Deobandi identity of terrorists in Pakistani and international media is becoming more clear.
LUBP has a useful archive on media discourse on Deobandi terrorism: https://lubpak.net/archives/tag/media-discourse-on-deobandi-terrorism
Here are excerpts from select recent articles in February 2014:
Assumptions and presumptions, 12 February
‘Enforcement of Shariah is a simple matter.” Not at all. In a multiethnic society such as Pakistan, the foremost question is whose Shariah should be made the supreme law of the land? Which sect or sub-sect? That of Sunnis (72 percent of the population), Shias (25 percent of the population), Deobandis (40 percent of the Sunni population), or Barelvis (60 percent of the Sunni population)?
Then there are divergent interpretations of Islam: progressive and primitive, strict and liberal. Does Shariah essentially stand for stoning to death or amputation of the limbs? Is going to the shrines of sufis and saints un-Islamic and thus deserving of severe punishment? Are men who do not grow a beard or women who do not veil themselves lesser Muslims? Is co-education or even girls’ education forbidden by Islam? Is desecration of sacred places of rival creeds a religious obligation?
The Taliban, of course, would want their interpretation of Islam to be adopted. But why? Should their interpretation be adopted just because they strike widespread fear and terror and can kill soldiers and civilians with impunity?
9 Sunni Muslims were martyred and 7 others injured by Deubandi Taliban – 9th Feb
least 9 Sunni Muslims were martyred and 7 others injured when pro-Taliban Deobandi terrorists of Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat on motorbikes opened fire at a Sufi Aastana of Mehrban Jalali Shah Baba.
The attack took place in Baldia Town No. 12 area of Karachi.According to rescue sources, the injured are being shifted to Civil Hospital.An official at Civil Hospital confirmed the fatalities.Police officials said that six gunmen wearing helmets were riding on three motorcycles, when they carried out the attack.
Amir Rana, a security and political analyst from the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, discussed the role of political Islam and emerging trends. Speaking about the reality of religious discourse in Pakistan today, he highlighted the two main components of religious discourse, Islamisation and religious socialisation, emphasising how religious discourse is encroaching upon civil society.
He identified key elements that form a religiously cultivated civil society, which include political, missionary, sectarian and militant activities. He stated that political parties had adopted a religious perspective to promote their agendas and religious movements had expanded to all classes in Pakistan but developed different characteristics.
Rana concluded his presentation with the identification of emerging trends, the first of which is the increasing coherence among violent and non-violent radical groups of Deobandi sect and the emergence of a new far right. He also mentioned the increasing sense of alienation among Barelvi and Shiite sects.
Sectarian conflict — a threat to security – 10th Feb
Sectarianism has a definite connotation to religion since it is about discrimination, or hatred arising from attaching importance to perceived differences between subdivisions within a group, such as between different denominations of a religion, class, regional or factions of a movement as opposed to actions that are generally against public interest or destructive in nature. Infractions of the universal right to freedom of worship and practice of religion are systematic and rampant in Pakistan. Sectarian violence was rife in Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. Former military dictator General Ziaul Haq’s rule (1977 to 1988) sowed the seeds of sectarianism. His policies and statutes were directed at Islamising Pakistan and were devised in conformity with an orthodox adaptation of Wahabi Sunni Islam as expounded by Deobandi Darul Uloom, to the exclusion of Sunni Barelvis and Shia Muslims.
Say no to dialogue -Feb 10th
A state like Pakistan cannot negotiate with the Taliban. We are talking about the 27th largest economy in the world according to purchasing power parity. Its armed forces on active duty are the eighth largest in the world. This country has about 30 million Shias. There are close to four million Christians and four million Hindus who call themselves Pakistanis. There are also four million Ahmedis who have been forced to call themselves non-Muslims. In total, Pakistan has in excess of 43 million Pakistanis who do not subscribe to Sunni Islam. Within Sunnis, the clear majority is of Barelvis who disagree with the Deobandi school of thought to which the Taliban belong. Within the Deobandis, a significant section disagrees with Taliban ideology. All in all, a very tiny minority will accept the Taliban and their dictates. Their numbers cannot exceed more than half a million. Why then is the state so willing to bend over backwards to accommodate the Taliban?