Original Articles

King Abdullah, the great-grandson of Abu Jahl – by Omar Khattab

Wikileaks have made it clear what the world already knew: That King Abdullah, the notorious womanizer-cum-custodian of the Ka’aba carries on the work of King Fahad the boozer who, in turn, continued the task which was initiated by the ancestor of the House of Saud. This unenviable task is to create mischief in the world. The Prophet Muhammad repeatedly cursed his arch enemy Abu Jahl. Abu Jahl means the Father of Ignorance.

While the scions of the House of Saud continue to patronize brothels and casinos all over the world, King Abdullah, notorious for marrying young women until he took over as King, has been trying to bring immense destruction to the world. The House of Saud has been corrupting the world through building Wahabi centers (called mosques) in the Western world and madrassas in Muslim countries. Some of Wahabism’s proudest products are the Taliban and the al-Qaeda.

Since he took over after the death of his insane brother King Fahad, King Abdullah has pumped in billions in spreading Wahabism which is an ideology of bloodlust. Not content with the mad desire to conquer the world, he wants to destroy what he cannot conquer. He wants Iran destroyed and its people killed by the millions.

Everyone knows what will happen if the United States or Israel destroys Iran’s nuclear facilities: millions of Iranians will die as a result, and the long-term effects of such an attack will be disastrous too because the destroyed uranium will destroy Iran’s environment and that of the whole region.

Being the Abu Jahl of modern times, King Abdullah doe not realize that if he succeeds in having Iran destroyed, his own country will not be spared. But he does not care. He and the debauch sons of the House of Saud have stashed billions of dollars in American banks, the money they have stolen from the people of the country they have been ruling like hungry hyenas amongst gazelles. They will run away to the States with the money not realizing, the House of Saud being the House of Ignorance, that peaceful coexistence is more lasting than insanity of warfare.

Related article:

Saudi Arabia without King Abdullah – by Hassan Hanizadeh

Wikileaks reconfirm the Taliban ISI Alliance (LUBP update 29 Nov 2010)

About the author

Omar Khattab


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  • I understand the reasons for this rant, but no choosing such a picture is not justified. Editors take notice please.

    Editor’s note: Thank you, Shahid, for the suggestion. We have now removed the picture of one dog.

  • US embassy cables: Saudi king urges US strike on Iran

    Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649
    EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018
    Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly asks America to attack Iran to stop its nuclear programme. He warns that if Tehran develops a nuclear weapon, then so will the Saudis and other countries in the region. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

    1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all making essentially the same points. They said that the Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are satisfied that the security situation has improved and the Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all Iraqis, reinforce Iraq’s Arab identity, and resist Iranian influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the Charge’ on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce changes to its Iraq policy before the President’s visit to Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.

    The Need to Resist Iran

    10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King’s frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. “He told you to cut off the head of the snake,” he recalled to the Charge’, adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

    11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

    RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003



  • Very true.USA alone is not responsible for cultivating the mindless crop of terrorists who have endangered the world’s peace at present but House of Saud has played a key role to nurture it and is equally responsible along with USA.

  • Keep it up. Expose the nasty face of Al-Saud Family who have robbed the true ancestors of Muhammad and are now involved in looting the wealth of Saudi Arabia, investing it into USA and Europe in Hotels, Casinos and brothels. Funneling billions of dollars into terrorism around the world financing Al-Qaida and now Taliban. The spread of Wahabism and its message of hate and killing around the world, is the main goal of this Abu Jahl.Expose these former decoits and robbers of Najd tribe who used to rob pilgrims while on their way to Hajj. These are the real traitors of the Muslim World.

  • How can a King who don’t consider women even worth driving a car or traveling on their own, can Like a party or its leaders who believe in equality of gender and had a women as its most cherished leader.

  • US embassy cables: Saudi royals believe army rule better for Pakistan


    guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 09.45 GMT
    Article history
    Sunday, 17 May 2009, 16:06
    C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000670
    EO 12958 DECL: 05/17/2019
    Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)

    1. KEY POINTS:

    — (C) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met in Riyadh May 16 with HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN), Saudi Assistant Minister of the Interior.

    — (C) Holbrooke emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan should be treated as a closely inter-related problem. He stressed U.S. desire for stronger cooperation and a common U.S./Saudi approach to Pakistan based on economic assistance, encouraging cooperation between Pakistani political factions, and transforming the Pakistani army to fight a counterinsurgency war.

    — (C) MbN noted the Saudis viewed the Pakistan army as the strongest element for stability in the country. In reply Holbrooke emphasized U.S. support for Pakistan’s democracy and said the U.S. opposed a military coup. MbN said he agreed.

    — (C) MbN described Yemen as a dangerous failed state and a growing threat to Saudi Arabia because it attracts Al-Qaeda (AQ), said Yemeni President Saleh is losing control, and outlined a Saudi strategy of co-opting Yemeni tribes with assistance projects.

    — (C) MbN strongly supported President Obama’s decision to oppose release of photographs of U.S. detainee interrogations, saying release would provide a boon to AQ, and would be “the favor of their life.”


    2. (C) Holbrooke thanked the Prince for Saudi Arabia’s $700 million pledge at the April 17 Pakistan donors’ conference in Japan. He said he had not come to make demands or requests but simply to begin a consultative process. The fact that three U.S. special envoys (Senator Mitchell, Dennis Ross, and now Holbrooke) have visited Saudi Arabia demonstrates the importance President Obama places on U.S./Saudi relations and the Saudi role in the region. Afghanistan and Pakistan were a major problem the new U.S. administration had inherited.

    3. (C) Success in Afghanistan was essential for U.S. security as well as security in Europe and the Middle East, Holbrooke continued. The U.S. might be able to live with some degree of instability in Afghanistan, but not with an unstable Pakistan, because of Pakistan’s nuclear arms, fragile politics, and relationship with India. He asked if Saudi Arabia shared this conclusion. MbN said “Absolutely,” a comment echoed precisely in Holbrooke’s subsequent meetings with King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal (septels). It’s clear that Saudi Arabia has a “unique” relationship with Pakistan, Holbrooke said. He noted that over 800,000 Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was especially important to Nawaz Sharif, the most popular politician in Pakistan. These were reasons why what happened in Pakistan was of direct concern to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

    4. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shared a common purpose on Pakistan but not yet a “common collaboration.” The purpose of his visit was thus to begin a dialogue on Pakistan and seek a common policy. Neither the U.S. nor Saudi Arabia could afford to let Pakistan fall apart. There were three important issues to address:

    — Pakistan desperately needs economic assistance; — Even though the Saudis preferred Nawaz Sharif, Sharif and Zardari need to be persuaded to work together; — The Pakistan army needs to restructure itself to fight today’s war against the Taliban rather than yesterday’s war against India.

    If Pakistan fell apart, Holbrooke said, the consequences for Saudi Arabia would be “unimaginable,” especially if Pakistan’s nuclear weapons fell into unfriendly hands. (“God forbid!” interjected the Prince.) “Under your leadership,” Holbrooke told the Prince “Saudi Arabia has defeated terror, but if Pakistan falls apart, the result would be catastrophe.”

    5. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. wanted to expand the U.S./Saudi relationship concerning Pakistan. Saudi Arabia could do a lot for Pakistan, he added, noting that economic

    and social conditions in Pakistan created fertile ground for extremism. Zardari had many faults but he was democratically elected, so the U.S. tries to get him and Sharif to work together. Meanwhile, Holbrooke said, money for the Taliban flows in from the region.

    6. (C) MbN said a vacuum in Islamabad would be dangerous. He described Pakistan army Chief of Staff General Kayani as a “decent man” who wanted to restore dignity to the army, and sought consensus support of all the civilian factions. The army was the Saudis’ “winning horse,” MbN said, but it needed to prepare to fight the current war against terror. Pakistani soldiers needed to be proud of their service, and not hide their identity as soldiers when they were off duty, MbN said. He had told Kayani that Pakistani troops needed to feel they were fighting for Pakistan and not the U.S. The Pakistani army had a “golden opportunity” because now Pakistan faced an external enemy. MbN emphasized that the army was Pakistan’s “best bet” for stability. There were 800,000 Pakistanis and over one million Indians living in Saudi Arabia, MbN said, and millions more visited the Kingdom to make the Hajj pilgrimage, so anything that happened in Pakistan, or between Pakistan and India, was a threat to stability in Saudi Arabia.

    7. (C) Holbrooke said he knew Kayani, with the Director of Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI), and General Pasha, and also Musharraf. He recalled the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had decided to support Musharraf in the aftermath of 9/11. This had been the right decision at the time but Musharraf had been a disappointment. The U.S. supported democracy in Pakistan, not any individual leader. Holbrooke repeated that the U.S. supported Zardari because he was elected, and emphasized that the U.S. was “100 percent opposed” to a military coup in Pakistan. MbN assured that Saudi Arabia would not support a coup either.

    8. (C) He noted the U.S. agreed that corruption in Pakistan was an issue, but the U.S. had decided it was more important to help Pakistan. Attaching onerous conditions to assistance was a mistake, Holbrooke said. Since the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed on Pakistan’s importance, the question was how to start working together. MbN answered that U.S./Saudi security cooperation should stay as it is, since it had “never been better” despite past tensions. Each side knew its own business best, and the focus should be on obtaining results. MbN characterized Saudi cooperation with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies as “one team.”

    9. (C) Holbrooke reiterated that terrorists in Pakistan were not under enough pressure and pressed the point that U.S./Saudi cooperation on Pakistan needed to rise to a higher level. MbN replied that he had asked King Abdullah for permission to maintain a “security channel” with the U.S. to remain open at all times to facilitate information exchange regardless of other issues in bilateral relations. The Prince added that the King despised the corruption he saw in Pakistan and this colored his views toward that country.


    10. (C) Moving to a new subject, the Prince said “We have a problem called Yemen.” AQ has found fertile ground there, he said. The geography was similar to Afghanistan, and many Yemenis were more sympathetic to AQ’s goals than were the Afghans. Yemen is also closer to AQ targets and recruiting grounds in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had detected a pattern of individuals coming to the Kingdom for Hajj or Umrah and then traveling south to Yemen (“it’s only 400 miles,” he noted) for training before returning to their home countries. Saudi forces have arrested Egyptians and Algerians, among others, who were attempting to do this.

    11. (C) MbN described Yemen as a failed state that is “very, very, extremely dangerous,” and required focus. The Huthi tribes were Takfiri and Shi’a “like Hizballah South,” he said. This was a threat forming around Saudi Arabia that required action now. The Saudis would like Saleh to be a strong leader, MbN said, but “his vision of Yemen has shrunk to Sana’a,” and he was losing control over the rest of the country. Saleh’s old advisors were gone and now he relied on his son and other younger men who did not have good connections with the Yemeni tribes. In contrast, Saudi Arabia had good connections with the tribes, MbN said.

    12. (C) MbN said the Saudis had established a bilateral council with Yemen that met twice a year to consider assistance projects. The Saudi representatives were the

    Crown prince and the oil minister (Note: Crown Prince Sultan has been incapacitated by illness for at least he past year; it is not clear whether the bilateral council has continued to meet in his absence.) Saudi assistance to Yemen was not in the form of cash payments, MbN said, since cash tended to end up in Swiss banks. Instead the Saudis backed projects in the tribal areas of Yemen where AQ was hiding. The idea was that when Yemenis saw the concrete benefits of these projects they would push their leaders to eject the extremists. Saudi Arabia was counting on this strategy, MbN said, to persuade Yemenis to see extremists as criminals rather than heroes. Holbrooke replied that the U.S. understood Saudi concerns about Yemen, and would work with the Saudis to address the problem there.


    13. (C) Turning to another issue, MbN recalled that the day following President Obama’s inauguration, White House counterterrorism advisor Brennan had telephoned to assure him the new president was committed to continuing the war on terror. “Terrorists stole the most valuable things we have,” said the Prince. “They took our faith and our children and used them to attack us.” It had not been easy to see Saudi involvement in 9/11 and other terrorist incidents, he said. AQ was smart in wanting to hit both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. AQ’s strategic goal was to hurt the U.S. and to take control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.

    14. (C) MbN claimed that in 2003 radicals were present in “90 percent” of Saudi mosques. The current Saudi leadership had decided it needed to be on the front lines of the struggle against terrorism, that the task could not be left to the next generation, since AQ gained momentum every time it succeeded. The Saudis realized they could not fight back without public support, he said, and developed a strategy of working with families of suicide bombers and other extremists who had been killed. This approach involved providing support to the families and telling them their sons had been “victims” and not “criminals.” This gave the families “a way out” and provided a public relations advantage to the government. “If you stop five but create fifty” new radicals, “that’s dumb.” MbN said. The Saudis measure their success against extremism by looking at levels of terrorist recruitment the number of successful operations, and they see a growing rejection of extremist violence. The Prince related an anecdote about an anti-terrorist operation in which the officer commanding Interior Ministry forces had discovered his cousin was the leader of the terrorists inside a surrounded building. MbN said he had offered to relieve the officer, but the latter had refused, and had insisted on leading the attack. The officer succeeded in defeating the terrorists while capturing his cousin alive.

    15. (C) Saudi Arabia was not yet free of terrorism, MbN said. Thus it remained important to defeat the terrorists on the ground, in the media, and ideologically. The Saudis wanted to do this in cooperation with the U.S., the Prince said. Time was the key, and it was “not in our favor,” he added, so “we need to work fast.”

    16. (C) On terrorist financing, MbN said “We are trying to do our best.” Saudi Arabia has millions of visitors, especially during Hajj. The Saudis are making arrests, but are not making this public. Instead, the Saudi goal is to make the public aware that donations could go to the wrong places. MbN said that “if money wants to go” to terrorist causes, “it will go,” and that terrorist attacks were inexpensive, “but let’s make it harder.” Holbrooke asked what the Saudis would do with Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia who financed terrorism. The Prince replied the suspects would be tried in Shari’a courts with Wahhabi judges so that the results of the judicial process could be used to condemn extremist ideology.


    17. (C) Holbrooke explained that President Obama had decided to oppose release of 2000 photographs of U.S. interrogations of terrorist suspects on grounds of national security, and asked what the Saudi public reaction would be to publication of these photos. MbN responded “You bet!” it would be bad for security, and noted that following publication of the first Abu Ghraib photos, Saudi authorities had arrested 250 individuals trying to leave Saudi Arabia to join extremist groups in Afghanistan. Release of more pictures would give AQ “the favor of their life,” said the

    Prince. Saudi Arabia had fought very hard to defeat AQ on the Internet, but he couldn,t see how to fight 2000 new photos.

    18. (U) Meeting participants


    Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor David Rundell, Charge d’Affaires Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker) Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh

    Saudi Arabia

    HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior

    Major General Dr. Sa’ad al-Jabri, Senior Advisor, Ministry of the Interior

    Major General Khalid al-Humaydan (“Abu Ali”), Counterterrorism Advisor, Ministry of the Interior

    Brigadier General Ahmed al-Issa, U.S. Liaison, Ministry of the Interior

    19. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram. RUNDELL


  • State Department cables: Saudis distrust Pakistan’s Shia president Zardari


    guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 09.45 GMT
    Article history
    Monday, 26 October 2009, 13:18
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001415
    EO 12958 DECL: 10/21/2019
    RIYADH 00001415 001.2 OF 002
    Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)



    1. (C) During an Oct. 20 courtesy call with the Ambassador, Pakistani Ambassador Umar Khan Alisherzai highlighted the success of recent military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas; lamented strains on the Saudi-Pakistani bilateral relationship; discussed other regional issues affecting Pakistan; and offered his advice on countering extremism in rural tribal regions. End Summary.



    2. (C) Alisherzai described the Pakistani military operations in Waziristan as “progressing well,” adding that they had encountered “reasonable resistance, but not as much as we expected.” The army faced difficult terrain in the region, he continued, but had already killed over 100 militants. Alisherzai described the extremists as a group of “Chechens, Saudis, Uzbeks and others” who had come across the border from Afghanistan and sought refuge with the local population. Although tribal tradition required the Pakistanis to offer them shelter, he explained, “these people turned out to be monsters,” and the local population turned against them.



    3. (C) Alisherzai pointed to the military’s advances against the Taliban in the Swat Valley as one example of success in the region. The cooperation of the local people was a decisive factor, as they provided the most effective intelligence to the military after realizing that “the militants were not interested in Islam at all.” In addition, the military and police in Swat provided weapons to local tribes. When pressed about conditions in Swat, Alisherzai admitted that the Pakistani military still faced challenges due to their limited resources. He said that 10,000 soldiers had been relocated from the Indian border to Swat and that 100,000 new soldiers were placed there as well. However, Alisherzai was quick to point out that the 100,000 new soldiers were inexperienced.

    4. (C) While upbeat that Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders were “truly working in tandem for the first time,” Alisherzai was disappointed that action was not taken sooner. “All of this would have been easier if done under (former Pakistani President) Musharraf,” he concluded.



    5. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s question about support from CentCom, Alisherzai replied that the U.S. “does a lot for Pakistan.” However, it was not enough to fight this problem. All of NATO was fighting the battle in Afghanistan, he complained, while Pakistan alone was standing up to the extremists within its borders. For this reason he insisted that Pakistan needed more material support from the U.S. in the form of “arms, ammo and planes.”



    6. (C) When asked about the Saudi-Pakistani relationship, Alisherzai admitted that it had been strained since Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s election. Alisherzai blamed the problems on the Saudi perception that Zardari was pro-Iranian and pro-Shia, which made them apprehensive about working with him. “We have been punished by Saudi Arabia because our president talks to the Iranians,” Alisherzai lamented. He claimed that his access to Saudi leadership was good, but that he would have to continue to work hard to rebuild Pakistan,s relationship with the SAG. Alisherzai opined

    RIYADH 00001415 002.2 OF 002

    that the Saudis were more concerned with their own internal problems than with the problems of Pakistan.



    7. (C) Alisherzai accused Russia of “fully supporting the Iranians’ nuclear program,” adding that all Shia communities in the region supported this program. He described Iranian nuclear ambitions as a move to consolidate domestic political power and stated multiple times, “they will not leave this subject.”



    8. (C) Alisherzai blamed India for helping to train and fund extremist groups fighting against the Government of Pakistan. He said that India also helped support the Taliban in Pakistan, explaining “They (India) will never let a chance to harm Pakistan go.” Alisherzai summed up his feelings about India by saying, “We are not expecting anything good from them.”



    9. (C) Asked how to stop terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, Alisherzai said that the people living in the tribal areas “don’t know the value of life.” He blamed this on their lack of education and knowledge of the outside world, and said that they only know fighting and dying. In his view, investment in education and development was the only way to help the tribal areas, and said that years of “bad luck” had redirected development funds from the tribal areas to the urban population centers. He reiterated his support for military operations, but insisted that a program to educate young boys in the region must also be implemented. He noted that this program should be funded by NATO and added, “I am only here today because of my education. Perhaps I would have been Al-Qaeda too, if not for my education.”



    10. (C) Alisherzai is from the Kurram Agency, one of the seven tribal agencies that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) along the Afghanistan border. As such, he is able to offer an insider’s view of life along the Pakistani-Afghan border. His observation that intelligence and support provided by the local population has been essential to the success of Pakistani military operations is worth noting, as are his suggestions as to how we might counter the growth of extremism in the region. However, his insights about larger regional issues (ie: Iran, India, Saudi Arabia) appear to be much more limited. End comment.



    11. (C) Alisherzai grew up in the FATA bordering the Afghanistan provinces of Khowst and Paktya. His father served in the British military and insisted that his son attend school. Alisherzai says that at the age of five he walked 8km to school everyday. He has six children, all living in the U.S. and all graduates of George Mason University. SMITH


  • US embassy cables: Saudis fear ‘Shia triangle’ of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan


    guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 09.45 GMT
    Article history
    Thursday, 09 April 2009, 04:22
    S E C R E T STATE 034688
    EO 12958 DECL: 04/07/2019
    SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton’s April 7, 2009 meeting

    with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed

    1.(U) Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

    2. (U) April 7, 2009; 1:30 p.m.; Washington, DC.

    3. (U) Participants:



    The Secretary Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman Jake Sullivan, S staff Barbara Masilko, NEA Notetaker


    UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) Ambassador Yousef al Otaiba Abdullah al Saboosi, UAE Notetaker

    4. (S) SUMMARY. The Secretary reviewed the status of the US-UAE 123 agreement and additional action the UAE can take to encourage a positive Congressional review. The UAE request for participation in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) is under serious consideration. The Secretary expressed her interest in participating in a GCC plus three meeting in Baghdad in the near future. The UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) also suggested a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting to discuss Iran. AbZ confirmed his intention to participate in the Pakistan Donors conference in Tokyo and expressed concerns about Saudi back peddling. The Secretary thanked the UAE for the positive support for both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian Authority. AbZ noted that Qatar wants the Arab League to request a meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. END SUMMARY.


    Nuclear Cooperation and Export Control


    5. (S) The Secretary expressed the Administration’s commitment to the U.S.-UAE Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (aka 123 Agreement). She emphasized that our goal is to get the agreement completed as smoothly as possible. AbZ said that he is delighted with the progress on the agreement. He added that the UAE’s goal is to create a gold standard for a nuclear power program. Then, because of the strong commitments the UAE has made, it will be impossible to have improper use of its nuclear facilities.

    6. (S) Turning to the need to be prepared to respond to Congress, the Secretary committed to form a State Department committee including H, NEA and ISN to work on the notification. The Secretary noted the importance of implementing the UAE export control law and continued UAE efforts against illicit Iranian trade and Iranian front companies. The Secretary encouraged action on nonproliferation treaty commitments as especially helpful actions the UAE could take to support our efforts. AbZ noted that the UAE would formally join the additional protocol on April 8.

    7. (S) AbZ agreed that the August 2007 export control law had some “loopholes” and said that the UAE Cabinet “revisited” the issue last week. Otaiba said that AbZ had personally intervened to ensure timely action. Otaiba elaborated that the committee charged with implementing the export control law will have its first meeting later this month to begin operations.

    8. (S) Otaiba noted that, even in the absence of a formal implementation committee, the UAE is taking action – citing a recent case involving German-made Siemens computers and a Chinese ship bound for Iran interdicted in port in the UAE.


    Major Economies Forum


    9. (S) The Secretary noted UAE interest in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). While noting that the UAE does not technically meet the criteria for the meeting, based on size of the economy alone, the Secretary said there are many criteria that make it important for the UAE to attend, adding she will make a recommendation for UAE participation as an observer. AbZ said the UAE bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) headquarters would be very difficult to achieve if the UAE is locked out of the MEF preparatory meeting in Washington and promised “we will remember your help.”




    10. (S) The Secretary said the U.S. is looking to see if Iran can be engaged in any productive manner and noted that Special Advisor Ross would travel to the region soon for consultations. AbZ told the Secretary that UAE feels threatened by Iran today, even though Iran does not yet have a nuclear capability. AbZ asserted that the UAE is even more worried about Iranian intentions than is Israel. AbZ encouraged the U.S. to consider a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting.


    Iraqi GCC plus 3


    11. (S) The Secretary expressed interest in the Iraqi invitations for a GCC plus 3 meeting in Baghdad, at a date to be determined. She noted the value of the GCC plus 3 mechanism not only for furthering Arab engagement with the Iraqi government during a time of transition, but as a way to send a message to Iran that Iraq has broad support in the Arab world.




    12. (S) The Secretary told AbZ that the U.S. needs help to stem the flow of funds from the Gulf to the Taliban. She noted that one area of potential action is reviving training related to bulk cash smuggling.

    13. (S) Thanking the UAE for hosting the Friends of Pakistan preparatory meeting, the Secretary said she hopes AbZ would attend the April donors conference in Tokyo. AbZ confirmed that he plans to attend and said that the UAE will make a “strong” pledge, but no decision has been made on an exact dollar figure.

    14. (S) AbZ express concern over Saudi Arabia’s decision not to make a pledge at the Tokyo conference. AbZ said that the Saudis have never liked the Pakistan Peoples Party, and support Nawaz Sharif. In addition, AbZ posited that Saudi Arabia suspects that Zardari is Shia, thus creating Saudi concern of a Shia triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan under Zardari. Feltman noted a pattern of Saudi behavior of withholding financial assistance – not supporting March 14 in Lebanon, not sending funds to the PA, and not planning a pledge for Pakistan. Otaiba added that Saudi Arabia also failed make a commitment at the G20 meeting.




    15. (S) The Secretary noted the need to support Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the run up to the elections with concrete displays of support. Feltman added that the UAE had been particularly helpful already by funding the delivery of the first ten refurbished tanks for the LAF. AbZ noted that he would meet with visiting Lebanese Minister of Defense Murr later on April 7. AbZ said the UAE will purchase additional munitions for LAF helicopters, donated by the UAE to LAF last year, but is waiting for France to provide a price estimate.


    Middle East Peace Process


    16. (S) The Secretary thanked the UAE for its strong financial support for the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Secretary asked if AbZ had an update on the status of Palestinian unity talks. Acknowledging that Hamas and Fatah are not coming to an agreement, AbZ replied with a smile that things are “going well.”

    17. (S) AbZ said that in addition to financial support for the PA it is important that the new Israeli government reach out to President Abbas. AbZ said that the Secretary should expect the Qatari Prime Minister to request an Arab League meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. AbZ said the Quartet will need to use the same standards for the new Israel government as already applied to the Palestinians regarding respecting previous agreements. The Secretary agreed. AbZ said that it is important to create a road map of Israeli and Palestinian actions towards an end game. The Secretary agreed on the importance of simultaneous reinforcing actions in support of negotiations. AbZ said that the UAE candidacy to host IRENA could yield political benefits, if successful. Israel is already a signatory to the agreement, so it would have a representative IRENA mission in Abu Dhabi should the UAE be chosen to host headquarters.



  • US embassy cables: Saudi rulers’ contempt for Pakistan president Zardari


    guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 09.45 GMT
    Article history
    Friday, 12 February 2010, 12:15
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000182
    EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
    REF: KABUL 500
    RIYADH 00000182 001.2 OF 003
    Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    1. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke, Embassy Riyadh warmly welcomes you to Saudi Arabia, which, by virtue of its historical and cultural ties to Central Asia; personal relationships between Saudi, Afghani and Pakistani leaders; financial power; and leadership of the Muslim world, can play a central role in implementing the President’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Your visit comes at a time of great potential but great uncertainty: the Saudi-Afghan relationship appears to be warming up, while the traditionally close Saudi-Pakistani relationship has grown increasingly strained. The Saudis are broadly supportive of our approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but occasionally express skepticism about our timing or our approach. Your visit provides an opportunity to mine the Saudis’ wealth of experience in dealing with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and extremism, and further explore ways to translate our shared goals into action in the unique Saudi context. We have requested meetings with GIP Director Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, and Prince Turki Al-Faisal during your visit.

    2. (C) SAUDI-AFGHAN RELATIONS WARMING: President Karzai’s February 2-3 visit to the Kingdom, although richer in symbolism than substance, was a sign that lukewarm Saudi-Afghan relations may finally be warming up. In his official statement at the London Conference, FM Saud announced a $150 million pledge of additional financial support for Afghan reconstruction. He expressed broad Saudi support for reconciliation, adding that they would be willing to assist at the request of President Karzai– on the condition that the Taliban sever its relationship with Al-Qaeda and cease providing refuge to its leaders. While not as forward leaning as we may have liked, FM Saud’s statement put the Saudis on the record and created an opportunity to put reconciliation talks back in motion–eventually. Saudi participation at the Turkish-led regional conference on Afghanistan on January 26 was further evidence of the Saudi commitment to engagement. Karzai’s visit showed that the King was ready to deal with Karzai as a legitimate, Muslim head of state. However, the Saudis continue to have concerns about Afghan corruption and believe greater political incorporation of the Pashtun community is essential. Their apparent wish to downplay Karzai’s visit–as compared to the Afghans (reftel)–may also indicate the King’s desire to keep some distance and maintain his credibility as a potential reconciliation mediator.

    3. (S/NF) BUT MEDIATION NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME: Privately, the Saudis tell us it’s still “too soon” to be publicly discussing technical and financial aspects of reintegration efforts. GIP Director Prince Muqrin has made clear that his marching orders are to work through intelligence channels only until progress becomes sustainable, at which point foreign ministries will be brought in. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, Prince Muqrin hinted at but did not provide details about what appears to be significant movement on the Saudi mediation effort, with visits by high-level Taliban and Afghan officials, since the Hajj. We surmise that Muqrin is reluctant to share information because the talks remain delicate and he fears U.S. involvement could derail progress. He has also voiced concern about how to address UNSCR 1267 prohibitions on dealing with various Taliban members.

    4. (C) ZARDARI STILL THE PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN: The Saudis generally agree that there is a need to deny terrorists safehavens in Pakistan, but question whether the methods we have outlined will be effective. Despite tense relations with the Zardari government, close military and intelligence cooperation continues between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Saudis believe opposition leader Nawaz Sharif can play a “great role” in working with tribal chiefs and that “money is better than bullets” in the fight against the Taliban. They have started to fulfill their pledge from the Tokyo donor,s conference (over half of the $700 million pledged has been disbursed) and have expressed a willingness to continue with financial support for a stable Pakistan. Saudi interlocutors stress the importance of remembering that Pakistan remains

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    pre-occupied with issues on its Indian border, coloring its ability to deal with the Taliban.

    5. (C) IN THE ARMY WE TRUST: The tumultuous democratic process in Pakistan makes the Saudis nervous, and they appear to be looking for “another Musharraf”: a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust. In his January meeting with General Jones, the King cited President Zardari as an impediment to denying terrorist safehavens, calling him an “obstacle” and “a rotten head” that was infecting the whole body. He maintained that the Pakistani Army was capable of being a strong partner for the U.S., and opined that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust. He asserted that that the Army was staying out of Pakistani politics in deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it “should.” FM Saud told General Jones that we must reach out to tribal leaders and separate “those we could work with” from “those we must fight.” He believed that using the military to fight extremists posed certain dangers, and that the credibility of the army must be maintained. The Saudis were pushing Pakistan’s civilian leaders to work together, but “compromise seemed alien to Pakistani politicians.”

    6. (C) TURKI’S TAKE: During a recent meeting with Ambassador, former GIP Director Prince Turki Al-Faisal called Afghanistan a “puzzle,” where establishing trust with Afghan leaders, and recognizing the links between Pakistan and the Taliban, were keys to success. All financial aid to the Afghan government should be conditional: benchmarks must be set for the leadership, and aid must be withheld until these are met. Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation had failed, he said, when “both sides fell short.” He described the Taliban leadership as “fractured,” and suggested the U.S. and NATO needed to target criminal elements more vociferously and re-focus our attention on capturing Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. He suggested Saudi Arabia, the U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan could join forces and share assets in order to capture or kill bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. This would break the terrorists’ “aura of invincibility” and allow the U.S. to “declare victory” and move on.

    7. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE: Terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern. Over the last year, however, Saudi Arabia has made important progress in combating al-Qaida financing emanating from the country. Sensitive reporting indicates that al-Qaida’s ability to raise funds has deteriorated substantially, and that it is now in its weakest state since 9/11. The Kingdom is also cooperating more actively than at any previous point to respond to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States, and to investigate and detain financial facilitators of concern. Nonetheless, sustained engagement is required to maintain the current momentum, particularly in providing the Saudis with specific details and actionable information. Your visit provides another opportunity to welcome the progress Saudi Arabia has made, and reiterate the importance that President Obama and the USG place on curtailing fundraising activity by global terrorist groups in Saudi Arabia, particularly those that undermine the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    8. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: While in the past the KSA stood reluctant to pursue Saudi donors who backed groups that did not directly threaten the Kingdom, the Saudi Ministry of Interior (MOI) has now demonstrated willingness to take action, and has begun to detain individuals involved in funding networks for groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), the Taliban, and in some cases even Hamas. Our TF cooperation with the MOI is of utmost strategic importance to U.S. national security as donors in Saudi Arabia continue to constitute a source of funding to Sunni extremist groups worldwide. Available intelligence reflects that the Kingdom remains an important fundraising locale-especially during the Hajj and Ramadan-for the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The MOI remains almost completely dependent on the CIA to provide analytic support and direction for its counterterrorism operations. As such, our success against terrorist financing in the Kingdom remains directly tied to our ability to provide actionable intelligence to our Saudi counterparts. In order to enhance the USG’s ability to influence and direct Saudi efforts to

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    disrupt terrorist financing, in 2008 we stood up a Treasury attach office in Embassy Riyadh. This office actively contributes to the daily intelligence sharing process that is led by CIA.

    9. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: Saudi Arabia has taken increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qaida’s access to funding from Saudi sources. An example of recent progress by the KSA is the conviction of over 300 people for involvement in terrorism, including some for providing financial support. News reports suggest that appeals may be opened to the media in order to enhance the deterrent effects of such prosecutions. In addition, Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs Mohammed bin Nayif stated that the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) deliberately timed its August 19, 2009 press release regarding the arrest of 44 terrorist supporters to deter potential donors from giving money to suspected terrorist groups during Ramadan. Although a great deal of work remains to be done, Mohammed bin Nayif has given his commitment to work with the United States on Taliban finance, and has said that the MOI will arrest individuals involved in Saudi-based Taliban fundraising activities – even if involved in the reconciliation process – when provided with actionable intelligence.

    10. (S/NF) IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES: The Saudis have expressed broad support for the President’s strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, but often balk when asked to designate an SRAP to coordinate policy with the USG and others. In part, this reflects the centralized Saudi decision-making process and the reality that issues related to Afghanistan and Pakistan policy are not delegated, but rather dealt with directly by the King and members of the intelligence community. While the Saudis are hesitant to delegate authority and tend to make only broad-based commitments to high-profile, multilateral initiatives, they appear ready, willing and eager to share their experiences with us and identify greater opportunities for cooperation on a bilateral basis. Your visit provides an opportunity to further explore how we can best translate our shared goals into action in the unique Saudi context.



  • WikiLeaks cables: Saudi Arabia wants military rule in Pakistan
    King Abdullah and ruling princes distrust Asif Ali Zardari, the country’s Shia president, and would prefer ‘another Musharraf’

    • Full coverage of the WikiLeaks cables


    Declan Walsh in Islamabad
    guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 10.00 GMT
    Article history

    WikiLeaks cables: Billboards showing then-president Pervez Musharraf and King Abdullah during a visit by the Saudi monarch in 2006. The Saudis have said they would prefer a return to military rule in Pakistan. Photograph: Farooq Naeem/AFP/Getty Images
    America is often portrayed as the big dog in Pakistan’s yard: a swaggering power that makes rules, barks orders and throws its weight around. But the WikiLeaks cables highlight the understated yet insistent influence of another country with ideas about Pakistan’s future: Saudi Arabia.

    In recent years Saudi rulers have played favourites with Pakistani politicians, wielded their massive financial clout to political effect and even advocated a return to military rule.

    “We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants,” the Saudi ambassador to the US, Adel al-Jubeir, boasted in 2007. A senior US official later bemoaned as “negative” the Saudi influence.

    As home to Islam’s holiest sites, Saudi Arabia has longstanding ties with Pakistan. In the 1980s Saudi intelligence, along with the CIA, funded the anti-Soviet “jihad” in Afghanistan; since then the Saudis have given billions in financial aid and cut-price oil.

    But the close relationship has grown “increasingly strained” in the past two years, with King Abdullah and the ruling princes displaying a clear preference for the opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif, over the president, Asif Ali Zardari, who is viewed with thinly veiled contempt.

    In January 2009 Abdullah told James Jones, then the US national security adviser, that Zardari was incapable of countering terrorism, describing him as the “‘rotten head’ that was infecting the whole body”. Abdullah added that Pakistan’s army was “staying out of Pakistani politics in deference to US wishes, rather than doing what it ‘should'”.

    Abdullah’s preference for military rule was recorded by the Saudis’ American guests: “They appear to be looking for ‘another Musharraf’: a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust.” His views were echoed by the interior minister, who said Saudi Arabia viewed the army as its “winning horse” in Pakistan.

    The anti-Zardari bias appears to have a sectarian tinge. Pakistan’s ambassador to Riyadh, Umar Khan Alisherzai, says the Saudis, who are Sunni, distrust Zardari, a Shia. Last year the United Arab Emirates’ foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, told Hillary Clinton that Saudi suspicions of Zardari’s Shia background were “creating Saudi concern of a Shia triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan under Zardari”.

    The Saudis betray a strong preference for Sharif, who fled into exile in Jeddah in 2000 to avoid prosecution under General Pervez Musharraf. The cables contain details of Sharif’s secret exile deal – he was to remain out of politics for 10 years – as well as hints of Saudi anger when he returned to Pakistan in 2007.

    Since then, however, Saudi displeasure has abated, and the Saudis clearly view him as “their man” in the Pakistani power game. In early 2008 the Saudi foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, described Sharif as a “force for stability” and “a man who can speak across party lines even to religious extremists”. American officials noted that Sharif had obtained preferential business deals during his time in Saudi Arabia.

    Meanwhile the Saudis have pressured Zardari with oil and money. In late 2008 Pakistani officials complained that “not a drop” of Saudi oil promised at concessionary rates had been delivered, while the annual aid cheque of $300m was well below the regular rate. “Muslim brotherhood is not what it used to be,” fretted an economic counsellor at the Pakistani embassy.Pakistani officials echo the American fears about the radicalizing influence of Saudi money, some of it from the government. In April 2008 Pakistani interior advisor Rehman Malik said he was “particularly concerned about the role of the Saudi ambassador in funding religious schools and mosques” in Pakistan.

    “Malik said that [President] Musharraf had come close to “throwing him (the Saudi ambassador) out of the country” but Malik said he knew the Saudi royal family well and would work with them.”

    Zardari has asserted his independence from the Saudis. The king was unhappy that he made his first official visit to China and skipped the opening of a new university in favour of meetings in Europe and the US.

    US officials noted that the go-slow was part of a broader Saudi policy of “withholding assistance” – slowing the flow of cash and oil – when it suited policy in Lebanon, Palestine and Pakistan. Such economic tactics may be familiar to US officials, who used them against Pakistan for much of the 1990s.

    US diplomats see the Saudis as allies but also competitors for influence in Pakistan. In 2009 special envoy Richard Holbrooke warned Prince Mohammed bin Nayef of “unimaginable” consequences for Saudi Arabia if Pakistan fell apart, especially if its nuclear weapons fell into unfriendly hands.

    “God forbid!” responded the prince.

    But in Islamabad, American diplomats have sought to diminish Saudi influence by allying with another Muslim country, Turkey. After a meeting with the Turkish ambassador in May 2009, ambassador Anne Patterson noted that moderate, progressive Turkey presented a “positive role model” for Pakistan.

    It was well positioned, she said, to “neutralise somewhat the more negative influence on Pakistan politics and society exercised by Saudi Arabia”.


  • شدت پسندوں کو زیادہ امداد سعودیوں سے

    ان دستاویزات کے مطابق امریکہ کو شدت پسند تنظیموں کی مالی امداد کو روکنے سے متعلق اپنی کوششوں میں دشواری کا سامنا ہے۔

    وکی لیکس نامی ویب سائٹ کو ملنے والی امریکی سفارتی خط و کتابت کے مطابق القاعدہ، طالبان، لشکر طیبہ اور حماس جیسی اسلامی شدت پسند تنظیموں کو سب سے زیادہ رقوم سعودی عرب کے مخیر لوگوں سے مل رہی ہیں۔

    ان دستاویزات کے مطابق امریکہ کو شدت پسند تنظیموں کی مالی امداد کو روکنے سے متعلق اپنی کوششوں میں دشواری کا سامنا ہے۔

    امریکی وزیر خارجہ ہلیری کلنٹن کی جانب سے گزشتہ برس لکھے گئے ایک میمو میں کہا گیا کہ سعودی عرب کے مخیر حضرات القاعدہ، طالبان، لشکر طیبہ اور حماس جیسی اسلامی شدت پسند تنظیموں کی سب سے زیادہ مالی مدد کر رہے ہیں۔

    اس خط و کتابت میں جن دوسرے ممالک پر نکتہ چینی کی گئی ہے ان میں قطر اور کویت شامل ہیں جن کے بارے میں کہا گیا ہے کہ وہ دھشت گردوں کی مالی امداد کو روکنے کے لیے مناسب اقدامات نہیں کر رہے ہیں۔

    ان دستاویزات سے یہ بھی ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ القاعدہ مشرق وسطی میں مخیر لوگوں اور گروپوں سے جب چاہے رقوم حاصل کر سکتی ہے۔


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  • Muslims v Muslims

    Dr Farrukh Saleem
    Sunday, September 09, 2012
    From Print Edition

    86 14 31 0

    Capital suggestion

    America is the largest seller of killing machines on the face of the planet – we all know that. Shockingly, Saudi Arabia is now the largest buyer of killing machines on the face of the planet. Muslims are killing Muslims and the Americans are laughing all the way to the bank. Saudi Arabia and Iran have created proxy battlefields out of countries like Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Pakistan, while America is selling killing machines to Muslims to kill other Muslims.

    Last year, America sold $66 billion worth of killing machines nearly 80 percent of the global total. Of the $66 billion, Saudi Arabia bought more than $33 billion worth of F-15, twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighters, Apaches, the four-blade attack helicopters, Sikorsky utility aircraft plus a whole array of satellite-guided bombs, naval vessels, 3-dimensional air search radars, portable tactical air search radars and HAWK air defence missile systems.

    In 2011, Russia, a distant number two seller of arms, sold a mere $4.8 billion worth of killing machines or a paltry seven percent of American weapon exports. French killing machines, in the meanwhile, fetched France only $1.8 billion.

    According to Reuters, Al-Mamlakah al-’Arabiyyah as-Su’udiyyah, at $33 billion, is “the biggest arms buyer….” India, a distant number two weapons buyer, spent $6.9 billion on buying killing machines and the UAE spent $4.5 billion. Consider the geography: Al-Mamlakah al-’Arabiyyah as-Su’udiyyah (Saudi Arabia’s official name) has seven neighbours – Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Yemen. Which one of these seven Muslim-majority states is Saudi Arabia’s target? Or is it Iran? Or it may be the Saudi population itself if it decides to rise against the monarchy?

    According to Politact, a think tank “premised on the synergy between politics and tact”, there has been a ‘bloody awakening’ in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. That bloody awakening – having already engulfed Bahrain, Yemen and Syria – is turning inwards and bloodier. Saudi Arabia’s absolute monarchy feels threatened – and faults Iran as the primary driver of that threat.

    It’s all about Iran versus Saudi Arabia. Iran’s defence budget at $7 billion is less than 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s $48 billion. Saudi Arabia has money, Iran doesn’t. Iran has ideology, Saudi Arabia doesn’t. Saudi Arabia is all for the status quo, Iran is revisionist. Saudi Arabia has powerful friends, Iran doesn’t. Iran has human capital, Saudi Arabia has dollars.

    All six member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the so-called ‘Islamic core’ – Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE – are dictatorial monarchies. Iran claims, validly so, that representative governments in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE will mean an end to American influence in the region.

    According to Richard Silverstein, a Seattle-based political blog writer, “we’ve nicely exploited the Iran card to our maximum advantage. I suppose it’s a form of repatriation of wealth. We send our dollars to the Saudis for oil. They send them back to us for armaments. Nasty business, but a form of recycling I suppose.”

    GCC is in league with Nato – including Turkey -and Iran has teamed up with Russia, China and Syria. Muslims are killing Muslims and America is doing what it does best – make money out of death, destruction, blood and violence.

    The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com


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