڈن براؤن کو بتایا تھا کہ انھیں صدر زرداری نے بتایا کہ ’ آئی ایس آئی کے ڈائریکٹر اور جنرل کیانی مجھے اقتدار سے الگ کر دیں گے‘۔

    امریکی سفیر نے بائیس فروری سنہ دو ہزار دس میں امریکہ کی وفاقی تحقیقاتی ایجنسی ایف بی آئی کے ڈائریکٹر کے دورے سے پہلے ایک پیغام میں لکھا کہ ’ پاکستان میں سول حکومت کمزور، بدعنوان اور غیر موثر ہی ہے، صدر زرداری کی قسمت کے حوالے سے سیاست عدم استحکام کے زیر اثر ہے‘۔

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/world/2010/12/101201_wikileaks_pk_zs.shtml

  • Army has the nod to launch offensive in NWA: PM
    Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has said that Pakistan army has been given the nod to launch an offensive in North Waziristan but the decision to when and where to launch the operation lies with the army?

  • “Army has the nod to launch offensive in NWA: PM
    Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has said that Pakistan army has been given the nod to launch an offensive in North Waziristan but the decision to when and where to launch the operation lies with the army”? is it democracy ? where’s our sovereign parliament…?

  • 5. (C) IN THE ARMY WE TRUST: The tumultuous democratic process in Pakistan makes the Saudis nervous, and they appear to be looking for “another Musharraf”: a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust. In his January meeting with General Jones, the King cited President Zardari as an impediment to denying terrorist safehavens, calling him an “obstacle” and “a rotten head” that was infecting the whole body. He maintained that the Pakistani Army was capable of being a strong partner for the U.S., and opined that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust. He asserted that that the Army was staying out of Pakistani politics in deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it “should.” FM Saud told General Jones that we must reach out to tribal leaders and separate “those we could work with” from “those we must fight.” He believed that using the military to fight extremists posed certain dangers, and that the credibility of the army must be maintained. The Saudis were pushing Pakistan’s civilian leaders to work together, but “compromise seemed alien to Pakistani politicians.”

    Source : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248602

  • Disdain for the New President

    Only a few months after Zardari had been sworn into office, Kayani and the ISI director-general Pasha were making no secret of the fact that they felt disdain for the new president. “Kayani and Pasha’s body language was disrespectful of their own president,” then-Afghan Interior Minister Hanif Atmar indignantly told the Americans in the spring of 2009.

    In November of last year, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik even urgently requested a meeting at the US Embassy in Islamabad because, as he put it, the government needed political protection for the president. According to Malik, ISI Director-General Pasha was spinning intrigues against Zardari. The US ambassador was not convinced that Pasha was acting alone. “Malik’s view that ISI Director-General Pasha is behind the moves against President Zardari and that Chief of Army Staff Kayani is not involved is either naive or intentionally misleading,” she wrote to the US State Department. “It would be impossible for Pasha to move without Kayani’s acquiescence.”

    ………

    < <234212>> 11/11/2009 14:13 09ISLAMABAD2716 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL

    TED0542 ACTION SCA-00

    INFO LOG-00 AF-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 INL-00 PERC-00 PDI-00 DS-00 EUR-00 E-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 NIMA-00 GIWI-00 ISNE-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SRAP-00 SWCI-00 PESU-00 SRMC-00 SANA-00 /000W ——————D6CDB4 111521Z /38 O 111413Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5896 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY LONDON AMCONSUL LAHORE AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL PESHAWAR NSC WASHINGTON DC CIA WASHINGTON DC SECDEF WASHINGTON DC JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PK SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER SEEKS USG HELP IN PROTECTING

    C o n f i d e n t i a l islamabad 002716

    E.o. 12958: decl: 11/10/2034 Tags: pgov, kdem, pk Subject: interior minister seeks usg help in protecting president zardari

    Classified By: ANNE W. PATTERSON, REASONS 1.4 B AND D

    1. (C) Summary: In a November 9 meeting with Ambassador Patterson, Interior Minister Rehman Malik requested that the USG issue a public statement in support of Pakistani democracy. He suggested that such a statement would be useful in protecting President Asif Ali Zardari from military-induced pressure for Zardari to leave office. In addition, it would help dispel persistent charges from the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) that the United States and the United Kingdom had urged it to withdraw support for the National Reconciliation Ordinance, thereby placing Zardari at-risk. Malik assessed that Saudi Arabia and the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) were cooperating with the military and MQM to bring down President Zardari. Despite these charges, Malik was optimistic that the Supreme Court would not/not strip Zardari of his presidential immunity and suggested that even if it did, the government would simply cease prosecution of Zardari’s cases, thereby allowing him to continue to hold office. End Summary.

    2. (C) Interior Minister Rehman Malik met November 9 with Ambassador Patterson to provide a read-out of his meetings with senior officials of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in Dubai. Throughout the meeting, Malik was clearly nervous that the USG was distancing itself both from him and President Zardari. Malik claimed that during the course of his Dubai meetings, the MQM had repeatedly stated that both the United States and the United Kingdom had urged the party to oppose the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) — a move that led the government to withdraw the legislation from parliamentary consideration and placed the future of President Zardari at-risk. Malik claimed that the MQM stated it had received this message during the Sindh Governor’s recent trip to the United States and that Altaf Hussain had been approached by the British government in London. Ambassador strongly denied these allegations, stating that the USG had not/not had any such discussions with the Sindh Governor.

    3. (C) Interior Minister Malik further expressed concern that the Secretary was displeased with the civilian government upon her return from her recent trip to Pakistan. Malik attributed this impression to rumors from unspecified sources. Ambassador emphasized to Malik that she had heard no such thing and that in contrast, she was confident that the Secretary had been very pleased both with her visit and with her meetings with Pakistan government counterparts.

    4. (C) Minister Malik inquired as to whether the Ambassador was aware that the “establishment” — local short-hand for the military and the intelligence services — was involved in working against the NRO and for President Zardari’s departure. Ambassador told Rehman that we were aware of such allegations. Minister Malik reported that the MQM had told him directly in the Dubai meetings that the military was involved, although Malik personally did not/not believe that Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani was involved in the plotting. Malik also claimed that the MQM was meeting regularly with the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) and that PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif was, in turn, pressuring Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to disqualify President Zardari. Malik also assessed that Saudi Arabia was working to unseat President Zardari. Malik intended to visit Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, Chief of Saudi General Intelligence, in Saudi Arabia and then travel on to London to meet with MQM Convener Altaf Hussain.

    5. (C) Malik suggested that the best way to deal with military pressure would be for President Zardari to make internal changes within the military hierarchy. Malik proposed that Zardari recreate the Deputy Chief of Army Staff position and move Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director General Ahmad Shuja Pasha into that position in March 2010. Zardari could then commit to elevating Pasha to COAS in October 2010 on the expiration of Kayani’s term. Malik suggested that Kayani could then be moved to Chairman of the Joint Staff. Comment: Malik seemed to believe that ISI DG Pasha was unilaterally behind the push to oust Zardari — which we know is not/not the case. End Comment.

    6. (C) Despite these concerns, Malik reiterated the government’s line that Zardari is not in any real danger on expiration of the NRO. He asserted that the Chief Justice would not/not revoke Zardari’s presidential immunity. Even if he did, Malik claimed that the Interior Minister can instruct prosecutors to dismiss charges in any court case. He shared that, in one of his own corruption cases, this had been done, and that in another case, the Supreme Court had ruled his imprisonment illegal. Malik also added that President Zardari had the ability to pardon anyone.

    7. (C) Malik pressed the Ambassador for issuance of a strong statement from the United States. Ambassador inquired as to the content and the audience. Malik suggested that it be a public statement saying that the United States supported democracy in Pakistan.

    8. (C) Comment: Malik was clearly worried that President Zardari and his inner circle of advisors — including Malik — had lost the support of the international community. Malik appeared to believe that such support was essential for their survival in the face of military plotting against them. Malik’s view that ISI DG Pasha is behind the moves against President Zardari and that COAS Kayani is not involved is either naive or intentionally misleading. It would be impossible for Pasha to move without Kayani’s acquiescence. Malik’s views on Zardari’s legal troubles presuppose that Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will be bound by normal interpretations of the law and precedent. Such an assumption ignores Chaudhry’s penchant for ignoring both in recent rulings and his personal animosity towards Asif Ali Zardari. End Comment. Patterson

    http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,732110-2,00.html

  • 8. (C) Comment: Malik was clearly worried that President Zardari and his inner circle of advisors — including Malik — had lost the support of the international community. Malik appeared to believe that such support was essential for their survival in the face of military plotting against them. Malik’s view that ISI DG Pasha is behind the moves against President Zardari and that COAS Kayani is not involved is either naive or intentionally misleading. It would be impossible for Pasha to move without Kayani’s acquiescence. Malik’s views on Zardari’s legal troubles presuppose that Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will be bound by normal interpretations of the law and precedent. Such an assumption ignores Chaudhry’s penchant for ignoring both in recent rulings and his personal animosity towards Asif Ali Zardari. End Comment. Patterson

    This requires a separate article.

  • Now we know why were Talat Hussain, Hamid Mir, Ansar Abbasi, Shahid Masood so charged up against the Kerry Lugar Bill

    US embassy cables: Pakistan army angry at US aid bill but helping Israel

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    guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 11.08 GMT
    Article history
    Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 13:31
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002427
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
    TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
    KERRY-LUGAR
    Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    Summary
    In a private meeting with the US ambassador, Pakistan’s army chief and head spy complain vociferously about the provisions of a massive American aid package that requires military accountability towards the civilian government. As a measure of his good will, Gen Pasha, the ISI chief, says he has been offering intelligence tip-offs about impending attacks to India, and even Israel. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

    Read related article
    1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6. These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani. DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill’s long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and “assessments;” and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine political support for the Army’s anti-terrorist effort.

    2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much publicized “clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.

    3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this time.

    4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either reintegration or reconciliation without it.

    5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at any time. End Summary.

    6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting. General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no intention of taking over the government. “If I had wanted to do this, I would have done it during the long march.8

    7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers. Pasha said they could not figure out why these “conditions” on assistance had been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so

    ISLAMABAD 00002427 002 OF 003

    much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation, despite the different situation on the ground.

    8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan’s development. The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but President Bush had refused to sign it.

    9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund.

    10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the government to say it had been “informed” by the debate.

    11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

    12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it “left off:” he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan’s integrity and intelligence.

    13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz

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    stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward immediately. End Note.)

    14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in Afghanistan was the “perception that the US was winning.” There was no chance for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/228747

  • Zardari’s deal with Kayani on Musharraf’s indemnity

    Saturday, 23 August 2008, 14:12
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002802
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 08/23/2018
    TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, EAID, PK
    SUBJECT: IMMUNITY FOR MUSHARRAF LIKELY AFTER ZARDARI’S
    ELECTION AS PRESIDENT
    REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 2742 (B) ISLAMABAD 2741
    Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

    Summary
    The US ambassador to Pakistan reports on meetings with (now president) Asif Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and General Ashfaq Kayani. They discuss immunity for former president Pervez Musharraf; the upcoming election and US drone attacks on the tribal areas. Although publicly the officials oppose the attacks, the meetings show they back them in private. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

    Read related article
    1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and Chief of Army Staff Kayani, Ambassador pressed for quick action on immunity for former President Musharraf. Zardari and Gilani said flatly that they were committed to providing immunity, but not until after the presidential election (now scheduled for September 6). Pushing immunity now, they believed, could jeopardize Zardari’s candidacy. Kayani expressed concern that if immunity becomes tied up with the ongoing debate over the judges’ future, it may never happen. Zardari plans to continue to slow roll action on the judges’ restoration but remains confident that Nawaz Sharif will not walk out of the coalition. Nawaz’s deadlines for action on the judges continue to pass unfulfilled; the next one is scheduled for August 27. The decision by the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) August 20 to back Zardari for President has strengthened Zardari’s hand against Nawaz. Nawaz is left with the option of walking out of the coalition but having little prospect of forcing a new general election in the short term. Zardari is walking tall these days, hopefully not too tall to forget his promise to Kayani and to us on an immunity deal. End Summary.

    2. (C) Ambassador met with Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari on August 23, with PM Gilani on August 21, and with COAS Kayani on August 20.

    3. (C) Zardari told Ambassador August 23 that he was committed to indemnity for Musharraf. Ambassador stressed that only the promise of indemnity had persuaded Musharraf to step down as President. We believed, as we had often said, that Musharraf should have a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the country. Zardari cited a British anecdote about the Spanish empire and said “tell the most powerful man in the world that there is no way that I would go back on what I have said.” Zardari noted that he already had firmly committed to the U.S., the UK, and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani that indemnity for Musharraf would be forthcoming. Ambassador urged him to do it quickly. Zardari said flatly that to do it before he was elected President would lose him votes, but he would do both the legislation and a presidential pardon as soon as he was elected. Zardari revealed that former President Musharraf had approached Chief Justice Dogar about issuing a restraining order against the impeachment motion, but Dogar had refused. Zardari also alleged that Musharraf had planned to replace COAS Kayani if Dogar had blocked the impeachment. 4. (C) Zardari said he was trying to keep Nawaz in the coalition and was candid that he planned to tie up the judges issue for a long time. He said the parliament would debate the restoration of the judges; Chief Justice Dogar would then submit some rulings on the restoration of the judges; all this could take months. In the meantime, he was trying to persuade former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to become Governor of Balochistan. (Note: In a move clearly orchestrated by Zardari, the Governor Magsi of Balochistan resigned on August 20, making it possible to offer the position to Chaudhry.)

    5. (C) Zardari said he did not think Nawaz would leave the coalition, but he admitted the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz had become increasingly testy. He said that he had already agreed with Nawaz to curtail the powers of the President and then allow Nawaz to be eligible for a third term as Prime Minister; both measures would require constitutional amendments. Zardari revealed that he also had leverage over Shahbaz Sharif, who through paperwork snafus, had been technically elected illegally for a third term as Chief Minister. This, too, would have to be resolved in parliament, Zardari said. “So I can give them something they want,” noted Zardari, “that’s what politics is all about.”

    Kayani Worried

    ————–

    6. (C) After an August 20 meeting with visiting S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey, Kayani asked Ambassador to stay behind and discuss his concerns that Zardari was delaying

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    Musharraf,s immunity bill. Kayani had heard the large meeting of coalition partners (chaired August 19 by the newly returned Bilawal Bhutto) had discussed mostly the judges. Then they decided to take a 72-hour “break” to consult party members.

    7. (C) As post earlier reported (Reftels), Kayani said he took Zardari,s commitments to now ex-President Musharraf as the most important argument in persuading him to resign. Zardari made very specific commitments to Kayani. Now, for Zardari to delay, it makes him (Kayani) look bad within his own institution “and I have to bring the Army along with me.” Kayani also noted that the delay does nothing for Zardari,s reputation for trustworthiness. If this issue gets conflated with the judges and with Zardari,s own desires to be President, it will become too complicated to pass, Kayani said.

    Gilani on Immunity, Bajaur, Subsidies

    ————————————-

    8. (C) Ambassador met with PM Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik for thirty minutes August 21, after a graduation ceremony for U.S. trained members of his protective detail. He had been briefed about PDAS Camp’s discussion with Ambassador Haqqani.

    9. (C) Gilani said the PPP was going to provide immunity for ex-President Musharraf, but timing was important. They were afraid that putting forward immunity legislation would lose them votes for Asif Zardari,s presidential campaign. Ambassador pressed on this issue, saying that Musharraf would never have agreed to resign without the promise of immunity. He assured Ambassador that he and the party did not want vengeance. Regarding immunity, Gilani said “many will say that we have done a deal with America, but still I understand that we have to do it.”

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/167125

  • It is an open secret that Pakistan’s military establishment wields great power even when a civilian government is in place. Jasmine Zerinini, the head of France’s interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, was of the view that though General Kayani has “learned the lesson of Musharraf” and was not interested in a direct military coup, he was manipulating the government and parliament. Ms Zerinini alleged that General Kayani stirred up the “controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties continued US aid to increased civilian control of the military”. As per the cable, “Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective, and that more coordination was needed among donors” and the Friends of Democratic Pakistan “was designed to transform Pakistan’s political elite and give them more leverage over the military”. This shows that the west is now interested in strengthening our democratic dispensation. It is imperative that the government is allowed to complete its tenure. It is time that democracy is allowed to take root in the country so that the civil-military relations are put in a proper perspective

  • Wikileaks (creation of “The Invisible Government”) has done nothing except bringing the ‘Naked Truth’ about Mr. Super Corrupt-cum-Crook #1 of Pakistan to the lime light. He and his government,has proved through their actions, to be without any speck of doubt, ‘Enemy of the 98% of the People of Pakistan'(comprising of Poors, Lower Middle-Class & Middle Class)of our entire population. 2% being the so-called elite, or more factually, opportunists, exploiters, plunderers, drug-mafia, land-grabbers, cheaters, thieves, criminals, tax-evaders. PPP now therefore stands for ‘Pakistan Plundering Party’. They have by their very practical actions, coined the ‘New Definition of DEMOCRACY’ which is, by virtue of their practice, over the past almost 3 years dawned as:-
    Government …OFF … the People,
    Government …FAR … the People and
    Government …BUY … the People.

  • I have to but agree with the views expressed by Aqeela A. Qureshi and would like to add to it the idiomatic truths, namely, “A man is known by the company he keeps.” and, “Birds of a Feather, Fly together.” Have a look at his ministers, advisors, parliamentarians, officer-bearers and choicest-lackies, and you will definitely find, convicts, criminals, crooks and cheats who were and are around him. In one way or the other, they have served and continue to serve him in his judicial as well as extra-judicial super-crimes.
    Members of ‘real Bhutto Clan/Family’ publicly call him as ‘hijacker of Bhutto Legacy.’ Top and Real Jiyalas (those nearest to Z.A. Bhutto and BB) reckon the ‘President House as the HQ of Conspiracies’ and openly point at him as one who is responsible for murder of Murtaza and in addition ask, “Who benefited the most from BB’s murder?” For this very daring stand, it is now an open secret taht most of them have been and are being shunted from the CEC and other important positions and replaced by flatterers and blockhead/puppets.

    “ZUBANE-E-KHANJAR JO CHUP RAHE GI; LAHOO PUKAREGA ASTEEN KA.”

  • وکی لیکس کی طرف سے طرف سے پاکستان کی فوج اور سول قیادت کے بارے میں انکشافات کے بعد ابتداء میں فوج خاموشی رہی لیکن اب ان کی جانب سے ایک مختصر بیان جاری کیا گیا۔

    لیکن پاکستان کی فوج کے شعبہ تعلقات عامہ کے بیان میں وکی لیکس کی طرف سے افشا کیے جانے والے امریکی سفارتی دستاویز میں پاکستان کی فوج کے سربراہ جنرل اشفاق پرویز کیانی سے منسوب ریمارکس کے بارے میں کوئی وضاحت نہیں کی اور نہ ہی اس کی تردید کی گئی ہے۔

    بعض حلقوں کا خیال ہے کہ اس بیان کا بظاہر مقصد فوج اور سیاسی قیادت کے درمیان کسی ممکنہ غلط فہمی سے بچنا ہے جبکہ کچھ لوگوں کی سوچ ہے کہ وکی لیکس کے انکشافات کے بعد ملک میں فوج کے سیاسی کردار پر آئندہ جو سوالات اٹھ سکتے ہیں اس کے پیش نظر پاکستان کی فوج کے ترجمان کو بیان جاری کرنا پڑا ہے۔

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2010/12/101204_army_reaction_wikileaks_zs.shtml